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ABSTRACT 
Amy L. Weissman: Overcoming the identified sociopolitical barriers to a national nutrition 
response in Cambodia 
(Under the direction of Suzanne Babich) 
 
Between 2000 and 2010, Cambodia’s national stunting prevalence among children under 
5 was nearly 40%, with some provinces reaching 50%. As recently as 2014, more than one-third 
of children were stunted, giving Cambodia one of the highest proportions of chronically 
malnourished children in the East Asia and Pacific region. An important contributor to stunting 
in Cambodia are suboptimal complementary feeding practices. Stunted children suffer 
irremediable damage both physically and mentally; countries with a high prevalence also face 
severe economic consequences. Yet, stunting could be substantially reduced through existing 
nutrition interventions implemented at scale. This makes it vital to understand and address the 
intersecting sociopolitical factors hindering a national, effective response.  
This study sought to learn: 1) how favorable are current conditions in Cambodia for 
scaling-up evidence-based complementary feeding policies and programs to reduce child 
stunting? and 2) what strategies could be employed to create more favorable conditions? This 
qualitative study employed both document review and key informant interviews. Interviews with 
nutrition national working groups members, representing government, funders and civil society, 
were conducted using a question guide along with two card exercises, one to rank barriers to 
progress and another to prioritize strategies for improving complementary feeding. 
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Participants noted that Cambodia faces challenges in ensuring political commitment, 
recognizing the extent of the problem, effective policy implementation and sufficient technical 
capacity, strong coordination and communication, and sufficient information evidence and 
research. Participants reflected that successful country-level efforts will require sustained 
political commitment, sufficient financial resources, strong multisectoral, multi-stakeholder and 
multi-level governance, and technical, managerial and implementation capacity. Study results 
suggest that key actors in the country must step beyond their organizational mandates to 
collaboratively build Cambodia’s capacity to lead its own response. A plan for change is 
proposed, in order to create policy community cohesion as a mechanism for generating traction 
toward coordinated action and funding around a set of agreed priorities to address malnutrition at 
scale in Cambodia. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem Statement  
1.1.1 Introduction 
Across the globe, approximately 165 million children are chronically malnourished (3).  
This malnutrition is often expressed by stunting, which is an indicator for impaired linear 
growth.1 Stunted children suffer often irremediable damage both physically and mentally (4-10). 
In the short term, stunting is a major contributor to mortality, morbidity, and disability (3). In the 
long term, it is linked to shorter adult height, lower intellectual ability and school attainment, 
reduced income, and poorer health, including higher incidence of obesity and non-communicable 
disease (6, 11-14). Stunting also has economic consequences for affected countries as illustrated 
by Cambodia where malnutrition costs more than $400 million or 2.5% of the gross domestic 
product (GDP) annually (15).  
Stunting among young children is caused by a variety of factors across multiple socio-
ecological levels. A primary cause is that children do not receive and/or absorb the nutrition they 
require due to sub-optimal infant and young child feeding (IYCF) practices. Optimal IYCF 
includes exclusive breastfeeding for six months and sustained breastfeeding through two years 
and adequate complementary feeding, which requires a set of complex complementary feeding 
behaviors starting at six months, such as the appropriate timing of introduction, diet diversity, 
quantity and frequency of feedings, preparation methods, responsive feeding, and safe food
                                                 
1See Annex 1: Key Constructs 
2 
preparation and storage (6). The limited coverage and scale of effective health and non-health 
sector interventions also contributes to the persistence of stunting (4).  
In the past decade, there have been substantial increases in attention and funding to 
address malnutrition, including to prevent stunting. Two Lancet series (2008, 2013), a Maternal 
and Child Nutrition special series (2013), and a global report (2014) (16-18) played important 
roles in contributing to and capturing this progress. Political attention and commitment have also 
led to investment and action, as expressed by Scaling up Nutrition (SUN), Renewed Efforts 
Against Child Hunger (REACH), and 1,000 Days. SUN is an international nutrition movement 
with 55 member countries2 aimed at generating global multi-stakeholder collaboration and 
national-level nutrition investments (19, 20). A guiding principle of SUN is national leadership, 
ownership, and accountability, as well as the alignment of financial and technical resources to 
support country plans (19). REACH, representing the combined efforts of four key United 
Nations (UN) food and nutrition agencies: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World 
Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and World Food 
Program (WFP), stems from the Paris Declaration to improve aid effectiveness (21). REACH 
aims to raise awareness of nutrition problems and solutions, strengthen national nutrition 
policies, increase nutrition capacity, and increase efficiency and accountability at country level 
(22). The 1,000 Days is an advocacy campaign championing investment and partnerships for 
improving nutrition during the 1,000 days between pregnancy and when a child reaches 2 years 
old, the time when action is most critical for preventing stunting (23). 
                                                 
2The number and a list of member countries can be found on the SUN website: http://scalingupnutrition.org/about.  
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1.1.2 Stunting in Cambodia 
With a national stunting prevalence of nearly 40% (with some provinces reaching 50%) 
between 2000 and 2010, and with more than one-third of children stunted as recently as 2014, 
Cambodia has had one of the highest proportions of chronically malnourished children in the 
East Asia and Pacific region (11, 24-27).3 Despite these concerning numbers, there are positive 
trends: chronic malnutrition has declined and stunting has improved in certain age groups. For 
example, according to an examination of the annualized prevalence change between the 2000 
and 2010 Cambodian Demographic and Health Surveys (CDHS), the country’s stunting 
prevalence made steady but slow progress—a 10.3% decline (28). Greater reductions were seen 
among children older than two years (12.9% absolute change) compared to children less than 
two years (5.1% absolute change) (28).  Between 2000 and 2005, reasons for the decline 
included improved adherence to seven of the eight core WHO child feeding indicators (29).  
Noteworthy was the 5-fold increase in exclusive breastfeeding among 0-5 month olds while, by 
contrast, the prevalence of feeding diversity and provision of a minimally acceptable diet for 6-
17 month old children remained at approximately 25%. According to another study of pooled 
data from the 2000, 2005, and 2010 CDHS, progress was associated with improvements in 
household wealth, sanitation, parental education, and birth spacing (30). 
Between 2010 and 2014, Cambodia’s stunting prevalence continued to decline to 32% 
(26). Because the complete analysis of the 2014 CDHS is not yet available, the factors related to 
this decline are unclear. According to the Royal Government, it is due to the reduction of poverty 
between 2007 and 2013 (from 47.8% to 18.8%) and the increase in social protection programs, 
                                                 
3According to UNICEF’s definition, East Asia and Pacific comprises 28 countries, though UNICEF is present only 
in the following: Cambodia, China, Indonesia, DPR Korea, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pacific 
Islands, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam. 
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such as the health equity fund (HEF) (31). Although social safety net programming demonstrably 
addresses poverty and although some have conferred nutritional impacts, it is unclear which 
aspect of the intervention led to this outcome (32). Indeed, globally it is understood that poverty 
reduction is insufficient for reducing undernutrition (18, 32). There is now a growing trend to 
view this relationship in reverse—improving nutrition is an important means to reduce poverty 
(33).   
Of note, according to the 2005, 2010, and 2015 CDH studies, the greatest increases in the 
proportion of children stunted in Cambodia occurred from the ages of 6 to 23 months (Figure 1) 
(25, 27). These growth patterns reflect other countries where increases were attributed in part to 
suboptimal IYCF practices (4, 5, 
10). Until recently, Cambodia had 
made significant progress in 
improving breastfeeding practices, 
but not in complementary feeding. 
This suggests that, without 
improving complementary feeding 
practices among Cambodian 
children 6-23 months at sufficient 
scale, progress will remain stagnant.    
1.2 Background  
1.2.1 Determinants of Stunting   
The immediate, underlying and root causes of maternal and child undernutrition were 
illustrated more than 25 years ago in UNICEF’s widely-accepted framework of the determinants 
Figure 1. Rates in Child Stunting 0-59 months in 
Cambodia, 2005, 2010 and 2015 
 
Source: CDHS 2005, 2010, 2014 
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of malnutrition (34). In more recent years, this framework has been revised and adapted by 
WHO and Frongillo to focus on childhood stunting (6, 35). Demonstrated in Figure 2 below, it 
provides a helpful overview of the causes of stunting and the critical role that optimal 
breastfeeding and complementary feeding can play in alleviating the functional consequences.   
 
As shown, stunting is a consequence of a variety of biological, environmental, and socio-
economic factors operating both at distal and proximal levels (3, 36). The immediate causes are 
long-term deprivation of essential nutrition through either inadequate intake or absorption. Root 
causes are associated with contextual factors, such as food prices, poverty, access to health care, 
Figure 2. Adapted Conceptual Framework on Childhood Stunting 
 
 
Source: UNICEF, 1990 
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societal beliefs and norms regarding food choice and eating patterns, food availability, water and 
sanitation infrastructure, biological factors, and toxicology (6).   
Underlying causes of stunting are associated with household food security, and care of 
mother and child. Stunting is also affected by household environment, health, sanitation, and 
hygiene practices (37, 38). Hygiene and sanitation as a contributor to chronic malnutrition can be 
seen both through diarrheal disease and through its link to environmental enteropathy. The 
inflammatory condition of the gut has gained attention as another pathway to impaired linear 
growth and is believed to contribute to faltering by affecting nutrient absorption (39-43).  
Because IYCF is interlinked with household food security, care of mother and child, and 
the household environment and behaviors, it too is an underlying cause of chronic malnutrition 
among young children (6, 44). This makes improved complementary feeding, as an IYCF 
component, one of the “central pillars for supporting healthy growth and development” (6).  
1.2.2 Determinants of Stunting in Cambodia  
As previously presented, Cambodia has a significant childhood stunting problem, 
especially among children 6-23 months. The Conceptual Framework on Child Stunting is useful 
for understanding this high prevalence (6, 34). It outlines three vital aspects of suboptimal 
complementary feeding: poor quality and frequency of foods, inadequate practices, and food and 
water safety. WHO’s 10 guiding principles for complementary feeding of the breastfed child are 
also of value (45). 
Poor quality and frequency of foods: Sufficient diet diversity, including the intake of 
animal source foods, and feeding frequency are important components of optimal 
complementary feeding. According to a study among children 12-59 months old in Cambodia, 
consuming a diverse diet was associated with lower levels of stunting (46). This study also found 
7 
consumption of animal source foods as protective. Diet diversity in Cambodia remains a gap. In 
2010, although 70% of children were fed the minimum number of times, only 37% had been fed 
foods from the minimum number of food groups for their age (27).  In 2010, only 24% of 
children 6-23 months old met the minimum standard for all three IYCF practices—number of 
food groups consumed, number of times a child is fed, and consumption of breastmilk or a milk 
product (27). Although in 2014 this figure increased to 30%, at least 2/3 of Cambodian children 
still do not receive an adequate diet at the right frequency (26).   
Food insecurity remains a contributing factor to the lack of diet diversity in some parts of 
Cambodia (31, 47). Alternatively, while many households do have access to animal source 
foods, such as poultry or fish, consumption is limited because they are considered a source of 
income more than a food (46). This was true even in a homestead food production program that 
provided poultry products and promoted their consumption for improved nutritional outcomes 
(48). 
Inadequate Practices: WHO recommends children be exclusively breastfed until six 
months of age when complementary foods should be added (45). Complementary feeding 
requires a set of essential nutrition actions, such as the introduction of appropriate and nutrient 
dense foods at six months and not before, actively feeding the child, and feeding a diverse diet at 
sufficient frequency, as described above (49).  
In 2010, despite a relatively high prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding for children under 
six months (74%), exclusive breastfeeding was dramatically lower at 4-5 months (60%) (27). 
This was confirmed in 2014 when one in every five babies by 4-5 months was given 
complementary foods (26), suggesting that complementary foods are introduced too early.  
Further, although sugary foods are nutrient poor and may decrease a child’s appetite for more 
8 
nutritious foods, mixed feeding of sweetened condensed milk, sugary drinks, chips, and other 
snack food is common (45, 50, 51). Bottle-feeding, often with sweetened condensed milk instead 
of breastmilk or formula, is also on the rise (50). The proportion of children 6-23 months old 
being bottle-fed more than doubled from 2005 to 2010 (27).   
WHO, along with more recent research, recommends responsive feeding. This entails 
encouraging children to eat, using eye-to-eye contact and talking to the child during feeding, and 
avoiding distractions during meals to help ensure children eat appropriately and sufficiently (45, 
52, 53). Conversely, the data show that young Cambodian children are frequently left to eat on 
their own (50). 
Clean food, water, and environment: Complementary feeding also requires a set of 
essential hygiene actions, such as safely preparing and storing food, and washing hands before 
food preparation and/or feeding the child (49). A clean environment, and good hygiene and 
proper food handling are also highlighted by WHO (6, 45); yet, hygiene and sanitation are severe 
problems, with more than 70% of Cambodian households lacking improved sanitary facilities 
(30). The majority (56.7%) of the population, both urban and rural, also report open defecation 
(27). This situation likely contributes to diarrheal disease among children less than 5 years of 
age, the highest rates of which are in the 6-23 month age range (26.4% of 6-11 month olds and 
21.1% of 12-23 month olds, compared to 14.2% of children <6 months old and 13.7% of 24-35 
month olds, the next highest categories) (27).   
These findings suggest that tremendous room exists for preventing stunting among young 
children in Cambodia through improved complementary feeding (27, 29, 50). This is confirmed 
by a 2012 UNICEF assessment of the scope and scale of countries’ IYCF programming and 
implementation status. Overall, Cambodia was rated “fair,” which meant that the country had 
9 
met few of the key IYCF actions or interventions implemented (54). Cambodia also received a 
six out of ten on the specific complementary feeding component, comprising IYCF counseling of 
mothers/care-givers in relation to home preparation of complementary foods, and the provision 
of complementary feeding supplements (micronutrients and food supplements) (54).  
1.3 Evidence of Effective Complementary Feeding Approaches 
The 2008 Lancet nutrition series estimates that existing nutrition interventions 
implemented at scale in the 36 highest burden countries could reduce child stunting at 36 months 
by more than 1/3 (7). These effective interventions target children during the “window of 
opportunity”—the 1,000 days from conception to age 2 (3, 7, 12, 14, 55). Because rapid 
increases in stunting occur from 6 to 23 months, it is particularly important to identify 
approaches that target children during this portion of the 1,000 days. One approach entails 
improving complementary feeding, which requires education, strategic behavior change 
communication (SBCC), counseling, food provision in food insecure settings, and micronutrient 
supplementation strategies. Two of these complementary feeding strategies were found most 
effective: 1) education on diet diversity and consumption of animal-source foods when such 
foods are available, and 2) the provision of complementary foods along with education in food 
insecure settings (3, 55). Complementary feeding outcomes are further enhanced when these 
interventions are paired with interpersonal communication, community mobilization, mass 
media, and evidence-based policy dialogue and advocacy (56, 57).    
To improve complementary feeding (along with other aspects of IYCF), the Alive & 
Thrive4 experience suggests the importance of building on existing delivery platforms, 
                                                 
4Alive & Thrive is a Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation-funded project led by FHI 360. It improves infant and young 
child nutrition by improving IYCF practices in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Vietnam through policy dialogue, service 
delivery and behavior change, and nutrition products. 
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particularly those with significant numbers of frontline health workers and health care providers 
who have contact with caregivers of children two years and under (58). Bhutta and colleagues 
modeled community-based delivery strategies and platforms as a mechanism for reaching poor 
and marginalized populations. They found that nutrition-focused communication and outreach 
strategies could be integrated into existing services, such as community health worker programs 
for maternal and child health, which would foster the scale-up of nutrition interventions (3).  
WHO also highlights the importance of community-based nutrition interventions, but cautions 
that sufficient resources must be invested to ensure their quality and sustainability (59).   
Despite these and other examples of successful delivery of complementary feeding 
programming, few such programs have achieved scale. This is in stark contrast to other nutrition 
interventions, such as Vitamin A supplementation (7, 60). Reasons for this gap include a lack of 
understanding and/or incorrect assumptions of socio-cultural and economic barriers and 
determinants of poor feeding practices, lack of consensus on program approaches and 
documentation of program experience, lack of implementation support tools, and an absence of 
or delay in development of international consensus and guidance for complementary feeding 
(61).   
1.4 Purpose and Significance of the Research  
1.4.1 Remaining Challenge 
Applying the evidence base at scale is aligned with the Paris and Accra Declarations, 
which urge countries to draw on international best practice while ensuring country ownership 
and relevance (21). A recent review of scaling-up nutrition shows that there is an understanding 
of what must be done but not an understanding of how to scale up the right mix of interventions 
for each country context and to integrate nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive interventions 
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(62). This holds true for stunting—stunting can be reduced through known interventions 
delivered through existing delivery platforms (3, 6, 44, 55, 56, 58, 60). Much of the evidence for 
stunting, however, is drawn from efficacy trials rather than effectiveness studies conducted in 
defined geographic areas and at relatively small scale (3, 7, 59, 63). There is a vital need to 
understand and address the intersecting factors hindering an effective response at scale: how to 
generate political and resource commitment; how to create effective multisectoral, multi-
stakeholder and multilevel governance; how to overcome conflicting ideas about the best 
approaches to affect change; and how to fill gaps in evidence at sufficient scale to address the 
severity and magnitude of the problem (57, 62, 64).   
Answering these questions requires the study of strategies to improve the uptake, 
implementation, and translation of research findings into healthcare policy and practice, known 
as implementation science (65, 66). It also requires drawing on the scaling-up and agenda setting 
evidence base. Combined, these approaches help to identify which strategies are best for which 
settings, ensure their correct application, deliver at sufficient scale and coverage, and ultimately 
achieve meaningful nutritional outcomes (59, 61).   
1.4.2 Contribution of the Research 
Although evidence for effective complementary feeding interventions exist (3, 7, 55) and 
some progress has been achieved, stunting remains a significant problem in Cambodia, requiring 
urgent and effective action. To determine the actions needed for a national response, this study 
addresses two research questions: 
1) How favorable are current conditions in Cambodia for scaling-up evidence-based 
complementary feeding policies and programs to reduce child stunting? These 
conditions include political commitment, policy frameworks and their 
12 
implementation, technical capacity, financial resources and investments, multisectoral 
intervention coordination, national coordination and communication structures, and 
the evidence, information, and research available to inform and monitor the response; 
and  
2) What strategies could be employed to create more favorable conditions?   
By identifying actions needed to create more favorable conditions for scaling-up 
complementary feeding, this study contributes to the literature of how to tackle the socio-
political barriers to addressing young child stunting at a country level. It also contributes to the 
practice of “going to scale”, defined as: “the ambition or process of expanding the coverage of 
health interventions” (67). Further, the findings and recommendations from this study will be 
shared with key stakeholders—government, funders, and civil society—in Cambodia to address 
the barriers identified within this research towards addressing child stunting in-country. 
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation 
 Chapter 2 of this dissertation presents a review of two bodies of literature. The first 
examines effective agenda setting and policy making for young child undernutrition, with an 
emphasis on Southeast Asia. The second body of literature concerns scaling up. Chapters 3-5 
present the empirical research and Chapter 6 discusses the implications of this research study, 
presents a plan for change, and provides recommendations for further research.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, two bodies of literature are reviewed. The first relates to effective agenda 
setting and policy making for young child undernutrition, with an emphasis on Southeast Asia.  
Agenda setting and policy making processes are examined as part of the scale-up process—
improving recognition of the problem, generating political commitment to address it, and 
formulating responsive policies. The second body of literature concerns going to scale as it 
relates to nutrition interventions, and specifically IYCF, when available. Reviewed articles were 
identified by searching three search engines: EBSCO host: Global Health, NCBI: PubMed, and 
Google Scholar. 
2.1 Agenda setting and policy making to address young child undernutrition 
2.1.1 Global Experience 
Drawing from global and country-level experience, there is a growing body of scientific 
peer reviewed literature aimed at understanding the barriers and facilitators both of nutrition 
agenda setting, and policy formulation processes to address young child stunting at scale (8, 57, 
68-71).  This research builds on earlier work on political prioritization and agenda setting for 
health topics, such as maternal and child health (72-78). The nutrition-related literature is 
primarily found in health policy and nutrition journals, including two Lancet series in 2008 and 
2013, and special Food and Nutrition Bulletin supplements published in 2011 and 2013.   
A number of the articles identified barriers to progress, such as the invisibility of chronic 
malnutrition, which hinders recognition of the problem. These articles also highlighted
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governance and the lack of accountability, due to the absence of an obvious government body for 
nutrition leadership for a multisectoral response (79, 80). Some articles also cited the lack of 
consensus among key stakeholders as a critical barrier, largely the result of competing 
organizational mandates and interests (68, 70, 81).   
One of the earliest articles, from 2008 identified seven actions needed to overcome these 
challenges to progress: 1) develop action plans with timelines, budgets, and clear roles and 
responsibilities; 2) identify an accountable organization; 3) create policy champions; 4) build 
networks; 5) use evidence to do the right thing; 6) ensure sufficient coverage among populations 
in need; 6) use data for decision-making and for fostering a “one voice” response; and 7) create 
capacity and mechanisms to respond (8). Important lessons from another review centered on 
minimizing challenges from societal and structural conditions by formulating mechanisms for 
governance and partnership coordination to build government leadership and stakeholder 
advocacy capacity; this review also suggested the need for a government (rather than donor-
owned) plan supported by donors with buy-in from local government and civil society (71).   
Another study drawing upon experience from South Asia, South America, and Eastern 
and Southern Africa highlighted, among other key findings, the importance of: 1) vertical 
coordination within the government and the role of the sub-national level in the nutrition 
response; 2) nutrition coordination bodies that facilitate cooperation across ministries; 3) framing 
the issue as part of the broader development agenda; 4) reaching consensus on the “narrative,” 
setting clear policy goals and actions; and 5) collecting accurate data on a routine basis (82).  A 
more recent review (2013) that drew upon experience from three countries—Bangladesh, 
Uganda, and Vietnam—identified additional features such as informal and formal partnerships 
that facilitate a sense of shared responsibility, ownership, and credit among the key actors. This 
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review also suggested conducting country-based research to identify priorities, advocacy needs 
and gaps, and to inform strategies to employ, as well as continue to develop the evidence base. 
Another key finding noted the effectiveness of compelling, contextualized messages and 
strategic communication tools disseminated through multiple channels and messages and 
partnerships with media and key champions to promote the messages and generate interest. 
Sufficient resources for research and communication activities are critical to ensuring these 
strategies are effective (57).   
A 2013 review also highlighted the importance of generating, framing, and 
communicating credible evidence, strengthening horizontal coordination and accountability 
among key stakeholders, including different sectors of government, and addressing the political 
economy by building advocacy capacity, including leadership and championing skills, and 
financial resources (18). Experience from Bolivia echoes some of these findings, highlighting in 
particular the importance of strengthening the capacity of nutrition policy communities, and 
identifying well-respected, stable champions (83). Similarly, a multi-country study of influential 
stakeholders in four countries found strong leadership a critical component of success. 
Leadership is positively driven by an individual’s motivation to address the problem due to their 
personal experience, training, and nutrition technical knowledge as well as their multisectoral 
understanding and program experience (84).  
2.1.2 Southeast Asia Experience 
Articles were reviewed that described nutrition policy making processes related to young 
child stunting with complementary feeding as a component in Southeast Asian countries.  
Important policy-related lessons from Lao PDR (22), the Philippines (85), and Vietnam—first set 
(69, 70, 86) and second set (85, 86)—were identified. In Lao PDR, the REACH methodology 
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was used (22) to analyze policy assessment and change, while in the Philippines, PROFILES, a 
data-based approach to nutrition policy was applied (85). PROFILES models interventions and 
examines cost, coverage, and effectiveness. By contrast, in the first set of Vietnam articles, a 
participant-observer change agent catalyzed the policy process (69, 70, 86). The international 
expert identified key gaps, such as the lack of an organized nutrition community and the lack of 
government attention to nutrition, and spearheaded actions to address them. As described in the 
second set of Vietnam articles, a number of strategies were employed—use of strategic 
information, including inclusion and collection of IYCF indicators in the routine nutrition 
surveillance system, establishment of partnerships and harmonized technical, financial and 
human resources, a focus on the sub-national level, and engagement of the media in raising 
awareness, and mobilizing champions (87, 88). All processes in these countries led to positive 
change, with results ranging from strengthening existing frameworks/plans (the Philippines (85)) 
to creating new or strengthened plans and structures (Lao PDR and Vietnam (22, 69, 70, 86-88)).   
Although different processes were applied, common factors emerged, each seen in at 
least two of the three studies: paired facilitators, framing, and consensus building, all of which 
were also highlighted by the global literature.   
Paired Facilitators: In Lao PDR (22) and Vietnam (69, 70, 86), an external expert was 
paired with a national facilitator. This pairing was intended to build local ownership of the 
process and to ensure sustained action. The external expert was also tasked with developing the 
capacity of the local facilitator to conduct gap analyses and planning exercises, and to advocate 
for change.   
Framing: To raise stakeholders’ awareness of the importance of addressing child 
malnutrition, multiple messages framed for cultural significance were employed. In the 
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Philippines, in addition to economic arguments, “consequence models” were developed that 
appealed to Filipino culture’s ideology regarding equity, social justice, and child welfare (85). In 
Vietnam, stunting was the priority nutrition problem identified by the nutrition community. To 
garner stakeholder commitment, socio-economic and sports arguments were made. Additional 
messages, building on cultural characteristics of competition and Vietnam’s desire to be a world 
leader in development, strengthened the case (69, 70, 86). 
Consensus building: In Lao PDR (22) and in the first set of Vietnam articles (69, 70, 86), 
the paired facilitation team was responsible for building consensus for priority issues and actions 
among government, non-government, and donor stakeholders. In the Philippines, the PROFILES 
team recognized that evidence alone was insufficient and paired technical arguments with 
political ones (85). In the second Vietnam articles, evidence was created through the integration 
of IYCF indicators into the National Nutrition Surveillance Survey and proved an effective 
advocacy tool; however, both capacity building and buy-in by all stakeholders was critical for 
adoption of the IYCF indicators (87). Consensus building was achieved by conducting formative 
and opinion leader research on policy priorities and barriers and holding multiple rounds of 
discussions with government partnership and key stakeholders (88).   
2.1.3 Gaps in the Literature  
  While the literature reviewed here identifies key barriers and facilitators to delivering 
national responses to young child undernutrition and provides critical facilitators for success, 
gaps in the literature remain. The majority of evidence related to nutrition focuses on 
undernutrition, with only a few examples from the region that specifically examine policy 
making to address stunting. Examples related to complementary feeding are also limited. Indeed, 
there are no peer reviewed data and analyses that address scale-up of complementary feeding to 
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address stunting, revealing an important window of opportunity to contribute additional insight 
into the growing body of literature on undernutrition.  
2.2 Going to scale  
Successfully taking a high quality intervention to scale, as perhaps the ultimate goal of 
implementation science, is predicated in part on intervention effectiveness (demand, delivery and 
outcomes, and the adaptability of efficacious interventions to real world constraints), as well as 
political priority setting. The term “scale-up” (sometimes referred to as “going to scale” and “at 
scale”) is widely used in public health literature. But there is neither an agreed definition nor 
framework for studying scale-up in international settings (67, 89-92). Scale-up has been used to 
describe the increased coverage of tested/effective interventions to benefit more people at a 
larger or national scale (90). It has also been used to describe both the purpose (to increase 
coverage, as well as the process of expanding interventions), the inputs required (financial or 
human resources), or the actual policy or strategy for expansion (67, 91).  Attention, however, 
appears to have focused more on achieving high coverage rates than on the process of scaling-up 
(93).  Perhaps the following general definition by Mangham and colleagues is most useful, as it 
is used by a number of researchers: “the ambition or process of expanding the coverage of health 
interventions” (67).   
2.2.1 Pathways for Going to Scale  
Although there is no single agreed upon approach for expanding the coverage of health 
interventions, a number of different pathways can be employed. “Quantitative” or “horizontal 
scaling-up” refers to an expansion in size, geographic base, and/or budget (62, 64). Another 
pathway is diversification—adding new interventions to existing innovations (also called 
“functional”), and a third is policy or legal actions, which is also referred to as “vertical scale-
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up” (62, 64). A cascade or phased approach is yet another pathway, which entails tailoring to the 
local situation, and integrating into an existing delivery mechanism (3, 59, 89). Two more 
processes are: “1) organizational, which refers to improving organizational strength and capacity; 
and 2) political, which refers to political power and engagement with wider political processes” 
(62). Additional approaches are recommended to achieve scale: “task shifting within the public 
sector and increasing the capacity and service delivery of community health workers (67),” and 
using the private and NGO sectors for service delivery (56, 58, 67).   
For complementary feeding, a four-part approach for “disseminating, replicating, and 
scaling-up” improved programs is drawn from four countries’ experience: 1) engendering 
political commitment, government ownership, and partner support at all stages; 2) evidence-
based program planning by employing contextualized practices and using a theory of change; 3) 
program implementation using doable, locally-relevant, action-oriented messages and foods, 
strengthening the health system to provide sustained support to families, and building capacity of 
and utilizing actors from all sectors; and 4) program evaluation to assess and improve quality 
through processes and impact studies (60). 
Nutrition interventions have tremendous diversity in strategy/product as well as context, 
both of which can be either simple or complex (62). The appropriate scale-up strategy depends 
on the intervention characteristics—simple and applied in a specific setting, or complex and 
implemented across a system (92, 94). Interventions can also be characterized as complex, 
meaning they can be product or service intensive (67). Furthermore, they can be delivered 
through different—and sometimes multiple—channels, such as clinical, community-based 
preventive or promotional, mass media, or legislative, all of which affect the scale-up strategy 
(56, 95).   
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2.2.2 Factors for Effectiveness 
Drawing from the literature, factors of effective scale-up efforts common across case 
studies are “strong leadership, effective management, realistic financing arrangements, country 
ownership, and technical innovation” (67, 93). Further, approaches that build partnerships among 
stakeholders at various levels, from community members to policy makers, to researchers and 
technical experts, appear to have been more successful than those that do not (93). Experience 
with nutritional interventions in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Vietnam confirm these findings, 
highlighting three core strategies for scaling-up and maintaining quality: “1) using national-level 
coordinating and information exchange mechanisms to catalyze action in a harmonized way; 2) 
providing institutional support and sharing ownership with carefully selected implementing 
partners to facilitate sustainability; and 3) generating and disseminating evidence regularly 
through routine program monitoring, rigorous evaluation, documentation, and stakeholder 
forums” (56).   
Experience from a community-based nutrition program in Thailand found that a dual 
approach encompassing action at policy and community levels to be key. Facilitators of success 
also entailed capitalizing on cultural values regarding the care of children, raising community 
awareness of the problem and presenting a solution, using indicators for multisectoral efforts, 
focusing programming on targeted geographic areas, and developing human, financial, and 
management resources (96). Many of these attributes were also identified by a 2015 scale-up 
nutrition literature review, which synthesized articles about theoretical frameworks and 
programmatic experience with scale-up into nine key elements (62). As presented here, these 
elements are further summarized into seven: 1) having a clear vision/goal, with metrics, for 
large-scale impact, and framing why the issue is important and how it can be addressed; 2) 
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identifying clearly what is being scaled, the evidence of effectiveness, and the scale-up strategy, 
processes and pathway(s); 3) understanding well the socio-political environment, such as the 
degree to which there is national ownership and commitment, political support for a coordinated 
multisectoral response and supporting governance structures, and champions to catalyze and 
sustain efforts, or systematic incentives for change; 4) establishing governance mechanisms for 
creating and managing horizontal and vertical actions; 5) developing strategic and operational 
capacity to plan, implement, monitor, and evaluate the scale-up process; 6) ensuring financial 
resources are available for capacity building and going to scale; and 7) developing monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E) to support accountability and generate data for course correction and 
evidence of impact (62). 
2.3 Frameworks 
There are numerous frameworks to guide going to scale in the literature, yet an agreed 
framework is missing, which could direct efforts and lead to more effective accumulation of 
evidence across multiple settings. A frequently cited scale-up framework by Simmons and 
Shiffman links five factors: “1) the innovation; 2) the resource organization or resource team 
(those involved in the development and testing of the innovation and/or to facilitate its wider 
use); 3) the user organization (the institutions or organizations expected to widely adopt and 
implement the innovation); 4) the scaling-up strategy (the mechanism for communicating, 
transferring, or promoting the innovation); and 5) the environment (policy setting, the political 
system, bureaucratic culture, the health sector, the socioeconomic and cultural contexts and the 
influence of global trends)” (64). Hanson and colleagues’ framework aims to classify the 
constraints of scale-up using an ecological approach, organizing constraints by level— 
community and household, health service delivery, health sector policy and management, public 
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policies, and environmental and contextual characteristics (97). Gericke and colleagues 
developed a framework to facilitate the systematic analysis of intervention complexity, 
considered a key barrier to program expansion (94, 98-100). The framework identifies four 
dimensions of intervention design: the characteristics of the intervention itself, how it is 
delivered, the government’s capacity to deliver, and usage characteristics. 
Yamey’s six-level framework for guiding successful scale-up (Figure 3) draws from the 
previous three frameworks, qualitative interviews with “scale-up leaders”, and the literature on 
implementation science and political priority setting  (89, 101). A description of each level 
follows, along with additional references to overlapping and similar frameworks:  
Level I: Attributes of the Tool or Service—A simple intervention is more likely to be 
successful than a complex one (94), consequently, this framework prioritizes the assessment of 
whether the intervention is simple or complex.  Also examined is the degree to which the 
intervention is “manualized” since having technically- and scientifically-based programmatic 
policies, guidance, standard operating 
procedures, and training manuals 
facilitate scale-up (56).   
Another useful model for 
examining factors affecting an 
innovation’s successful implementation 
and scale-up is one developed by 
Durlak and colleagues (Figure 4) (102).  
Durlak’s framework is grounded in the 
implementation science literature, 
 
 
Source: Yamey, 2012 
 
Figure 3. Framework for Scaling Up 
Interventions 
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which seeks to understand, for instance, the importance of fidelity versus 
adaptability/customization when going to scale (99, 103-106). According to Durlak, 
implementation is dependent on five factors, the first is innovation characteristics—its 
compatibility, fit with norms and values, and adaptability.  
Level II: Attributes of the Implementers—In this level, Simmons and Shiffman’s 
categories of the resource organization and the user organization are combined across the macro, 
meso, and micro levels to examine whether implementers have the necessary capacity, the health 
system is sufficiently functioning, if strong leadership and governance are in place at national 
and local levels to champion the intervention, the degree to which implementers and key 
stakeholders are engaged and supportive, and the role NGOs and the private sector can play—in 
addition to the public sector—in scaling-up the intervention.   
Durlak’s second, third, and fourth factors are also relevant here: provider characteristics, 
the perceived need for the innovation, perceived benefits of the innovation, and the self-efficacy 
and skills proficiency of the implementers/service providers; community factors, the political 
context, funding availability, and the existence and enforcement of relevant policy; and the 
delivery system, the organizational factors, such as norms regarding change, the organizational 
policies and practices, such as related to decision-making and community involvement (also 
Level IV of Yamey), and staffing, such as the existence of a leader/champion. 
Level III: Choice of Scale-up Approach or Delivery Strategy—To spread innovations, 
Yamey draws from Rogers’ diffusion of innovations theory (the relative advantage, 
compatibility, simplicity, trial-ability, and the observability of the innovation and its effects) 
(107) and social networks theory (the characteristics and complexities of the social network into 
which the innovation is to be disseminated) (98, 108). Durlak’s final factor, the support system, 
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guidelines, standards of care, job aids, training and performance support needed to ensure 
implementation quality, is not one included in many other frameworks, yet as experience from 
Alive & Thrive demonstrates, it helps to ensure the effectiveness of innovations as they spread 
(56, 58, 109). 
Level IV: Attributes of the “Adopting” Community—Rather than examining the attributes 
of the user organization as per Simmons and Shiffman, Yamey focuses on the level of 
engagement, activity, and the readiness of the community members because community 
involvement in planning, implementing, and monitoring interventions facilitates scale-up (110).  
Social mobilization was recognized as essential to achieving results while scaling up IYCF in 
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Vietnam, among other settings (56, 57, 111). 
Level V: Socio-Political, Fiscal, and Cultural Context—Political will and priority setting 
as well as country ownership are critical components of scaling-up. Other factors include the 
existence and enforcement of relevant, supportive policies, sufficient financing and donor 
coordination (101). Recognizing this, building an enabling environment was highlighted in the 
2013 Lancet series as a significant component of the delivery, implementation, and scale-up of 
evidence-based nutrition interventions (18). Three key factors were identified that shape enabling 
environments—1) knowledge and evidence provides a context-specific framing of the issue; 2) 
politics and governance among a wide variety of stakeholders who have or should have a vested 
interest in nutrition; and 3) capacity and resources in nutrition and in alliance building and 
networking, communication and collaboration, and the leveraging of resources (18). 
Four domains of political agenda setting were also identified by Shiffman: 1) actor power, 
defined as the strength of the individuals and organizations concerned with the issue; 2) ideas, 
meaning the ways those involved with the issue understand and portray it, and encompass an 
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internal and an external frame; 3) political context, the environment in which actors operate; and 
4) issue characteristics, which are features of the problem, such as its severity (76).   
Level VI: Research Context—Yamey draws from Simmons and Shiffman who posit that 
“the systematic use of evidence to guide the process and incorporate new learning” is necessary 
for successful scale-up (64). This is echoed by Greenhalgh who recommends further research  on 
the process and not the package—“What features account for the success of program x in this 
context and the failure of a comparable program in a different context (98)?” Greenhalgh’s use 
of the term “context” as part of the evidence-base is broadly interpreted to encompass 
knowledge, experience, contextual understanding, goal clarity, and ability to adapt to dynamic 
contexts at all levels. This interpretation is echoed by Wheatley who, examining leadership using 
a quantum lens, recognizes that growth occurs due to the small changes taking place at all levels 
of a system (112). Meanwhile, Damschroder and Proctor argue that while it is critical to measure 
the implementation and replication process and to use data to make course correction, it is also 
critical to measure implementation outcomes (“acceptability, adoption, appropriateness, 
feasibility, fidelity, implementation cost, penetration, sustainability”) (99, 113). 
2.4 Conclusion 
The substantial body of literature on policy making processes to address undernutrition 
around the world provides an ideal start for understanding the complex elements needed for 
improving health and development outcomes. As suggested by Pelletier and colleagues, the 
nutrition community likely has the answer to create successful country-level efforts; they must 
be comprehensive and include sustained political commitment, sufficient financial resources and 
strong multisectoral, multi-stakeholder, and multi-level governance. Technical, managerial and 
implementation capacity are also critical elements for success (57). The frameworks and 
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interventions presented in this chapter help the nutrition community understand how to address 
nutrition problems at scale, but there remains a need to bolster the multisectoral nutrition 
response through further consensus, experience, and evidence for doing so (62). This is 
especially true for complementary feeding, a complex set of behaviors requiring interventions 
that employ multisectoral strategies using multiple channels. In response, this research study 
seeks to identify current conditions and strategies for improving conditions for a national scale 
complementary feeding response to young child stunting in Cambodia, where despite recent 
progress, stunting, in part due to suboptimal complementary feeding, remains a severe and 
widespread challenge. It adapts and builds upon the existing literature by exploring how to create 
and sustain change within a broader environmental context, while identifying solutions that 
recognize the complex interdependence of each level within the sociopolitical system (103).
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS 
3.1 Study Design 
This qualitative study was designed to answer two research questions: 1) How favorable 
are current conditions in Cambodia for scaling-up evidence-based complementary feeding 
policies and programs to reduce child stunting? and 2) What strategies could be employed to 
create more favorable conditions? Qualitative methods are appropriate for understanding what 
must be done to create a more favorable environment for taking complementary feeding to scale 
in the context of Cambodia (114-116). They also allow researchers to understand a problem in its 
milieu, helping ensure this study’s findings and recommendations are relevant for and feasible in 
Cambodia (116). 
This study utilized an adapted conceptual framework (Figure 3) of scaling-up domains, a 
form of the socio-ecological model (117), as presented in Chapter 2. SEMs are often employed 
in qualitative inquiries because they allow a systematic analysis of individual or group behavior. 
They also help to explain how factors within the micro, meso, and macro levels affect this 
behavior (118). Because this study aimed to determine current conditions and strategies needing 
improvement for a national scale approach to addressing child stunting through complementary 
feeding—and not to identify an evidence-based intervention to take to scale and the delivery 
channel for doing so—only select aspects of Yamey’s six level framework (those at the higher 
levels of the SEM) were examined. 
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To answer the two research questions, this study employed two methods. The first, 
document review, entailed the structured extraction of information on current conditions, 
including existing coordination mechanisms (e.g., working groups) and nutrition policies and 
strategies (114). The second method used was key informant interviews (KIIs), verbal 
interchanges with purposefully selected individuals who have specific knowledge or 
understanding of the research topic (114-116). This helped answer the research questions by 
giving key experts the opportunity to share their views and experience with the principal 
investigator (PI). During the KIIs, card ranking and sorting exercises were used to gather 
participants’ perspectives on priority barriers and strategies to improve complementary feeding 
practices. Using multiple methods in qualitative data is known as triangulation. This technique 
fosters a deeper understanding of data from different sources, facilitating an accurate 
interpretation (116).   
A set of sub-questions (Table 1), based on the conceptual framework (101), and drawing 
from tools and experience measuring readiness for scale for both nutrition and newborn health 
(119, 120), guided this research.   
Table 1. Study Sub-questions 
Topics/Questions per Sub-question 
Political commitment/Shared understanding (Levels 2 & 5) 
What is in place: 
 To what degree is there political commitment for addressing child stunting through 
complementary feeding policies and programs? (What level of understanding/recognition of 
stunting as a problem exists? To what degree is there agreement on the issue definition, 
causes, and solutions for child stunting? What local framing/public portrayal of the issue 
can make stunting resonate with decision makers/donors? What are potential policy 
windows?) 
 To what extent do the stakeholders have a common understanding/view of these factors? 
Improvements needed: 
 How could greater political commitment be generated? 
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Topics/Questions per Sub-question 
Policy frameworks and systems (Levels 1, 3 & 5) 
What is in place: 
 What policy documents (including strategies, plans, SOPs, pre-service/in-service training 
curricula for providers, delivery protocols) exist to promote, protect and support 
complementary feeding to address child stunting?  
Improvements needed: 
 What more is needed?  How could gaps be filled? 
Policy Implementation (Level 5) 
What is in place: 
 To what degree are complementary feeding policy frameworks (as identified in section 2) 
being implemented? 
 Are sufficient funds available?  
 What are the barriers to implementation? 
 What are the barriers to sufficient budget allocation? 
Improvements needed: 
 How can these barriers be overcome? 
Coordination and Communication (Levels 1 & 2) 
What is in place: 
 What coordination and communication mechanisms are in place (donor, technical, 
implementer, multisectoral) and how well are they functioning? (What is the strength of 
individuals and organizations concerned with the issue (guiding/leading institutions)? What 
are current alliances? What are ways to strengthen/build alliances to raise national attention 
to this issue and is further collaboration needed, among whom? Who are current leaders and 
champions and how can they be tapped/created?) 
 Which key stakeholders are not engaged? 
Improvements needed: 
 How could these mechanisms be improved?  How can those missing from the dialogue be 
engaged? 
Information, Evidence, Research (Level 6) 
What is in place: 
 To what extent is evidence on factors affecting complementary feeding in Cambodia 
available?  
 What kind of data on stunting and complementary feeding programs have been incorporated 
into data systems? 
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Topics/Questions per Sub-question 
 To what extent are data elements actually being collected? How is available data being used 
for program management and decision making? 
 What are the barriers for greater collection and use of such data? 
Improvements needed: 
 How can barriers be overcome? What evidence is regularly gathered and how is it 
conveyed?  How could information be made available to those who need it?  What 
additional evidence is needed? What gaps in knowledge/what research is needed to more 
effectively address child stunting in the Cambodian context? 
 
3.2 Study Population and Sampling 
This study was conducted in Cambodia, where the Khmer are the majority culture among 
multiple ethnic groups and the dominant actors in public and political spheres. Because of this, 
references to Cambodian culture and society are primarily to that of the Khmer. 
Study participants were national and international stakeholders purposefully sampled to 
ensure they were best able to answer the research questions. Participants were drawn from two 
national working groups responsible for nutrition: the Nutrition Working Group (NWG) and the 
Technical Working Group for Social Protection and Food Security and Nutrition (31) (31). The 
NWG is housed within the National Nutrition Program (121) of the National Maternal and Child 
Health Centre (NMCHC) in the Ministry of Health (MoH). It is a government-led group. The 
TWG-SP&FSN is chaired by the Council for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD), a 
government coordinating body, and co-facilitated by the WFP and FAO. Members of these 
groups are those who currently make or contribute to the development of nutrition-related policy 
documents, both government and non-government actors, and/or fund or implement nutrition 
programming and/or conduct nutrition research in Cambodia. Participants were divided into one 
of three categories: government, funder, or civil society.   
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3.2.1 Inclusion criteria 
Upon receipt of government permission, the PI requested an interview with 
representatives of all member organizations of these groups meeting the following criteria: 
NWG: Participants had to have attended more than three meetings from 2013-2014 (with 
one having to be in 2014) or at least two of the three meetings for which there were meeting 
minutes in 2014. To develop the list of organizations to sample, the PI reviewed all available 
meeting minutes from 2013 and 2014, and compared it to two membership lists produced by the 
National Nutrition Program (121), one from July 2014 and one from December 2014. Individuals 
who represented participating organizations in the meetings were named in the meeting minutes, 
so invitations were sent to them. 
TWG-SP&FSN: To develop the list of organizations to sample, the PI reviewed the 
official Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) declaration of the TWG dated January 2014 that 
lists members, reviewed the membership email list received from the WFP (one of two official 
TWG co-facilitators), and reviewed the February 5, 2015 meeting participation list. 
Organizations had to be listed on at least two of these documents to be included. If no individual 
representing the organization was named on these lists, the PI sought advice from CARD, the 
RGC Chair of the TWG, WFP, a co-facilitator, as well as from two active members—UNICEF 
and World Vision—to identify the individuals from eligible organizations to invite for an 
interview. Members working only on social protection, and not also nutrition, were considered 
ineligible.  
3.2.2 Recruitment 
To invite NWG participants, the PI made an announcement during the December 5, 2014 
NWG meeting and then contacted each eligible member by email. The email described the 
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purpose of the study and attached the informed consent form and the National Ethics Committee 
for Health Research (NEC) approval letter. To invite TWG-SP&FSN participants, the PI sent an 
email explaining the purpose of the study, noting that the PI had received the recipient’s contact 
details from WFP as co-facilitator of the group. The PI also included the informed consent form 
and the NEC approval letter. All email sent requested participants to propose an interview date.  
If no response to this initial email was received, additional requests were made by email and/or 
text message and/or telephone. For both groups, a participant was considered “declined” if there 
was no response after three contacts or if they responded and declined to participate.   
3.3 Data Collection Procedures 
3.3.1 Document Review 
Documents dated between 2000 and March 2015 were gathered by conducting internet-
based literature searches using EBSCO host: Global Health, NCBI: PubMed, Google Scholar and 
Google, reviewing government and organizational websites, and by request to government, 
funders, and national and international organizations via phone, email, or in person, sometimes 
during interviews. Documents were also gathered from email distribution lists, and when 
participating in meetings or events. The document inclusion dates were aligned with the first 
DHS conducted in Cambodia (2000) and the final interview conducted by the PI. 
3.3.2 Key Informant Interviews 
Between December 2014 and March 2015, the PI conducted the interviews with 
participants. Interviews were conducted in a private space, and lasted between 30 minutes and 2 
hours. All but one interview was conducted in English. For the interview conducted in Khmer, 
the PI brought an interpreter. The PI obtained written consent from the study participants at the 
time of the interview (Annex 2). With participant permission granted, all interviews but one were 
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audio recorded. For the one, based on the participant’s request, the PI took notes. An interview 
guide specifically developed for this study was used (Annex 3). This guide covered the study 
framework domains: political commitment/shared understanding; policy frameworks and 
systems; policy implementation; coordination and communication; and information, evidence, 
and research (note: all informants were asked the same questions). 
During the interviews, two card exercises were conducted with participants. The first was 
a ranking exercise. Potential barriers, drawn from the study framework and the literature, were 
each listed on a card (Annex 3). Participants were asked to place the cards in order from most to 
least significant barrier.   
The second, a card sorting exercise, was used to assess the degree to which participants 
concurred on the components of a priority package of services for implementation at scale in-
country. Participants were given 12 cards, with 1 approach per card, and asked to sort the cards 
into 3 piles—must do, maybe do, not do (Annex 3). Approaches selected for inclusion in this 
exercise aimed to represent each of the levels of the SEM (individual, household, community, 
society, national/policy) and were drawn from the literature and Cambodian policies and 
strategies (31, 45, 55).   
3.4 Data Management 
As collected, documents were stored on the PI’s computer. They were sorted into folders 
by type of document: policy/strategy, progress report, and other. These were then uploaded into 
NVivo for analysis. Following each interview, the digital recordings were labeled with a de-
identifying short code for participant category, working group membership, and date of 
interview. All were logged. The PI then transcribed the digital recordings following the 
interviews. For the interview that was not recorded, the PI expanded upon the interview notes 
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when typing them. For the card exercises, following the interviews, the PI recorded the 
sequences and the piles in a computer file created for this purpose. The cards were collected in 
order during the interview to facilitate accurate documentation, but notes were also taken during 
the interviews and cross-checked. 
3.5 Data Analysis 
Subsequent to transcribing and conducting an initial read of the interview transcripts, the 
PI coded and analyzed all narrative data using NVivo. As recommended by Saldaña, multiple 
coding cycles were used (coding and re-coding) (122). At each cycle, different strategies were 
employed. The first cycle used structural coding, with a priori analysis categories based on the 
study framework. This strategy was supplemented in the first and second cycles with sub-coding, 
breaking codes into further sub-units. Attribute coding was also used to identify the demographic 
characteristics of the study participants: government, funder or civil society, and magnitude 
coding was used to determine the intensity and/or frequency of data points. Codes were revised 
and refined during the analysis process and emergent codes were added as they were created, and 
transcripts re-coded. All codes were maintained in a code book. 
To manage the relatively large data set, which included data related to both research 
questions and two card exercises, the PI partitioned the data, using codes to make boundaries.  
The PI created and analyzed a data set for each card exercise and employed counts and matrices 
to determine the ranking and sorting results. For the narrative data, throughout the coding and 
analysis process, the PI drafted memos to document, sort and organize emerging themes. The PI 
ran queries using NVivo tools, including word frequencies, examining counts but also cluster 
analyses to determine patterns and explanatory ideas. Matrices, such as co-occurrence matrices, 
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were also utilized to compare themes with one another as well as to help analyze them by 
participant attributes.  
Code frequencies and counts were used to determine the number of unique participants 
who mentioned it, and comparisons were made by participant group. These frequencies helped to 
determine salience, which was considered “present” if the majority of participants discussed it or 
“absent” if not. Code frequencies also helped the PI determine if further sub-coding was needed 
to better describe the data and/or if a code rarely occurred and needed refining or deletion. Each 
domain was also examined for its degree of favorability—favorable, neutral, or unfavorable.  
The domains were examined by all participants combined and by participant group. A condition 
was rated unfavorable when the majority of participants in a category considered it a problem, 
and favorable when the majority of the participants viewed it in a positive light. A condition was 
rated neutral when there was a relatively even mix of positive, negative, and neutral comments.   
Card sorting results were analyzed by all participants and by participant group. For the 
first card ranking exercise, the card sequence was analyzed to determine the top three perceived 
barriers to progress for each participant and these rankings were then aggregated to determine the 
top priorities across all groups.  Participants’ explanations as to why they placed each card in its 
sequence were also analyzed to discern the full meaning of each barrier. For the pile sorting card 
exercise, services had to be selected by at least half of the participants of any group to be 
reported. Those most frequently selected services were identified for each participant group, and 
then tallied to create the summary list for all.  
3.6 Ethical Approval 
 The study protocol was reviewed and approved the Cambodian NEC at the National 
Institute of Public Health (NIPH), Cambodia on November 17, 2014. NEC is registered with the 
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U.S. Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP) and has a federal-wide assurance. 
Following a review by the institutional review board (IRB) of the University of North Carolina, 
the study received a research exemption on December 9, 2014.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS: QUESTION 1 CURRENT CONDITIONS  
4.1 Study Participants   
There were a total of 40 participants in the 35 interviews conducted for this study. In five 
of the interviews, two members of the organization participated in response to the organization’s 
request. Because these participants reached consensus on their responses, the two individuals 
were collectively counted as one. As such, participation is counted as 35. These 35 interviews 
comprised 23 individuals from the NWG and 19 from the TWG-SP&FSN. Seven participants 
were members of both groups and their interviews counted in both the NWG and the TWG. Of 
the 35 interviews conducted, 10 were representatives of the RGC, 10 were funders, and 15 were 
civil society actors (Table 2).  
The majority of organizations eligible and invited for an interview participated (30 of 40 
or 75%). In terms of individuals, for the NWG, 3 of 26 invited were not interviewed, all from 
civil society. Although all accepted the invitation, a time was never agreed upon, despite 
multiple contacts by the PI. No additional participants were recruited because saturation had 
been achieved (2). Further, the distribution of study participants from the NWG (14 civil society, 
6 funders, and 3 RGC) reflected the composition of the group (Table 2).  
For the TWG-SP&FSN, 6 of the 25 individuals who were invited either declined or did 
not respond to the invitation. Reasons given for declining the interview included that the 
participant’s organization was not an active member of the group and/or that the scope of work 
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or the mandate of the organization was not relevant to the study. Of those who declined or did 
not respond to the invitation, one was from civil society, and five were from government.     
Table 2. Sampling Frame by Working Group 
Participant 
categories 
Working Group 
Total 
interviews 
per category 
NWG TWG-SP&FSN 
Invited Interviewed Invited Interviewed 
RGC  3 3 13 8  10 
Funders 6 6 7 7 10 
Civil Society 17 14 5 4 15 
Totals 26 23 25 19  35* 
*Because 7 participants were members of both groups, their interviews were counted 
in both the NWG and the TWG.  
 
4.2 Summary of Key Findings  
Overall, participants’ perceptions of Cambodia’s current situation―its willingness, 
readiness, and ability to address young child chronic malnutrition at scale―were unfavorable.  
This was true for all the study framework domains except policy frameworks, which participants 
viewed in a positive light. All the rest—political commitment, recognition of the problem, policy 
implementation (intervention coordination, technical capacity to address the problem, and 
funding), coordination and communication, and information evidence and research—were 
perceived to be barriers to progress. 
During the card exercise, overall funding was identified as the greatest constraint. When 
examined by type of participant, government named funding as the most significant barrier, 
funders selected political commitment, and civil society ranked two issues equally: national 
coordination and intervention coordination (Table 3).   
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Table 3. Card ranking barriers to progress overall and by organization type 
Rank 
Organization Type 
All RGC Funder Civil Society 
#1 Funding Funding Political 
Commitment 
National 
coordination; 
Intervention 
Coordination 
#2 Political 
commitment 
 
Intervention 
coordination 
Technical capacity 
#3 Intervention 
coordination 
Political 
commitment 
Funding 
 
Political 
commitment; 
Funding  
 
The second top-ranked barrier mentioned by all participants was political commitment, 
although some government officials perceived political commitment to be in place.   
Detailed results for each of these domains are presented in this chapter. 
4.3 Political commitment, Recognition of the Problem, and Shared Understanding 
4.3.1 Political Commitment 
Political commitment is defined as sustained expressions of concern about the issue by 
national political leaders (76) combined with “political and policy processes that build and 
sustain momentum for the effective implementation of actions that reduce undernutrition” (18).   
Although the majority of participants viewed political commitment as a gap, this perspective 
varied by participant type. Civil society considered political commitment as needing attention, 
and funders, based on an analysis of the narrative data, were neutral, despite having ranked it as 
the top barrier during the card exercise. Most government participants considered political 
commitment in place, though these officials were not from the health community. 
Between 2000 and 2015, momentum around young child malnutrition grew in Cambodia 
(Table 4). This was demonstrated by a number of key events, such as the 2012 National Nutrition 
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Seminar presided by the Prime Minister. In his opening speech, the Prime Minister stated that 
childhood malnutrition is a problem in Cambodia and identified CARD as a coordinating body.  
Mounting political will was also demonstrated when Cambodia's joined the Scaling up Nutrition 
(SUN) movement in 2014, the establishment in 2014 of a National Nutrition Day to be held 
annually on November 6th, and a national nutrition conference held in March 2015. This 
conference, as expressed by one participant, intended to build political will among key decision 
makers:    
The conference is focused on stunting, and aims to get them [government 
representatives] together to talk about the issues, and then put them in the 
hot seat and ask them what they're going to do about that. 
 –Funder 
Growing political commitment was also demonstrated by the variety of policy 
frameworks promulgated. According to one official, the government’s commitment to nutrition 
can be seen through sectoral and multisectoral policies, as well as those for the entire country, 
such as the Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency Phase III, 
2013-2018. Also highlighted are the National Strategic Development Plan 2014-2018, the 
National Strategy for Food Security and Nutrition, 2014-2018, and the Fast Track Road Map for 
Improving Nutrition, 2014-2020. 
Table 4. Timeline of IYCF-related Events and Documents, 2000 to March 2015 
Year Event/Document 
2015 • National Nutrition Conference & Declaration, 2015 
2014 
• National Nutrition Day established • Prime Minister Directive No. 1317, Sor Chor 
Nor5 • Sub-decree 133 and Joint Prakas 061 oversight board established6 • Cambodia 
joined the SUN movement • Journal article: Economic consequences of malnutrition • 
                                                 
5Directive on the eight-recommendations (related to food security and nutrition) of Samdech Akka Moha Sena Padei 
Techo Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia during the Dissemination Workshop on National 
Strategy for Food Security and Nutrition 2014-2018. 
 
6Sub-decree 133 regulates the advertising and marketing of IYCF products in accord with the International Code of 
Marketing on Breast-milk substitutes and Prakas 061 is the implementation guidance for sub-decree 133. 
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Year Event/Document 
National Strategic Development Plan 2014-2018 • Fast Track Road Map for Improving 
Nutrition, 2014-2020 • National Strategy for Food Security and Nutrition, 2014-2018 • 
Food Security, Nutrition and Social Protection TWG formed 
2013 
• The Economic Consequences of Malnutrition in Cambodia: A Damage Assessment 
Report • Masters of Science in Nutrition Degree program established • Community-
based nutrition costing study 
2012 
• 4th National Seminar on Food Security and Nutrition: Improving Child and Maternal 
Nutrition in Cambodia and Prime Minister Hun Sen’s opening speech 
2011  
2010  
2009  
2008 
• National Nutrition Strategy, 2008-2015 • National Policy on IYCF (update) • 
Nutrition Working Group (established after merging Micronutrient and IYCF groups) • 
Guidelines for use of IFAs among pregnant and lactating women and WRAs • National 
Framework for Food Security and Nutrition 
2007 
• Inter-ministerial Joint Prakas 061 on the implementation of Sub-decree 133 • Pilot 
study on micronutrient powders 
2006 • Child Survival Strategy 
2005 
• Sub-decree 133 on the marketing of products for IYCF • National IYCF 
communication strategy 
2004 
• Food Security and Nutrition Technical Working Group established • Baby-friendly 
Community Initiative launched 
2003 
•  Cambodia adopts country specific Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) • 
National Food Security Forum established 
2002 • Baby-friendly Hospital Initiative launched • National IYCF Policy 
2001 
• World Breastfeeding Week celebration • National IYCF TWG established • 
Guidelines on prohibiting marketing of IYCF products • Pilot Vitamin A 
supplementation distribution strategy 
2000 • National Micronutrient survey • National Vitamin A program assessment 
 
Three themes emerged among participants, primarily civil society and funders, who 
considered political commitment weak: 1) lack of ownership, 2) relative importance of nutrition, 
and 3) recognition of the issue. This latter point, its own domain, is presented in a separate sub-
section.   
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1) Lack of ownership: Participants described a lack of political commitment as those in 
high-level positions did not consider themselves responsible or accountable for moving the 
agenda.   
In 2012 they had the big meeting with Hun Sen [the Prime Minister] and 
he brought together CARD and MoH to try and demonstrate political 
commitment to this issue.  ...But I don't think there's been any follow 
through and I think when the commitment was made, there wasn’t 
anything clearly articulated that said: ‘This is exactly what we're 
committed to doing and why.’  
—Civil Society 
A government official expressed dismay that the government’s words are empty, having 
no action or budget behind them: 
The government is always saying nutrition is very important.  So if it's 
very important what do they do to address this issue? [The Prime 
Minister] should not only talk nicely, but translate the work into practice. 
—RGC 
For both civil society and funders, the absence of commitment was seen in the 
government’s lack of ownership of the agenda. A few civil society participants expressed 
frustration that this lack of commitment was also seen in the government’s lack of ownership of 
the work itself:  
The government says: ‘This is your work.’  So they leave us to do and we 
work alone. And when our project ends? There is no more. But we still try 
to work with them. When we go to the field or conduct follow-up 
supervision, we always go with the government, but we give the per diem 
and transportation, otherwise they would not go.   
—Civil Society 
Without funders and civil society, the agenda does not progress because, as one funder 
explained, “Every time we let it go, it doesn't happen.” 
Nutrition requires a multisectoral response, but the sector was also perceived to be 
“fragmented” with no one government body recognized as responsible. Different ministries are 
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in charge of different aspects of nutrition, such as the Ministry of Planning (MoP) for food 
fortification and the Ministry of Mines, Industry, Minerals and Energy (MIME) for food-related 
laws.     
Who is in charge of nutrition in Cambodia?  About 5, 6 or 7 ministries, 
depending on what you're talking about.  If you're talking about the 
quality of food, it's the MIME.  If fortified foods, it's the Ministry of 
Planning.  If sprinkles, then it falls on the MoH.  Everyone has a piece and 
there's hardly any coordination between them. 
—Civil Society 
2) Relative importance of nutrition: The government’s lack of commitment was 
expressed as the limited power and budget given to the NNP or to the MoH more broadly.  This 
was considered true particularly when compared to other health sector programs, such as the 
National Center for HIV/AIDS and Dermatology (NCHADS), or when compared to the urgent 
need to address child stunting.   
I don't see strong support for NNP even though the problem is quite 
significant. [There is a lack of support from] the national level. There is a 
limited amount of funding for the NNP, or within the MoH. The question 
is: ‘Where would the country put nutrition in the hierarchy of needs?’ 
—Civil Society 
4.3.2 Recognition of the Issue 
Overall, participants agreed that there is insufficient recognition of stunting both as a 
problem and as one that requires action. This is truer of government from all sectors and funders 
than of civil society. In particular, participants saw policy makers’ and the general public’s levels 
of understanding of young child chronic malnutrition needing improvement. This section 
presents the findings related to: 1) awareness and recognition, 2) shared understanding of the 
causes of stunting, and 3) shared understanding of complementary feeding. 
1) Awareness and recognition: All participants’ were aware of the country’s stunting 
prevalence. The majority also believed that stunting is recognized as a problem, but not by all 
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who should recognize it. As one funder explained, individuals who are not nutritionists or do not 
have a medical background may not understand stunting because a stunted child often looks 
healthy. Another participant put it this way: 
I hear a lot about it being a priority, but the actual complexity is still [a 
problem]. There is some work we need to do in terms of explaining 
stunting to WASH [water, sanitation, and hygiene], to the different sectors 
because even when I worked with the WASH sector, they didn’t have the 
same understanding of malnutrition that the nutrition community does.  
—Civil Society 
Many participants raised concerns that there is insufficient recognition that nutrition 
requires connections across sectors and a multisectoral response. This means individuals tend to 
see only their area of focus and thus miss the connections required to address the problem: 
For agriculture, they don't think: ‘In this season if the villager grows this 
they can earn a lot and it's also good for their health.’ And rural 
development, they only think about infrastructure, like building 
roads. They don't think: ‘Oh, if the road is better, there's more access to 
the health center, and it makes the health better.’   
—Civil Society 
Some participants also mentioned that the public does not recognize stunting as a 
problem. Rather, they believe Cambodians as a people are simply short.   
The problem is that they don't even see that there is a malnutrition 
problem. That's the problem with stunted children, especially if the whole 
country is stunted. Your neighbor’s children look the same. They don't 
even look thin necessarily; they look like normal children. They're just 
small. Everybody is the same size. Acute malnutrition is a different thing. 
That's a bit easier to see. Infections, being sick, being weak is 
understood. But the understanding that almost half the children are 
malnourished is not there.   
—Funder 
One participant shared her experience of returning to her own country for a visit to 
explain how easy it is to lose sight of the problem: 
When I've been here awhile, I go back home and see my friends' children.  
When they tell me their children’s age, I think: ‘Wow, so big!’ And then 
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you realize how easily it happens. If you've never been anywhere, you 
don't think it's any different, you think it's normal.   
—Civil Society 
For a number of participants, the lack of recognition is why there is limited political 
commitment to address the problem. This means that some programs, such as sanitation, have 
been underfunded and services available only when NGOs provide them. For other participants, 
although they expressed pleasure that there has been greater recognition, they emphasized that 
this has come without the required investment to address it.   
I think that they're finally realizing. Now especially there is huge 
momentum around nutrition in the government, which is really great.  But 
they still haven't put money behind it. This is something the donor 
community is really pushing to show that they are committed. 
—Funder 
2) Shared understanding of the causes of stunting: All participants cited a multitude of 
reasons why chronic malnutrition among young children in Cambodia has been so high for so 
long. Primary reasons given were a lack of knowledge and poor feeding practices. 
Young kids, especially kids under two, are fed really badly. The 
introduction of complementary foods is pretty good, but the quality of the 
diets—the kinds of foods and minimum dietary diversity, and the minimum 
number of times kids are fed are all very bad in Cambodia. And they 
haven’t improved over time, so that’s why it’s a chronic condition.  
There’s also a big emphasis on young children being able to take care of 
themselves, so the idea of responsive and active feeding isn’t taught to 
people or what’s expected. It’s almost the opposite. It’s almost a good 
thing if your child eats by himself. That means it’s a good child, a smart 
child.  
—Civil Society 
Traditional feeding practices were also considered sub-optimal. According to one 
government official, the public does not recognize current practices as a problem because they 
are passed from one generation to the next:  
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When I learn something from my grandmother or grandfather, I continue 
like this. I don’t recognize. 
—RGC 
Traditional food norms was another factor. Rice is a staple in Cambodia, and many 
people think rice is sufficient. There is also a belief children cannot eat certain foods. According 
to one government official, this includes fish, a major source of animal protein in Cambodia, for 
fear of the child's choking on the bones. 
The next most common reason cited for Cambodia’s high stunting prevalence was poor 
sanitation and hygiene, even though, according to one participant, debate remains about this 
issue:  
Sanitation is a part of it, but there’s a lot of debate about that here. Some 
people think hygiene and sanitation is really important and diarrheal 
disease is really important, while other people poo poo that and say that’s 
only in South Asia. But I think it’s because hygiene conditions are bad—
hand hygiene, home hygiene, food hygiene, and there’s open defecation. 
—Civil Society 
A few participants also mentioned that although Cambodia has achieved food security on 
a national level, pockets of insecurity remain. Meanwhile, others highlighted that poverty is not 
driving malnutrition since malnutrition exists in all socio-economic strata. Another factor a few 
participants cited is that caregivers have competing priorities, such as the need to earn an 
income, and that they have insufficient familial support to feed children adequately. 
3) Shared understanding of complementary feeding: Many participants reported that 
among the public health community, complementary feeding is understood and that there is 
consensus that it is a priority issue to be addressed. This was said to be demonstrated by the 
production of the Communication for Behavioral Impact (COMBI) strategy. By contrast, a few 
participants were less sure that the link between complementary feeding and stunting is clear. 
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I think there is consensus that complementary feeding is a problem, 
whether or not there is recognition that improving complementary feeding 
can reduce stunting, I'm not sure.   
—Civil Society 
Similarly a few participants, particularly civil society and funders, mentioned that 
complementary feeding is understood in general, but the breadth of the definition or its 
concomitant response is not well understood by either health or non-health actors.  
Complementary feeding, and nutrition more broadly, were seen as the purview of health alone: 
It's just at NNP [National Nutrition Program]. But clearly we know from the 
research and evidence that the key issues for malnutrition in Cambodia are 
not about the areas that are under the responsibilities of MoH. It isn’t about 
vaccinations; it isn’t about [antenatal care/postnatal care], though that still 
needs work. But water and sanitation, and food security and dietary 
diversification, which aren't MoH responsibilities, were key contributors.  
—Civil Society 
A number of participants from the health community also mentioned that there is limited 
understanding of complementary feeding as complementary. Children 6-24 months of age are 
fed without consideration that the food is a complement to breastfeeding or breastmilk 
substitutes. This lack of understanding was said to be true not only among health care providers 
and the general public, but also among policy makers, particularly those from non-health sectors.   
The word in Khmer means to start eating food, so complementary food is 
any food the child has. It's not seen like this [points to the UN definition of 
complementary feeding provided to participants].  But the understanding 
depends who you're talking to. I would like to say NNP, MoH sees it as a 
part of it. But the rest? Not necessarily.   
—Civil Society 
For a few participants, this understanding gap meant that needed discussions are not 
taking place and that the focus of the country’s nutrition efforts are missing the mark.   
I think the conversation is around developing supplements, developing 
appropriate complementary foods that can be marketed. It’s not about that 
larger scope of complementary feeding. ...There's this idea that it has to be 
purée, or special foods because the baby can't eat what the family is 
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eating. I don't think if we're really looking at impacting that definition. I 
don't think that's the dialogue. 
—Civil Society 
One participant expressed particular frustration with the nutrition community’s emphasis 
on the production of complementary foods, rather than on socio-cultural shifts to make long-
lasting behavior change. 
And that's the thing that bothers me a lot with the complementary 
conversation. I think in a way we are looking for that quick win that can 
be mass produced so we can say:‘Ta da!’   
—Civil Society 
4.3.3 Priorities for action 
Although agreement among key decision makers, funders, and civil society on what must 
be done to address young child stunting at scale is critical to an effective response, according to a 
few participants, no priorities related to complementary feeding have been defined. In addition, 
although the most recent Food Security and Nutrition Strategy (2014-2018) outlines actions 
needed by multiple sectors, it is believed to be a “kitchen sink” approach, containing everything, 
with nothing identified as most important. One participant expressed dismay about this situation:  
Even in the Nutrition Fast Track it was incredibly difficult, and in the end 
there wasn’t particular prioritization. It’s better than it had been; there are 
some things they want to see happen. But for some reason, even more in 
nutrition than other things in Cambodia where prioritization is really difficult, 
it’s really difficult here.  
–Civil Society 
According to this same participant, what is missing is not only the ability to prioritize, but 
also the criteria upon which to make decisions and then to apply them. During a TWG meeting, 
this participant recalled a fairly high level government official taking offense to the idea that the 
government would develop a 1,000 days strategy focused on pregnant women and children under 
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two years of age. This official highlighted that there are other malnourished people in Cambodia 
who also need services. The person leading the meeting acquiesced: 
The person who was running the meeting, who knows better, his response was 
not to say: ‘We have to prioritize ones where there's the most problem and 
where we can see impact and that will affect everybody else.’ He didn’t 
explain why that focus is important. Instead, he said: ‘Oh you're right, we 
have to worry about 13 year old boys as well…’    
–Civil Society  
In the card-sorting exercise, four services were selected by all participant groups as being 
needed at scale to improve complementary feeding: 1) water and sanitation; 2) breastfeeding 
maintenance; 3) SBCC/mass media; and 4) counseling/support for essential nutrition, hygiene, 
and sanitation actions. The water and sanitation strategy was most frequently selected by all 
participants and by each participant group, with near unanimity among funders and civil society. 
Breastfeeding maintenance was second overall and among all participant groups except funders, 
with near unanimity among civil society (Figure 4).   
The number of services prioritized by at least half of each participant group varied, with 
government including the most; eight services were considered essential. Civil society was next 
with six, and then funders with five. Food preparation demonstrations and home gardening were 
not considered a priority by the majority of participants, although both are in the government’s 
priority pile and home gardens is on civil society’s priority list. Participants also raised concerns 
about cash transfers, supplementary foods/feeding programs, micronutrient supplementation 
(MNS), fortified food, and food safety. The government prioritized MNS and food safety, the 
only group to do so. Meanwhile, fortified food was on the priority list of funders and civil 
society.   
Participants explained their reasoning for selecting and rejecting priorities, clustered as 
three criteria: 1) evidence, 2) existing platform, and 3) not relevant to all. The importance of 
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these criteria varied to some degree by participant type, with evidence being of greatest 
importance to civil society and then to funders. 
Figure 4. Ranked priority actions to be implemented at scale by participant group 
All RGC Funders Civil Society 
1. Water and 
sanitation 
2. Breastfeeding 
maintenance 
3. SBCC/mass media 
4. Counseling/ 
support for 
essential nutrition, 
hygiene and 
sanitation actions 
 
1. Water and 
sanitation 
2. Breastfeeding 
maintenance 
3. SBCC/mass media 
4. Home 
gardens/household 
support for 
diversified food 
production 
5. Micronutrient 
supplementation 
6. Counseling/ 
support for 
essential nutrition, 
hygiene and 
sanitation actions 
7. Food safety 
8. Food preparation 
demonstrations 
1. Water and 
sanitation 
2. SBCC/mass media 
3. Counseling/ 
support for 
essential nutrition, 
hygiene and 
sanitation actions 
4. Breastfeeding 
maintenance 
5. Fortified food 
1. Water and 
sanitation 
2. Breastfeeding 
maintenance 
3. SBCC/mass media 
4. Counseling/ 
support for 
essential nutrition, 
hygiene and 
sanitation actions 
5. Home 
gardens/household 
support for 
diversified food 
production 
6. Fortified food 
 
1) Evidence: Evidence of effectiveness or ineffectiveness was a reason to prioritize or not 
to prioritize a strategy, despite there being insufficient evidence in Cambodia as described in 
section 4.7 Information, Evidence and Research. This criteria was discussed primarily by civil 
society participants, and then by funders; however, it was not highlighted by government. 
Evidence includes country-specific evidence, such as SBCC/mass media, which is cited as 
effective for improving exclusive breastfeeding or, water and sanitation, which is said to have 
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reduced stunting in Cambodia. An action was also considered effective if it was linked to 
stunting prevention more generally, or if it had global evidence or is believed to have worked in 
Cambodia. (It was noteworthy that participants did not mention any link between an action and 
its effect on complementary feeding.) This latter consideration was, at times, related to the 
quality of its implementation.   
Everyone wants sprinkles [micro-nutrient powders] or something, but it’s the 
good old fashioned breastfeeding maintenance and counseling support [that is 
needed]. Here in Cambodia, the statistics show that exclusive breastfeeding 
rates have made a lot of progress. So it's continuing breastfeeding as 
complementary foods are introduced that is important.   
–Civil Society 
According to both civil society and funders, a lack of evidence was expressed as a 
negative experience with an intervention. This was portrayed as food demonstrations “not 
working,” meaning that these do not result in behavior change, or when a strategy does not 
impact stunting, such as micronutrient supplementation. The way an action is implemented was 
also a reason for not prioritizing it. An example related to food preparation demonstrations was 
given:  
I don't think we need food preparation demonstrations. Maybe we do, but 
they need to be revised. If I was a mother in the community I would be so 
happy. I would take my child whenever an NGO does it. I would take my 
child on that day and sit down and listen and have a gossip with other 
mothers and my baby would get food. And then I wouldn't need to feed my 
child anything else that day. And they don't cook together. It's the VHSG 
[village health support group] who cook. And if the mother can't come, the 
VHSG delivers the food in a bag on a moto so the child gets it.   
–Civil Society 
Another participant highlighted a problem with home gardening programs, stating that all 
too frequently households do not receive counseling about how best to use the food grown.  
Another participant raised similar concerns about supplementary foods: 
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You give them a package of something, powder, and they're supposed to put it 
in the porridge at home and feed it to their moderately malnourished 
children. If the children get this, they gain weight, but it ends there. What 
happens next? This mother only knows that she gave this porridge and the kid 
is now better. She doesn't have it anymore, so she goes back to where she was 
with the child losing weight.   
–Civil Society 
2) Existing platform: The second theme that emerged as a criteria was if there is an 
existing delivery platform that could easily be built upon. Fortified foods being produced by 
local companies was offered as an example. Another example from within the health sector was 
identified by another participant: 
One of the better options for getting messages across for people to really 
understand and engage is one-on-one. At the health center, they could do it 
any time a child came in; just five minutes of key messages. Even the VHSGs. 
It's a huge resource to have two VHSGs in each community, but unless an 
NGO is working in that community, they're not doing anything because they're 
not getting paid. But I think counseling and education programs could be 
nationwide.  
–Civil Society 
A few participants also considered if there is a readiness to apply an approach, despite its 
being important. Other than by the government, food safety was not selected. The lack of 
readiness to address food safety was because of Cambodia’s reliance on food from Thailand and 
Vietnam, and the inability to control or restrict importations.  
3) Not relevant for all: According to a number of participants, certain approaches were 
important, but not relevant to all and thus not a priority for implementation at scale. These 
approaches were classified as being needed only for sub-populations, in certain areas of the 
country or, in certain situations, such as food distribution in emergencies.   
Cash transfers only for a while.  This should only target the poor [until] the 
poverty is reduced.  
–RGC 
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4.3.4 Summary 
Political commitment was said to be lacking in Cambodia, except by government 
officials. This gap was because the government has not backed up its expressions of commitment 
with budget or action, and because nutrition has not received the attention given to other issues, 
such as HIV/AIDS. Recognition of the problem of young child stunting was also lacking among 
policy makers and the general public. Participants agreed that sub-optimal feeding practices were 
the primary cause of chronic malnutrition among young children, but that complementary 
feeding was not well understood by all needing to understand it, and that there is limited 
prioritization of actions to address it. When given actions to prioritize, participants agreed on 
four: water and sanitation, breastfeeding maintenance, SBCC/mass media, and 
counseling/support for essential nutrition, hygiene, and sanitation actions. However, funders 
and/or civil society disagreed with a number of government priorities. Two of these priorities 
(food preparation demonstrations and home gardening) were rejected by the majority of 
participants even though one of them, home gardens, was also prioritized by civil society.  
Concerns were also raised about three others approaches on the government’s priority list—
micronutrient supplementation, food safety, and food fortification (fortified food was also on the 
priority list of funders and civil society). From the analysis of participants’ explanations of how 
they selected priorities, three criteria were used: evidence of effectiveness, an existing platform 
on which to build, and relevant only for select populations. 
4.4 Policy Frameworks and Systems 
4.4.1 Policies Overview 
From 2000 to 2015 (Table 5), Cambodia promulgated at least 28 policy frameworks (e.g., 
policies, sub-decrees, guidelines, standard operating procedures) related to the 1,000 days (123-
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125). In general, participants perceived a plethora of policies. For a few of the government 
participants, Cambodia has the policies it needs, which reflects the government’s commitment to 
addressing nutrition. One official commented that Cambodia has been capable in this area: “We 
are making policy. We have all the policies.”   
According to some participants from civil society and funders, there are too many 
policies, and policy making has been too much the focus of efforts over the past 5-10 years.  
Despite there being many policies, participants did not consider all valuable. Rather, primarily 
from the perspective of civil society and funders, some policies were 1) good, while some were 
2) inadequate. 
4.4.2 Good Policies  
The majority of participants considered policy frameworks “good” if they demonstrated 
the government’s commitment to addressing nutrition or are related to young child stunting, such 
as the IYCF policy. Good policies were also based on evidence or if they were up to a global 
standard, even if not implemented/enforced. Sub-decree 133 was cited as an example. One civil 
society participant highlighted the National Strategy for Food Security and Nutrition, 2014-2018 
for being the first policy document to have officially made the links across the sectors needed to 
be engaged in the nutrition response. 
4.4.3 Inadequate policies 
Participants, primarily civil society and funders, gave four reasons for considering a 
policy inadequate: 1) exclusive development process, 2) does not address on-the-ground needs, 
3) lacks implementation guidance, and 4) not feasible.   
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Table 5. Health-related 1,000 days-related policy frameworks (2000-2015)  
(123-125) 
 
1) Exclusive development process: A policy development process that is exclusive and 
does not engage all relevant stakeholders does not generate the nutrition community’s ownership 
 Nutrition Fast Track Road Map for Improving Nutrition, 2014-2020  
 National Interim Guidelines for the Management of Acute Malnutrition, 2011 
 National Policy and Guidelines for Micronutrient Supplementation to Prevent and 
Control Deficiencies in Cambodia, 2011 
 National Policy on the Control of Acute Respiratory Infection and Diarrheal Disease 
among Children under the Age of Five, 2011 
 Communication for Behavioral Impact Campaign to Promote Complementary Feeding in 
Cambodia 2011-2013 
 National Communication Strategy to Promote the Use of Iron/Folic Acid 
Supplementation for Pregnant and Post-partum Women July 2010 – December 2013, 
2010 
 Implementation Guidelines for Baby-Friendly Community Initiative (BFCI), 2009 
 Protocol Teaching Caretakers about Home Feeding through Food Demonstration, 2009 
 National Nutrition Strategy, 2008 -2015 
 Health Strategic Plan II, 2008-2015 
 National Policy on Infant and Young Child Feeding, 2008 
 Community Participation Policy for Health, 2008 
 National Communication Strategy for the promotion of Vitamin A in Cambodia, 2008 
 Guidelines for use of IFAs among Pregnant and Lactating Women and WRAs, 2008 
 National Interim Guideline for the Management of Acute Malnutrition 2007 
 Inter-ministerial Joint Prakas 061 on Marketing of Products for IYCF, 2007 
 Anemia guideline, 2007 
 National Vitamin A Policy Guideline, 2007 
 Cambodia Child Survival Strategy, 2006-2015 
 Sub-Decree on Marketing of Products for Infant and Young Child Feeding, 2005 
 National Communication Strategy for the Promotion of IYCF in Cambodia, 2005-2007 
 Ministry of Health Guidelines on the Implementation and Enforcement of the Sub-decree 
on Marketing of products for IYCF and the Joint Prakas 
 Joint-Prakas on the Management and Procedures of All Kind of Iodized Salt Exploitation, 
2004 
 Sub-decree on the Management of Iodized Salt Exploitation, 2003 
 National Policy and Guideline for Micronutrient Supplementation to prevent and control 
Deficiencies in Cambodia 
 Law on Management of Quality and Safety of Products and Service, 2000 
 
Sources: Mengkhean, K. 2013; Global database on the Implementation of Nutrition Action (1), 
WHO; http://camnut.weebly.com/policy--guidelines.html. 
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or commitment. One civil society actor expressed frustration with the development of the 
Nutrition Fast Track, citing another, better policy development experience. 
It could be very useful if it hadn't just been developed by a few people. I don't 
know what it means; what kind of follow-up there's supposed to be; who's in 
charge; what kind of monitoring there is; who's being brought together; who's 
being held accountable for it happening? When the Fast Track for Maternal 
and Newborn Mortality was developed, there was a working group; there 
were events once a year; people needed to get together; it was clear who was 
responsible for each piece. The Nutrition Fast track was more getting a 
document than coordinating action and rallying people together.   
– Civil Society 
2) Does not address on-the-ground needs: A policy was also considered inadequate when 
it lacked flexibility in implementation. The IYCF guideline for making enriched bobor, a 
porridge promoted for feeding children from six months, was cited by many civil society 
actors—as well as by some government officials—to be difficult for mothers to follow. It was 
perceived as too restrictive about which foods can be used, including foods not available in all 
parts of Cambodia. According to one participant, not having the right ingredients frustrates 
mothers and leads them to abandon the effort altogether.   
3) Lacks implementation guidance: A few participants mentioned that although the IYCF 
guidelines dictated that people need to know about certain topics and be counseled, they were 
missing the “who, when, and where” of providing counseling. Furthermore, according to a civil 
society actor, the guidelines focus was on Vitamin A and albendazole distribution without a 
comprehensive focus on nutrition and, in particular, without sufficient guidance on supporting 
child growth. 
4) Not feasible: A policy was also inadequate when it does not prioritize action or is not 
implementable. 
If you think through what would be needed, it's all there. The problem with [the 
Food Security and Nutrition Strategy] is that everything is there, there's no 
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prioritization.  ...You would need to do an exercise where you prioritize and 
you do a costing exercise to bring it down to something implementable. That's 
the step that is missing…  
– Funder 
4.4.4 Summary 
The majority of participants reported that an abundance of policy frameworks exist in 
Cambodia and highlighted that this has been a major focus of efforts. A few participants had 
favorable views of the relevance and utility of some frameworks. Others were considered 
inadequate, either because they have not been developed by the nutrition community as a whole, 
have not enforced, do not address real needs, or are not feasible.    
4.5 Policy Implementation 
This section presents participants’ perceptions of the degree to which policies have been 
implemented or enforced in Cambodia, and three implementation barriers: 1) technical capacity 
to address the problem, 2) intervention coordination, and 3) funding.   
The issue with lack of policies comes down to lack of 
implementation. Policies and strategies are out there, but there's no 
funding to do it, people aren't coordinating to do it, there's not the 
technical expertise to lead on it. So they just sit there, not utilized.   
– Civil Society 
4.5.1 Policy Implementation 
The majority of participants reported that many policy frameworks in Cambodia have 
been infrequently enforced. As one civil society actor noted: “There is a policy for everything, 
but there is no implementation of it.”  Participants named three factors: 1) insufficient 
commitment and funding, 2) lack of relevance to local context, and 3) lack of awareness to 
explain why policies in Cambodia are not implemented or enforced. 
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1) Insufficient commitment and funding: As noted, political commitment for addressing 
young child chronic malnutrition was believed to be on the rise, yet still an issue requiring 
greater attention. According to civil society and funders, although many policies exist, some of 
which are considered good, they are thought irrelevant without commitment to implement or 
enforce them. 
Funding, either from the government or non-government sources, was another barrier to 
policy implementation. (The issue of funding for nutrition is discussed in greater detail in section 
4.5.4.) According to one civil society actor, guidelines are not implemented due to the absence of 
budget for community-based delivery of nutrition services: 
The big thing in this country for any implementation is that the VHSGs 
[village health support groups] do not get any remuneration for their 
work. Yet, they are the key people in a community, and we ask them to do 
everything. These are women who can't necessarily read, they don't have an 
education yet we tell them do the most important work, that one-to-one 
transaction.   
– Civil Society 
2) Lack of relevance to local context: Related to why a policy is perceived inadequate, 
policies are not implemented because they were seen as unresponsive to the realities on the 
ground. According to health-sector government officials and civil society, families have been 
unable to apply the current complementary feeding guidelines.   
Sometimes when we develop a recommendation, it’s okay. But later on, when 
we see the real practice and do an assessment, we found that mothers do not 
strictly follow our guideline or our policy. They say they don't have time to 
prepare a special porridge or something for children. 
– RGC 
Further, policies have been developed based on global evidence, without taking into 
account what would be feasible by both implementers and beneficiaries, or in terms of available 
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budget. This reflects the government’s lack of ownership of the nutrition agenda, as identified 
previously. 
We have the Rolls Royce of guidelines. Those SAM and MAM guidelines could 
be used in Cambodia, in Laos, in Vietnam; in any country. It's not Cambodia 
specific. And if you look at the supplementation, they're talking about weekly 
iron folate for women of reproductive age. This is a perfect example of 
someone writing a guideline without even thinking if the government can 
implement it. It’s impossible for the government. It costs too much.  
– Funder 
3) Lack of awareness and follow-up: The most common reason was that those who need 
to know about the policies are unaware, making it impossible to follow the policy frameworks.  
The MPA [Minimum Package of Activities] guidelines are a very thorough 
document, but it’s not implemented to the detail as what's in the policy.  And 
the problem is that people in the health centers don't know.  The chiefs don't 
know the policy document. They've never read it. They don't have it on their 
shelf.  So sometimes they don't even know what the standards are that they 
should be adhering to.   
– Civil Society 
This lack of awareness was due to the lack of dissemination and supervision provided by 
higher level government officials. Another factor was that guidelines are routinely modified, 
making it difficult for those trying to implement them to keep up with the changes. Others also 
reflected that policies are not implemented because there are few staff to implement them. The 
low pay provided to health care workers was another barrier.   
Policies are there, but not implemented. Because funding, but also lack of 
health staff. There are no health staff. For example, health centers should 
have 8 to 13 staff, but look at all the health centers. Do they have? Even if 
they have, not all the staff are working. They keep their name there, but they 
work somewhere else because of low pay.  
– RGC 
4.5.2 Technical capacity to address the problem 
According to the majority of participants, there is insufficient technical capacity within 
both the health and non-health sector. This view was held by all participant groups, but was 
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considered particularly unfavorable by government both from the health and non-health sectors, 
then civil society, and then funders. A few participants believed that capacity exists; however, 
for the majority who perceived a capacity gap, their reasons entailed: 1) the lack of qualified 
people, 2) complexity of a multi-sectoral response, and 3) complexity of implementing 
comprehensive programming. 
Among the few participants who perceived there to be available and/or improved 
capacity in Cambodia, their reasons are twofold. First, Cambodia’s nutrition community, broadly 
speaking, is full of technical experts but this expertise has not been accessed or used effectively. 
We’ve had a huge body of knowledge sitting in the nutrition TWG for 
years, whether that has been given space to impact or not is probably 
another question. There is enough technical know-how around that we 
could backstop or build capacity quite quickly. 
—Civil Society 
The second reason, as noted by a government official, related to the establishment in 
2013 of Cambodia’s Master’s in Nutrition degree program. This participant expressed 
hopefulness that once current students finish the course they will become nutritionists and that 
each generation will be better able to respond. 
1) Lack of qualified people: Among participants who believed there is insufficient 
capacity, the most frequently cited reason was the lack of qualified nutritionists in-country. This 
means that the people who should know—those in positions of influence regarding nutrition—do 
not have a deep enough understanding. Although participants acknowledged the new nutrition 
master’s degree program, most still considered the knowledge base “young.” One government 
official states: “It’s still new to us.  We are still in the learning stage.” This means Cambodians 
are not yet ready to tackle the issue themselves and remain dependent on external expertise. 
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There are very few Cambodian people who are specialists or skilled in 
nutrition. Even myself, I work on nutrition, but I don't have any 
background on nutrition. I have background on rural development and 
public management. But I work on nutrition issues. ...We very much 
depend on the external experts from our DPs [Development Partners], like 
WHO, UNICEF, and WFP. 
—RGC 
2) Complexity of a multi-sectoral response: A few participants mentioned that this lack of 
capacity has limited the response. Rather than tackling the complexities of nutrition, one civil 
society actor stated that the focus has been too narrow. 
Sometimes I think the higher-level does not have a good understanding of 
what nutrition actually is. [They think] nutrition is only the distribution of 
sprinkles and, if we do that, we don't have a problem with nutrition. 
—Civil Society 
The complexity of nutrition was also cited as a barrier because no one person can be an 
expert in all aspects of the sector.   
That's the whole thing about stunting prevention. You really have to work 
with different sectors and different levels of expertise. It's a different set of 
skills to train in complementary feeding and nutrition, than building 
latrines and water filters. And then if you do livelihood activities, you have 
to know what immunizations are required for cows or sheep, and what 
kind of seeds grow best. Trying to bring together all these different experts 
to focus on improving nutrition and improve stunting is challenging and 
why we haven't made progress in many countries. 
—Civil Society 
3) Complexity of implementing comprehensive programming: According to participants, 
primarily government, of particular concern was that the solution for young child stunting is not 
yet well understood.   
People know that nutrition is a big issue. They know, but they don't know 
how to put together an effort to respond to it. 
—RGC 
It is this lack of what one government official refers to as “specialized” capacity that was 
believed to be a barrier to progress.  Without it, according to a civil society actor, those working 
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in nutrition are unable to translate policies into programs.  
4.5.3 Intervention Coordination 
National coordination structures (see 4.6), such as the SP&FSN TWG, exist.  Despite 
this, according to many participants, sub-national intervention coordination is both needed and 
missing.  This was of particular concern to civil society actors. The reasons given for the lack of 
intervention coordination were two-fold: 1) many players and 2) sub-national coordination 
mechanisms. 
1) Many players: Coordinating on the ground is difficult because of the numerous actors 
implementing nutrition. 
Pretty much anybody who wants to work in Cambodia gets to work in 
Cambodia and nutrition has all kinds of small and large NGOs and 
private actors. They are all doing their own thing, not necessarily 
following policies or guidelines or national or international standards. 
—Civil Society 
The lack of government oversight and control means there is no standard way of 
operating, including standard payments for volunteers. This has led to competition among 
implementers and volunteers deciding for themselves the implementation priorities. 
When you go to the province, the government, UN, and NGOs do different 
activities.  Even though they probably have the same purpose, somehow, 
there is no coordinated effort.  For example, you are working in one 
community, you are working with the same VHV [village health volunteer], 
but you pay $5 a day and the other pays $2.  
—Civil Society 
A number of participants expressed frustration that organizations operating in the same 
geographic area and doing the same thing often fail to talk with one another to reduce duplication 
and the wasting of resources. An instance of this occurred despite one participant’s best efforts:  
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I always want to try to coordinate, but there are NGOs who say: ‘These 
are the activities we are doing, this is our coverage area, and you work 
around us.’ I find that a pity. I ask them: ‘Do you think having two of the 
same activities in the same community benefits the community?’ But they 
say: ‘It doesn't matter. You do your activities and I do mine.’   
—Civil Society 
Government participants in particular believed that coordination is hampered by 
Cambodia’s many donors having different priorities and not harmonizing among themselves.  
One government official stated: “All development partners, bi-lateral funders, and NGOs have to 
complement each other to avoid limited target coverage.” Another stated:  
We have many programs and projects supported by our development 
partners or bi-laterals, but they work separately; they have their own 
perspective, even in UN. 
—RGC 
Another barrier was donor-required targeting, and/or timeframes which make it difficult 
for organizations to coordinate or to stay up-to-date on who is doing what, where. 
The coordination is taking several months of our time. I'm sure it will be 
worth it, but some organizations only have a year of funding and they 
wouldn't have the time. [Mapping] is a full time job as new NGOs come in 
and others phase out. 
—Civil Society 
In addition to being donor driven, smaller NGOs were said to not see the forest for the 
trees. A few of the participants felt that these smaller groups do not always recognize their 
efforts as contributing to the bigger picture and so do not invest time in coordinating with others.   
2) Sub-national coordination mechanisms: A number of participants stated that sub-
national coordination is critical for a comprehensive and effective nutrition response, yet 
recognized many services are not delivered jointly. 
Some WASH projects they do in one village and community-based 
nutrition in another village, but they should come together to ensure all 
points have been responded to. 
—Civil Society 
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A government actor expressed a similar frustration: 
So far we work line by line ministry, but nutrition is a cross-cutting issue.  
So health focus on health, like counseling on the nutrition diet, or 
supplementation, but others, they work for agriculture or rural 
development.  They do not link the message together.  
—RGC 
This lack of coordination, primarily highlighted by civil society and government, is 
because a sub-national mechanism is missing.  One government official cited CARD and the 
national SP&FSN TWG, but also said: “at the sub-national level we don't have.”  
Alternatively, according to a few participants, although mechanisms do exist, they were 
not perceived to function effectively. Routine meetings tend to be used to share progress updates 
rather than to focus on reducing duplication or ensuring coverage of nutrition services. In 
addition, since attendance is not required, even if the right conversations happen, not all needed 
actors are present. 
There’s a monthly meeting on health [provincial level]. It's not really 
focused only on nutrition. It's NGOs, government working in the health 
sector meeting every month. It is not to coordinate. It's just telling: ‘This is 
what we did last month.’ I've tried to invite all the nutrition groups, but 
only one or two come. They say: ‘It's not required, so why would I go?’   
—Civil Society 
4.5.4 Funding 
As demonstrated by the card ranking exercise, the majority of participants considered the 
lack of funding to be a major barrier in addressing young child chronic malnutrition at scale. 
Three primary explanations for this lack of funding were given: 1) insufficient funds, 2) agenda 
setting, and 3) unwise use.  
1) Insufficient funds: For a few participants, primarily health and non-health sector 
government officials, there was a true lack of funding being allocated to nutrition. This lack of 
funding was largely from government sources. According to the conceptual budget for the Fast 
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Track Road Map for Improving Nutrition 2014-2020, donors must contribute 23% of the $40.7 
million needed between 2015 and 2020 to implement the health sector nutrition response at 
scale. For Component 5: Supporting Exclusive Breastfeeding and Complementary Feeding, 
which accounts for 12% of the total budget, this proportion is even greater. Of the $4.85 million 
estimated to be required, the proposed donor share is $2.7 million compared to $2.1 million for 
the government (126).  
This continued reliance on donor and civil society support was recognized by many 
participants across all organization types. Donors and civil society were said to implement 
nutrition policies and, without these actors, Cambodia’s nutrition program could not be 
sustained.  
The government committed to develop the national strategy for five years, 
but until now we do not see how much budget they contribute. For most of 
the activity, the government relies on the donor. When the financial 
support finishes, everything related to the implementation of the activity 
will also stop working.  
—Funder 
Another consideration was that although there had been donor support, it was generally 
insufficient for reaching scale:  
The government spends very little to intervene on the nutrition issue, except 
in some cases they support the MoH. Like the vitamin or other supplements 
or medicines that are provided to children and pregnant women. We very 
much depend on the external support. And the external support doesn't 
cover all. Say, for example, WFP covers some area they select for the pilot, 
and UNICEF selects some areas. They do not cover the country; not 
nationwide. 
—RGC 
According to a participant from a different part of the government, there have not been 
enough funds to implement at scale: “We can make our plan, but the budget does not fit with 
what we want, and that's why our plan to extend is slow.” In addition to there being insufficient 
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government funds, one government official raised concerns that donor investment was 
inadequate or on the decline. 
We don't have enough funds to deal with the nutrition gap from national 
sources or overseas funding agencies. So, I think this is one of the key 
factors that limits the interventions for the nutrition improvement. 
—RGC 
2) Agenda setting: The most common explanation for a lack of funding was agenda 
setting. Many participants mentioned that donors have invested in their own agendas, rather than 
aligning with government priorities, policies, and strategies. Frustration, as expressed by one 
government official, was acutely felt by many in the government: [Some DPs] have their own 
agenda. They can support this activity, but not that activity, even though that activity is 
important for us.” Representing another part of the government: 
I want all our partners to implement or support something we think is a 
gap, or to follow the policy or strategy. But another thing that is not so 
important because it's going very well already, they support. They do not 
listen. They do what they want or what their proposal says even though it 
does not fit with what we want.   
—RGC 
Being donor driven also meant that despite progress in an area, when a donor shifts its 
direction, everyone follows suit, sometimes moving away from a former priority.    
Most donors come with their global or regional strategies and their 
funding follows these and not the government strategy. It would be great if 
resources went toward the things that are already in the strategy, that are 
already building momentum, that are already making progress. They had 
funded a mass of activities in [fortified food], but then [they redirected 
their funding]....They're a major donor who is saying this isn't important 
anymore. 
—Civil Society 
Alternatively, when a donor recognizes a new area, progress will accelerate. One 
government official explained that if a donor has money to support nutrition programming, 
nutrition programming will be funded. Yet, if a donor expresses interest in emerging diseases, 
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then “everyone goes to emerging diseases.” Further, by funding the bulk of the work, a donor 
can define what it means to respond to nutrition in Cambodia, such as by providing food.   
A couple of the donors who like to give food and who like to pass food 
around also push this [feeding programs and food]. And this is also just 
money, money, money. It doesn't have anything to do with nutrition. And 
there was money for those programs and those are expensive 
programs. So, money is there. 
—Civil Society 
According to a few of the participants, agenda setting was also seen by the government’s 
budgetary decision makers’ lack of prioritization, recognition, and commitment to address the 
issue.   
I think it is difficult to convince the policy makers and the MoEF [Ministry 
of Economy and Finance] to support or fund the investment in nutrition 
because as the policy maker, they may think broadly about the whole 
forest rather than the tree. In the country there are many issues they want 
to solve, not just nutrition. But due to the limited funds, they can support a 
limited amount for nutrition.   
—RGC 
Similarly, even though ministries, such as MoH, have recognized the importance of 
addressing young child stunting, they do not hold the purse strings. As one funder explained, 
“the highest budget decisions are made at MoEF and they aren’t convinced.” 
3) Unwise use: According to a number of participants, there would be sufficient funds in 
Cambodia to address stunting if funds were spent on the right things in the right places.  
Whether the funding is utilized the right way, used most effectively... If we 
had clear coordination, clear identification of the problem and all that 
stuff, then the funding should fit. If we said this is the biggest problem in 
nutrition, we could put funding there. It's not that there's a lack of 
funding. More funding would be good, but it's not critical.   
—Civil Society 
A few participants expressed exasperation with the lack of strategic targeting and 
coverage of services. Reportedly multiple organizations have been working in the same 
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geographic areas, yet not covering provinces where malnutrition rates are highest. Funders too 
recognized that support has not always been utilized most effectively: 
I think as a community we have enough funds, we just don't always do the 
right things with it. I don't think there is a lack of funding necessarily in 
the whole development community. I think there is a lack of funding just 
when you think about stunting prevention. I think the money is going to 
other interventions.   
—Funder 
Highlighting again the lack of donor coordination, a government official stated: “I think 
there needs to be better coordination among donors because now the budget is here and there.” 
“Unwise use” was also expressed as implementing an approach without evidence. A 
funder stated that because of the lack of M&E, informed decisions about what should be done 
where have not been easy to make. 
It's hard to really decide what is essential and also what has worked in the 
past.  There were two things we said ‘no’ to because we have experience 
using those and knowing they're not effective.  But do we have concrete 
data on that?  No, we don't.  So maybe another organization says: ‘This is 
what we do and we think it's effective.’ So I think it's really hard, again, 
because there isn't great M&E to say ‘no this is working, this isn't 
working.’ 
—Funder 
Similarly, a civil society actor expressed disappointment that new programming for 
Cambodia has prioritized activities that do not yet have evidence behind them: 
I just heard the new GIZ [Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit, a German development company] program will include 
food demonstrations and gardens.  I just heard about that yesterday.  I 
thought: ‘Really, why?’  It's not proven to be effective. 
—Civil Society 
4.5.5 Summary 
Despite the existence of many policy frameworks in Cambodia, participants concurred 
that implementation and enforcement was a major gap.  This was said to be due to a lack of 
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political commitment or funding, a lack of awareness, or a lack of follow-up.  Technical 
capacity, implementation coordination, and funding are all needed to implement policy 
frameworks, yet these also were considered insufficient in Cambodia.  Technical capacity was 
viewed as lacking particularly by government officials, and many participants agreed that 
Cambodia does not yet have a cadre of nutritionists.  Civil society in particular raised concerns 
about the lack of on-the-ground coordination.  The numerous organizations working in the 
nutrition sector were seen as tripping over one another while leaving parts of the country 
untouched.  Although funding was considered a barrier to progress, this was not only a true lack 
of dollars, but also a misalignment between donor and government priorities, and funds being 
spent on non-priorities or on efforts unknown to be effective.  Also of concern was the lack of 
sustainability of nutrition programming in Cambodia without ongoing donor investment. 
4.6 Coordination and Communication 
This section presents participants’ perceptions of the degree to which coordination and 
communication mechanisms are in place in-country, particularly at the national level, the type of 
alliances that exist in the nutrition community, the organizations with significant influence and 
why, and the degree of dissonance among these actors.  
4.6.1 National coordination 
Cambodia has 18 officially recognized coordination bodies known as Technical Working 
Groups (TWGs).  They are led by the government and include funders and NGO participants.  
Three of these TWGs include nutrition: 1) TWG-SP&FSN, chaired by CARD, 2) Health, chaired 
by the MoH, and 3) Agriculture and Water (TWG-AW), co-chaired by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) and the Ministry of Water Resources and 
Meteorology (MWRM). The TWG for Food Security and Nutrition was initially established in 
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2004 but, in 2014, it was merged with the Social Protection TWG to form the TWG-SP&FSN 
(Table 6) (127).   
There is also the Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee (IMTC), housed within the 
National Council for Nutrition (NCN) in the MoP. The IMTC is chaired by the MoP. Within the 
IMTC, there are sub-national Committees on iron deficiency disorders (IDD) and iodine 
deficiency disorders (IDA) (128).    
“Unofficial” nutrition coordination mechanisms also exist.  The NWG was established in 
2008 by merging and renaming the Micronutrient TWG and the IYCF TWG. The NWG is 
chaired by the Director of the NNP of the National Maternal and Child Health Centre of the 
MoH. The National Food Security Forum (NFSF) is a sub-group of the TWG-SP&FSN (Table 
6).  
Table 6. Nutrition-related working groups 
Name Mandate Lead 
Technical Working Groups 
TWG-
SP&FSN 
Improve food security and nutrition in Cambodia through 
coordination; sharing information across ministries, donors, 
and other organizations; monitoring and providing feedback 
on progress towards national strategies and policies; policy 
formulation and prioritization (129). 
CARD 
TWG-Health Ensure effective coordination in the health sector, and 
contribute to the achievement of Cambodia’s development 
goals through implementation of National Strategic 
Development Plan and Health Strategic Plan (130) 
MoH 
TWG-AW Ensure coordination among agriculture and water sectors, 
develop policy frameworks, mobilize resources related to 
improved agricultural production and diversification, and 
water resource development and management (131, 132) 
MAFF and 
MWRM 
IMTC Facilitate stakeholders related to nutrition technical matters, 
particularly related to IDD and IDA (128). 
NCN 
“Unofficial” mechanisms  
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Name Mandate Lead 
NWG Support nutrition policy development and planning, 
implementation, M&E of nutrition interviews; increase 
advocacy and initiate relevant nutrition research and 
interventions; and establish and strengthen linkages, 
collaboration, and communication with other sectors working 
in nutrition and food security (133).   
NNP 
NSFS Improve information sharing experiences and lessons learned 
from on-going programs and innovative approaches among 
ministries, development partners, and civil society 
organizations (134). 
CARD 
 
Despite the government’s efforts to put in place these coordination mechanisms, the 
majority of participants from all organization types—with unanimity among government—
identified national coordination as a major barrier to addressing stunting in Cambodia. Reasons 
given included the following: 1) nutrition is a disjointed sector, 2) deterrents/disincentives to 
collaboration, 3) hierarchical barriers, 4) CARD lacks needed support, and 5) coordination 
mechanisms (NWG, TWG-SP&FSN, and FSN Forum) need improvement. 
1) Disjointed sector: Given the multisectoral nature of nutrition, participants considered it 
imperative to have multiple government bodies engaged. Doing so was perceived to be difficult, 
however, because of the structure of the government itself.    
…the responsibilities are so cut up that I don’t blame them for not being 
coordinated, for not being able to effectively address one issue. It is a 
much divided government structure. If you talk to people individually at 
the government, there is a commitment to addressing malnutrition or 
stunting. But how you actually build consensus, draw on that commitment 
to work together, pool the poorly funded ministries or departments that 
have other objectives, how you get that coordination among all the players 
that are required to fully address this issue. The structure, the system as it 
stands, is insufficient. 
—Funder 
Notwithstanding the existence of TWGs, coordination was said to be weak because there 
were too many groups. According to a government official, each line ministry has its own TWG 
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and members were more likely to join their own sectoral TWG rather than the TWG-SP&FSN.  
Alternatively, because the same people participated in all the groups, discussions tended to be 
among only this segment of the community, and did not include all who needed to be engaged. 
The NWG and the TWG or even the forum are not well connected. You see 
the same people everywhere. The problem is the disconnection, the lack of 
cross-sharing. What is discussed is discussed among themselves.   
—Funder 
Another difficulty identified was the lack of a precedent for how to work with multiple 
government bodies. One funder explained that it needed to work with five ministries to 
implement an activity. When this funder asked the government how to do so, the response was: 
"We don't know because we never work that way or we've never done that."   
Collaboration within ministries, because nutrition is often stretched across multiple 
departments, was also identified as a challenge. This was because each department sought to 
maintain its domain.   
At the MoP there are two separate bodies. One is the sub-committee for the 
salt iodization and the other is the sub-committee for the micronutrient 
fortification. They want to combine that, but they learned the [difficult] 
experience of food security and now they try to keep them separate. 
—Funder 
According to one government official, this was also because no one is pushing 
departments within ministries to work together and, as such, they do not do so. 
So many vertical programs. They work very independently and no one 
controls it. This is the big issue of coordination. …Now there are too many 
ministers. Minister of Nutrition, Minister of HIV/AIDS, Minister of TB, 
Minister of Malaria, Minister of Dengue.   
—RGC 
2) Deterrents/disincentives to collaboration: A number of participants mentioned that 
there are disincentives to collaborate and even stronger incentives not to collaborate. One is a 
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desire to protect one’s territory and receive credit for the work. The development of the Fast 
Track Road Map for Nutrition was highlighted as an example:  
I remember at different times sitting in meetings, and, especially around 
the complementary feeding pieces, it was so MoH focused. But what about 
food diversity and a multitude of other things that need to be taken into 
play for this to work? And basically everybody was just like: ‘We can't 
deal with that. It's out of our jurisdiction.’  
—Civil Society 
Similarly, a funder stated that there has been a perception that nutrition “belongs” to one 
sector or another: 
We consider nutrition belongs to the Ministry of Health and they work for 
health. Some people think it belongs to the Ministry of Agriculture because 
they work for food sustainability.  
—Funder 
A few participants mentioned that for some working in nutrition there was no benefit to 
working together when they could secure funds directly for their own activities. A desire to focus 
on one’s mandate and not be distracted by coordination was said to be another reason.   
People sometime don't want to be coordinated. This is not only 
government people, but the DPs [development partners] as well. It 
depends on the individual, rather than the institution. Some people have 
their own agenda probably because they're here for a short time and have 
specific work to do. 
—Funder 
Even if different ministries had planned to coordinate, additional hurdles needed jumping 
before a coordinated action could be taken. 
Let’s say those three ministries [MAFF, MRD, MoH] agree on a program.  
They have to go back to MoEF to get approval for their budget, and then 
get the budget. Then they have to go to the MoP to get their strategy 
approved.   
—Funder 
3) Hierarchical barriers: Many participants identified a lack of nutrition leadership and 
considered those who should to be leading nutrition as not having the power to do so. For some, 
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particularly civil society, the NNP was thought to be too low a level in the government’s 
hierarchical structure.   
In Cambodia, who needs to take the leadership is the MoH because there's 
so much the health system is not doing and there are so many essential 
interventions in health. And health workers, doctors, nurses, midwives are 
seen as providing trusted information on how to take care of your kids. 
....Right now the highest level that really cares and is being pushed is NNP 
and they're too low in the MoH. It has to be the Minister or a Secretary of 
State or one of the Deputy Generals. It has to be that level in that ministry 
or pretty much in any ministry to get any action. 
—Civil Society 
Because of NNP’s level, it was said to be unable to coordinate directly with other 
ministries. Yet, one participant mentioned that NNP has had limited influence within the MoH as 
well. 
The NNP has a very weak position in Cambodia. They are at the bottom of 
the list in the MoH to receive funding. When they say something in 
meetings at MoH no one listens to them.   
—Civil Society 
Prior to CARD being given the mandate to coordinate, NNP was thought to have 
insufficient capacity or stature to coordinate all aspects of nutrition. This is, according to one 
funder, why food fortification coordination became the responsibility of the MoP:   
In Cambodia we have another group who work in nutrition, the National 
Council of Nutrition. This was established before CARD and it's led by the 
high level officer of the MoP. Most of the activity responsible by the 
National Council of Nutrition is related to food fortification. I think this 
was a political issue because before they had CARD there was no 
institution to coordinate. When they brought this issue to the MoH, the 
MoH, especially the NNP, had no capacity to absorb. So they asked the 
MoP to do this. 
—Funder 
4) CARD lacks needed support: According to many participants, the idea of CARD 
serving as a coordinating body had merit although, as expressed by one funder, CARD was not 
yet as effective as needed. 
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The idea of CARD as a coordinating body has validity, especially given 
this multi-sectorial, complex issue that involves a complex set of actors.  
But, with anything that one is trying to do that requires consensus building 
and cooperation, it is only as effective as those involved. So, if the people 
or the entities that CARD is responsible for coordinating actually take that 
involvement seriously, are committed to working through the issues, are 
committed to coordination and cooperation, then CARD will be 
successful. But no matter how good and committed the members of CARD 
are, they can only push so much. And yet, without an entity like CARD, 
Cambodia would not move forward to the extent it is.   
—Funder 
One government official suggested that CARD would be more effective if it mobilized 
resources for the line ministries, and shifted funders’ current practice of funding ministry-by-
ministry.   
If you think in terms of coordination, you have to think in terms of the 
power to mobilize resource. If you have no power to mobilize resource to 
the ministries, they may lack interest to coordinate, and some DPs want to 
work directly with the line ministries without the coordination, without the 
TWG.   
—RGC 
Another government perspective was that CARD alone was insufficient. Rather, it 
needed to be bolstered by the ministries themselves.  
I'm not quite sure how capable CARD is. Because CARD is just one small 
unit. CARD needs strong back-up from these relevant agencies. 
—RGC 
5) Coordination mechanisms (NWG, TWG-SP&FSN, and FSN Forum) need 
improvement: Overall, participants perceived information sharing to be an inadequate purpose of 
the working groups. According to one civil society actor, the groups do not “give us an 
opportunity to sit down and talk about some of the issues or to think about coordination.”  
Members of each group provided specific insights into their respective group’s functioning and 
effectiveness.   
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NWG: Participants in the NWG had mixed views of the meetings, their purpose, and the 
influence and functioning of the group. Some participants found the meetings a great opportunity 
to receive technical updates, learn what is happening globally, and in Cambodia regarding 
nutrition, and to be a connected sector working toward a common goal.  
...People go because they're genuinely interested in the information. People 
get really good constructive feedback from it. ...  I know it's not perfect, but I 
really do feel it's something pretty impressive. 
—Funder 
The NWG was also seen as a technical forum in which the public health nutrition 
community has influenced government directions and supported the development of policies and 
strategies. By contrast, as explained by one civil society actor, the meetings alone were 
inadequate to influence policy. 
You can use the group for effective policy change, but you can't only use 
the group. You have to have those other background, foreground 
discussions. You have to have agreement on how much the group can 
decide and how much to recommend and to whom, and what else you 
need. It can play that role, but it's only part of the process. 
—Civil Society 
Despite the benefit of sharing information during the meetings, some participants 
highlighted that the NWG has not resulted in coordination because, in the end, organizations 
continue to have their own funding and activities. They further lamented that everyone working 
in nutrition in Cambodia was not present at every meeting. (See “Missing from the Dialogue” 
below.) The lack of participation was because some found the meetings useless, some were 
unaware of the meetings, or some were working too far from Phnom Penh to join.   
Another reason cited by a number of participants was that the membership list and the 
meetings themselves were not well managed. 
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The purpose is not particularly clear. They’re not very good at organizing 
their meetings, or running their agendas well, so you feel you’re sitting 
there twiddling your thumbs while people rant and rave not necessarily on 
the topic of the presentation and not necessarily with constructive 
feedback.   
—Funder 
Although participants desired a strategic agenda with topics of import that could be 
discussed and debated—something proactive instead of reactive—the lack of purpose was said to 
be because NNP has insufficient technical capacity. 
Participant: Sometimes I think it’s useless. They just come to talk, but there 
is no conclusion. NNP just sits and waits for someone to inform them, to 
update about their activity. 
 
PI: Why don’t they take charge? 
 
Participant: Because they don't know what to do. The real thing, the 
appropriate thing for nutrition, they don't know. 
—Civil Society 
Of note, some participants mentioned a change in the NWG in recent years, which one 
participants attributed to the relatively new leadership of Dr. Prak Sophonneary, Director of 
NNP. Most appreciated this shift, which has entailed more NNP control and oversight.   
They seem to be quite on top of who is doing what and I think they're very 
direct, which is good.  I went to one meeting where someone gave a 
presentation, the results of a study. The NWG didn't know it was going on 
and people in the group were questioning why the study had been done.  
Then the leadership said: ‘Don't come once it's done and show us the 
results. Come when it's being planned and involve all of us in the 
planning.’ I appreciate that. 
—Civil Society 
TWG-SP&FSN: Participants engaged in the TWG-SP&FSN identified its broad scope and size, 
particularly since social protection was merged with FSN, and its hierarchy as areas of concern. 
The hierarchical structure was said to limit technical discussions. 
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The meetings of the TWG are very high level. They are chaired by Yim 
Chhay Ly, [the Deputy Prime Minister]. If you have a meeting at that 
level, you don't talk technical issues. It's only to kind-of sign off on things.   
—Civil Society 
Hierarchy also led to jockeying to get one’s issue on the agenda and to be recognized by 
His Excellency Yim Chhay Ly who chairs the meetings or by their own leader. According to one 
government official, “they want to speak up in front of the big man, in front of their 
representative.” By contrast, according to a funder, having His Excellency Yim Chhay Ly 
present meant some participants are too fearful to speak: “When DPM is there, no one opens his 
or her mouth.” Another concern was the lack of sustained interaction between meetings. 
It’s like you finish the meeting and you close the book. Then in two 
months, they call for the meeting and you open the book. No follow-up. No 
continuing the work after the meeting.   
—Civil Society 
The FSN forum, with open membership—compared to the invitation only TWG—was 
intended to resolve some of these challenges. Yet, according to one funder, it has not done so. 
Similar to the NWG meetings, the forum was also said to lack a strategic agenda. 
You don't notice the difference between the forum and the TWG. If you 
look at the form that takes, they look the same. And, it's a big group, about 
70 or more, and that's not always easy.  
—Funder 
4.6.2 Community Connections and Influence 
To help understand the current state of national coordination in Cambodia, participants 
shared their views on: 1) existing connections and influence, 2) who was missing from the 
dialogue, and 3) dissonance in the nutrition community.   
1) Existing connections and influence: Participants who discussed having a connection to 
others named UNICEF most often, WHO second, and NNP third. These organizations were 
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frequently identified as influential actors, and those most influential were said to have: a historic 
voice of authority, hierarchical power, or funding or size.  
Historic voice of authority: The majority of respondents cited the UN as having the greatest 
influence in the nutrition realm. A few participants recognized this as the result of UN funds 
going directly to the government. However, from the government’s perspective, this was because 
the UN was seen as working with the government in support of the government’s agenda. 
UNICEF, when they have any plan to support, it is not on behalf of 
UNICEF, but the national program. Other NGOs? They work for their 
project. So, first I discuss with UNICEF and WHO how can we solve this 
problem. Then, when we develop anything or have an idea, we discuss 
with other partners. 
—RGC 
The UN was also recognized, particularly UNICEF and WHO, as the global authority.  
According to a health-sector government official, “We follow all for recommendations from 
WHO and UNICEF” because these bodies set global technical standards and guidelines. Another 
reason the UN, particularly UNICEF and WHO, was perceived to have greater influence was 
because it was considered an authoritative voice with historical significance.   
After the Khmer rouge, WHO was in charge; they literally ran the MoH. 
They financed it, ran it, developed it, and designed the district model. The 
government has had a long standing, very close relationship with 
WHO. And UNICEF also did a lot of implementation post war, while 
WFP's relationship seems to depend on how much food they bring in.  
Right now they're not bringing in much food.   
—Civil Society 
The level of influence and on which part of the government was said to have varied, 
depending on who—if anyone—was employed. According to one civil society actor, this means 
who sits in those organizations matters: “Whatever they say will pretty much happen eventually.”  
The level of influence was also said to depend on available budget and technical expertise.   
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At this point in time, WHO doesn't really have a nutrition person and 
they're kind of ceding leadership to UNICEF. I think UNICEF is not 
comfortable with that, but they have CARD. That's how they previously 
decided to divide it up.   
—Civil Society 
According to some participants, because the UN itself has been disjointed, it has not been 
as influential or effective as it could be.   
They [the government] are encouraged by the two main donors, WHO and 
UNICEF, to do things separately. So a lot of the things they could be 
doing preventatively for complementary feeding that would make the most 
sense, like combining with EPI [expanded program on immunization] as in 
most countries, they aren’t doing. They don’t seem to want to have those 
discussions and interactions to actually link those two systems so kids 
under two are taken care of in a more holistic way. 
—Civil Society 
Hierarchical power: Because Cambodian society is very hierarchical, leaders at each level have 
significant power and influence (135, 136). The most critical influencer as identified by most 
participants was the Prime Minister. Getting him on board was thus considered crucial. 
The Prime Minister has the power to say and to influence the execution of 
any law or any legislation. Now we use the Deputy PM from CARD. He is 
quite important, but for breastfeeding and complementary feeding, it 
should be the Prime Minister. 
—Civil Society 
Also important was having leaders of the nutrition coordinating mechanisms and 
government programs who were at a high enough level to influence the Prime Minister.  
According to some participants, CARD met this criteria. 
CARD has the power to report our issues to the Prime Minister, because 
they are chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister. When we get the political 
commitment from CARD, then the issue will go [to the Prime 
Minister]. You know the Prime Minister has the power. If he says 
something, then his voice will be heard all over the country. We will get 
the funding and then not just funding from international NGOs, but also to 
tell the government to give more funding for nutrition.   
—RGC 
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CARD’s connections were said to not only be to the Prime Minister, but also to other 
parts of the government that were needed to support the nutrition agenda. 
CARD is helping me a lot to move things forward at the high level. CARD 
staff know people at the Ministry [of Information], they open those doors.  
...Working with NNP opens some, but not many. Working with CARD 
opens big ones. 
—Funder 
Other participants, by contrast, did not view CARD as using its power effectively, or 
having the power required. 
A lot of people don't believe CARD is very important. It needs to start 
behaving like it's influential and has power. When talking with other 
ministries, I say: ‘Have you spoken with CARD about this?’ I always refer 
to CARD. Even within civil society. I say: ‘You haven't met with 
CARD?’  They say: ‘No, I've met with NNP.’ And I say: ‘You have to talk 
with CARD. They're the ones who have the strategy. They're accountable. 
If nutrition doesn't improve, it's not MoH's problem, it's CARD's.’ 
—Civil Society 
Perceptions of NNP’s power also varied. For some, NNP’s influence was perceived to be 
more within than beyond the MoH. According to a government official: “How can a program 
manager talk to the MoP? Why would he listen to you?” 
To move the nutrition agenda on the ground, local leadership was considered more 
critical than national leadership.  The Provincial Health Department (PHD) allocates budgets, 
and therefore was said to have significant influence. Village leaders were also said to be able to 
affect change. According to one civil society actor, an active village leader or commune council 
member can make a real difference when they tell people: "Make sure you have a toilet; make 
sure you wash your hands; make sure you eat this."   
By contrast, a few of the participants mentioned that nothing moves at the local level 
without the endorsement of the next level up. 
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When we work with the OD [operational district] level for nutrition 
activities, they always say to us: ‘But we need a letter from the 
PHD.’  They will always ask from the top if they are allowed to do things.   
—Civil Society 
 
Funding or Size: Most participants stated that having money or being a large organization with a 
big program gave one greater influence on government priorities and directions.   
I think there are serious power plays and I think those that come to the 
table with the most money have the loudest voice, or potentially have the 
greatest policy influence.  
—Civil Society 
Although some participants highlighted the importance of smaller organizations’ on-the-
ground experience, according to a government official, a small organization will be consulted, 
but only after key players have had their say.   
They are our member, but in a small thing.  When we do anything, we 
invite only the big organizations that work fully for nutrition. We do not 
invite the others at first because they are small. 
—RGC 
Although many participants believed that a large budget was the lever needed for 
influence, some participants noted that how money is used and to whom it is given affects the 
degree of influence an organization can have. That USAID does not give money directly to the 
government was offered as an example.   
Those two [WHO and UNICEF], even though they don't give a lot of 
money, they give it to the right people. USAID gives a ton of money in 
nutrition, so they should be influential, but they don't give money to the 
central level or to standardized trainings that would get money to the 
central level. So the fact that they're spending $16.5 million on a nutrition 
project isn't buying them any influence. 
—Civil Society 
Despite this, the US Government was considered by a few to be an influential voice. 
USAID is spending the most money on nutrition with food security and 
water and sanitation and everything, but they don’t have much influence 
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on government because the way they play is not always well accepted by 
the government. But, they put a lot of money, so people listen to them.  
Money has power. 
—Funder 
A few participants mentioned that although an organization may be considered a small 
actor and not deserving a voice in national fora, they would have a voice at a lower level because 
in their area of operation they provide significant resources.   
If you’re in three villages and you have $200,000, that’s a lot. That’s even 
more than what my organization is bringing to national things. Of course 
they have power. But in their district, not at the national level. 
—Funder 
2) Missing from the dialogue: Overall, some members of civil society, the private sector, 
and parts of the government were said to be missing from the nutrition dialogue.   
Civil Society: In addition to reasons mentioned in the section on working groups, civil society 
was considered absent because of their inconsistent participation in coordination mechanisms. 
Though no one organization was thought to be missing, their contribution to the dialogue was 
seen as unreliable. A few participants mentioned that because typically there are no introductions 
during meetings, it is impossible to know if someone is missing. In the case of the TWG-
SP&FSN, participation was limited by invitation and thus, according to one funder, “NGOs are 
represented, but it's a picking of NGOs. It's a limited number.” 
Further, although there were many participants in the meetings, some members of civil 
society working in nutrition were thought to be absent.   
We have loads and loads of NGOs working in nutrition in Cambodia. 
Sometimes we have 50 people in a meeting, which is a lot, but there is still 
a lot of work that some NGOs do and they're not part of it.   
—Civil Society 
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Participants involved only in health-related nutrition work mentioned that those 
participating in the TWG-SP&FSN should also join the NWG so they understood the work 
better. The WASH sector was highlighted as an example:  
I wish there was more coordination between WASH organizations and 
nutrition because it's really closely related. Nutritionists understand that 
WASH is an issue, and I know people out in the field building toilets who 
are doing really cool work, and they understand it as nutrition-related 
work, but they're not involved in the nutrition world.   
—Funder 
Private sector:  According to a few participants from civil society and funders, the private sector 
should be part of the coordination mechanisms. However, one civil society actor strongly 
opposed this idea. According to this participant, the private sector should help to coordinate 
government strategy because the private sector has its own agenda—that of making money. This 
participant further explained that there was no clear representative of the private sector in 
Cambodia and that those with money and ability to contribute were not based in-country. The 
push for private sector engagement was said to stem from some donors’ public-private 
partnership strategy, and thus was yet another example of the donor agenda driving the 
conversation. 
Government: A number of line ministries were identified, particularly by government 
participants, as not being part of the coordination mechanisms, as needed.  These were the 
Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports (MEYS), and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs 
(MOWA).  MOWA was considered a gap given their mandate related to women and children.  
MoP was also thought to be needed since they manage food-related products.    
Some participants stated that line ministries typically do join the TWG-SP&FSN. But, 
CARD and key line ministries, such as MAFF, MRD, MOWA, and MEYS were identified as 
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missing from the NWG, even though they reportedly had been invited to participate.  One civil 
society participant viewed this absence as appropriate: 
I don’t really know if it's a place for other government, other ministries to 
come.  It’s more technical sharing.  So I think it's ok that it's people who 
work in the field. 
—Civil Society 
A concern was also raised that other MoH departments with relevant scopes of work, 
such as health promotion and the centers for disease control that manage child health services 
have not joined the NWG on a routine basis. 
3) Dissonance: The majority of participants mentioned that disagreements occur; 
however, civil society reported dissonance more frequently than funders or the government.  
Reasons civil society gave for disagreements were: differing views of technical issues, 
competing priorities and interests, and not following government requirements. Some 
participants also mentioned that there was no dissonance.    
Differing views of technical issues: Conflict, particularly in the NWG, was said to be about what 
to do and/or how to do the work, or about how to make such decisions. This was expressed either 
as disconnect between global guidance and the realities on the ground, or as there being 
insufficient evidence to change current policies or develop new ones.   
They have [growth monitoring and promotion] guidelines at the facility 
level, but not community level. I understand they don't have them because 
there is a lot of debate. Some people say it doesn't work. 
—Civil Society 
Competing priorities and interests: Individuals and organizations having different priorities or 
agendas and trying to protect them was said to have led to conflict.  
86 
Sometimes we have a hard discussion. For example, it used to be separate 
social protection group and food security groups. When it was combined, 
everyone wanted to protect their interest. …for example, even how to 
present the work. Those from the food safety group want to write food 
safety first and then nutrition.   
—Civil Society 
When we first started to formulate this new strategy there was a lot of 
discussion; it took more than a year. Not only because of the budget 
constraint, but because of the technical consensus. Some said, ‘It's too 
early to develop this strategy,’ because they had their own agenda. Some 
said, ‘Ok, but social protection is more important than food security.’ 
—Civil Society 
Conflict within the donor community, particularly within the UN, was also identified as a 
problem. This was said to be because funders have not coordinated their strategies and disagree 
about what should be done in Cambodia to address malnutrition.   
Not following government requirements: A few participants mentioned dissonance was caused 
by not informing the government of one’s activities, such as not providing a report when asked, 
or doing activities that were outside the bounds of government policy.   
No dissonance: A number of participants, particularly members of the NWG, said that people try 
to reach consensus and that the space was available to have needed discussions, but that these 
were primarily technical in nature. However, for most participants from both the NWG and the 
TWG-SP&FSN, the lack of disagreements was said to be because people did not speak up for 
fear of angering the government or because they did not want to be perceived as challenging 
authority or working against the government. By contrast, according to one participant, conflict 
has not occurred because issues that may cause conflict were not included in the meeting agenda.  
This was said to be because the government was fearful of being criticized. 
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4.6.3 Summary 
Despite the existence of coordination mechanisms, participants were nearly unanimous in 
their view that coordination of the nutrition sector in Cambodia was happening, but not as much 
as needed. There were a number of reasons given, including the government’s structure and 
hierarchy, and how one manages debate and builds consensus in the Cambodian context.  
Participants also shared their perspectives on members of the nutrition community with the 
greatest influence, and the reasons for this, such as the historical influence of the UN dating to 
post-Khmer Rouge reconstruction. Although the nutrition sector has numerous government, 
funders, and civil society actors involved, government officials in particular identified other 
government, such as MOWA, that has been missing from the dialogue. Finally, participants, 
mainly civil society, expressed that some dissonance in the community exists, primarily related 
to technical matters or competing priorities. 
4.7 Information, Evidence, and Research 
The majority of participants considered information, evidence, and research to be 
significantly lacking in Cambodia. Four themes emerged to explain this perception: 1) uncertain 
if the investment is worthwhile, 2) quantity and frequency, 3) system gaps, and 4) capacity gaps.  
1) Uncertain if the investment is worthwhile: As highlighted previously in this chapter, 
according to a number of participants, wise investment decisions cannot be made because there 
is insufficient information to know if efforts have had an impact and/or if course corrections are 
needed. One government official expressed this gap this way: “…if we want to know about our 
intervention, where it is and if what we have done is successful, we don't have the information.” 
Another participant explained that output data, such as the number of micronutrient powder 
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packets produced, could be tracked, but not the outcome of their use, such as a reduction in 
malnutrition.   
A number of participants commented that for some aspects of nutrition there was 
information, while for other areas, such as anemia, little was known. This gap was said to limit 
the community’s understanding of the underlying causes of malnutrition and its ability to create a 
responsive program. Furthermore, a few participants highlighted that although some data were 
collected, they were not used. Growth monitoring data was given as an example. Another was 
that health care workers complete a child’s chart, but do not use the data to track a child’s growth 
and take action if the child falters. 
The lack of evidence, both research and M&E, in Cambodia was also said to mean that 
individual actors could rationalize their efforts without being challenged or without questioning 
their value. 
Maybe an organization says: ‘This is what we do and we think it's 
effective.’ It's really hard because there isn't great M&E to say ‘This is 
working.’ 
—Funder 
2) Quantity and frequency: According to the majority of participants, nutrition data is 
insufficient, and the data available have not been collected with the frequency needed to be 
useful.  The CDHS conducted every five years was cited as an example.    
There is 40% of stunting, but the year of measurement is 2010. In 2015, 
the story could be different.  
—Civil Society 
Data we get from the CDHS is not available regularly. Right now we wait 
every five years. Between those five years we don't know how our 
implementation goes.   
—RGC 
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3) System gaps: The majority of participants said there was no functioning M&E system 
or reporting mechanism. One participant highlighted the lack of coordination in M&E. 
People having different M&E frameworks, so everything is in people's 
own silo. Even NGOs are not able to combine their M&E in any way, 
shape or form.  Government also has different M&E in different 
ministries.  
—Civil Society 
One reason data were unavailable and hence not used in Cambodia was because the 
current Health Management Information System (HMIS) has few nutrition data, though 
reportedly NNP has its own system. By contrast, a government official explained that service 
providers forget or do not pay attention to entering data into the system, or that when a donor’s 
funding ends, the system no longer functions. This again points to the lack of sustainability of the 
nutrition response in Cambodia. 
Although not all data desired have been routinely collected, some data were available.  
The reason more were included in the HMIS and therefore collected was because certain 
activities were considered too new. According to a government official, there was a desire to 
await the outcome of a program review to know if a program was effective and thus worth 
including in a national data system. Further, some activities, such as the baby-friendly 
community initiative (BFCI), were seen as having too many indicators to include in the HMIS.  
Indicators of impact, without a survey to measure them, also could not be included. According to 
a government official from the health sector, for some indicators, the system should work: 
So now we have a database for SAM [severe acute malnutrition].  
Hopefully now everybody will know very well how to enter data.  Then, if 
you want to know which hospital, which child, just click. It's easy. It looks 
like an HIS. So we can for some, but not for all indicators in nutrition. 
—RGC 
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4) Capacity gaps: According to a number of participants, data were not used because of a 
lack of capacity. This gap ranged from a lack of understanding of M&E to the inability to 
analyze and use data. Not understanding M&E and the data collected was said to limit one’s 
ability to translate learning into practice, particularly interventions that prevent stunting. 
As an example, one government official expressed uncertainty about which indicators 
should be used to track outcomes. Another example offered by a funder who had worked with a 
government partner highlighted this person’s lack of understanding of the difference between 
M&E: 
She didn't really understand the concept of what we were trying to do.  So, 
when we say monitoring and evaluation, she thinks: ‘How many people 
attend the trainings?’ Just the idea of what evaluation is.  She didn’t 
understand that we wanted to understand if we had an impact.   
—Funder 
This capacity gap was also said to influence which data were collected and emphasized as 
important. For example, during a training one participant observed that the focus was on 
completing the forms—“tick here. It needs to look good”—and not on what you do with the data.  
According to this participant: 
I don't think you can deal with this [lack of data use] before you deal with 
the lack of technical know-how because it means nothing to you. If you 
don't understand the importance, then you can collect as much data as you 
want.  
—Funder 
4.7.1 Summary 
Effectively addressing young child chronic malnutrition requires that sufficient data be 
available and used for decision making. According to the majority of participants, this is not the 
current situation in Cambodia. Rather, participants believe appropriate investments cannot be 
made because the nutrition community does not know what works in Cambodia and how the 
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global evidence-base can be applied. They also reported that collected data are not routinely 
used, and outcome data, such as feeding behaviors and nutritional status, are not routinely 
collected. Data that are available, however, were said to be collected too infrequently to inform 
decision making. Further, according to participants, Cambodia does not currently have a fully 
functioning HMIS system, nor the M&E capacity required.  
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CHAPTER 5.  RESULTS: QUESTION 2 IMPROVING CONDITIONS 
Nearly all participants considered ways to create more favorable conditions to scale-up 
evidence-based complementary feeding policies and programs; however, few participants overall 
or from any participant group suggested strategies for improving conditions. Strategies proposed, 
which emerged as themes, even if only by select participants, are presented by study domain.   
5.1 Political commitment and Recognition of the problem 
To increase recognition of stunting as an urgent priority and the political will to respond, 
participants suggested ways to: 1) frame the issue, 2) reach consensus on doable priorities, and 3) 
utilize the right actors. Participants also suggested the Cambodian nutrition community 4) create 
champions.   
5.1.1 Frame the Issue 
The majority of participants, particularly civil society and government, offered 
suggestions for how to frame the issue. Despite this majority, few participants focused their 
response on complementary feeding. Rather, most spoke about nutrition in general and/or about 
young child stunting. Two themes emerged around framing: 1) an economic argument and 2) 
how to deliver.   
1) Economic Argument: The majority of participants suggested that an economic 
argument for addressing stunting, and one that focused on the future productivity of individuals 
and the country as a whole, would resonate best both with policy makers and the general public.   
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If you lose that potential because of stunting, Cambodia will still be a very 
poor country and the cycle of the poverty will be there. You cannot have 
economic growth. 
– Civil Society 
One funder suggested using an economic argument, but framing it in a positive light, 
showing the benefit of addressing stunting. 
You have to show them the intervention can have a good impact on the 
economy for them. They want their country to grow, to show people their 
lives are getting better.  
– Funder 
For the public, one government official suggested this message provide a financial 
incentive by comparing the cost of breastfeeding and complementary feeding to purchasing 
products: “…a lot of children can survive with little money…when you use a product or formula, 
you spend a lot of money.”   
2) How to deliver: According to a few participants, most important for raising awareness 
and ultimately galvanizing change was ensuring messages were routinely repeated and 
disseminated through every possible channel. 
The message has to get out there not just through one channel, but 
through 10 different channels. They have to be inundated by this message.  
It has to be pushed from everywhere. From the radio and TV.  Everybody 
has to be repeating it all the time.   
– Funder 
One civil society actor suggested that the nutrition community build on prior 
breastfeeding campaign experience and success. (Prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding among 
0-5 month olds increased from 60% to 73.5% between 2000 and 2010 (24, 27).) This campaign 
was said to be successful because the health sector had a common understanding of the problem 
and the resolution, it created a simple, easily understood, and attractive message, and because it 
relied on multiple strategies and channels.   
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According to a funder, having a successful campaign would be dependent on using 
communications experts to develop messages specific to current practices and their barriers and 
facilitators. Such experts could develop technical messages for certain audiences and translate 
technical content for lay people.   
Because nutrition is complex and requires a multisectoral response, which has not been 
well understood, a few civil society actors and funders said a message making nutrition more 
readily understood was needed for both policy makers and the general public. Examples of the 
kinds of messages needed for the public were related to complementary feeding. For instance, 
one funder suggested that messages for caregivers should talk about the “right food,” not just 
about food because sub-optimal foods and feeding practices were considered the primary cause 
of chronic malnutrition among young children. Messages were also said to be needed to shift 
normative food preparation and feeding practices by focusing on how caregivers could do the 
best for their children. 
In the western world, it's very normal that you spend extra time separately 
cooking for a child because you know that's what the child needs. We think 
that's normal, that's logical, but we have been brought up with that.  We 
need to create a generation that's being brought up saying: ‘It’s only 
normal that you do what's best for your child.’ Every parent, every 
caregiver in the world wants to do what's best for their child. ...So you 
have to give message of what they need to do that's the best for their child.   
– Civil Society 
This idea that caregivers want the best for their children was confirmed by a number of 
other participants, as reflected by a government official:  
No one wants their children growing badly. When they know this is 
important, they try to do; they try to earn money and feed the good food.  
– RGC 
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To help caregivers recognize this, a couple of civil society actors suggested providing a 
vision or a goal—an understanding of a healthy growing child, as well as true understanding of 
stunting and its effects. 
I don’t think they really know, because there’s no good role model or 
comparison of how children should be. I’m sure if a Cambodian mother 
could see what they’re actually aiming for they would realize they should 
feed their children more, more energy-filled foods.  
– Civil Society 
[In our project] we try to draw the picture of malnourished children [of the 
effects of the stunted brain]. When we explain to the community they say: 
‘Oh, we didn't know about that!’   
– Civil Society 
Another civil society actor suggested catering to Asian cultural norms and expectations: 
Parents expect children to grow up and take care of them. So we say that 
when your child grows up strong, healthy and educated, they will take 
care of you. And then that lights a bulb. ‘Oh, then I need to feed my child 
and send him to school.’  
– Civil Society 
5.1.2 Reach Consensus on Doable Priorities 
As presented in Chapter 4, the majority of all participants agreed on four priority actions 
to be implemented at scale: 1) water and sanitation, 2) breastfeeding maintenance, 3) 
SBCC/mass media, and 4) counseling/support for essential nutrition, hygiene and sanitation 
actions. According to a government official, reaching agreement on priority actions was said to 
be key: “…we cannot scale-up everything in one time, so we have to select the priority action 
and activity to do.” Toward this, a few participants recommended galvanizing all nutrition actors 
around a common goal and the identified priorities. This was seen as a critical response to the 
current focus on individual agendas and priorities. 
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If we understand a common goal in this area of food security and 
nutrition, then the way they design the program they should link to this 
structure and not just to push this and that priority.  
– Funder 
Agreeing on priorities was said to require one additional step—ensuring that what was 
prioritized was doable in terms of available resources, or by generating sufficient commitment 
and allocating sufficient budget to implement them. A few participants suggested that Cambodia 
needs a costed action plan for the Food Security and Nutrition Strategy and not only for each 
sector’s plans, such as the Fast Track Road Map for Improving Nutrition. 
5.1.3 Utilize the Right Actors 
Addressing malnutrition requires a multisectoral response. Many participants agreed that 
the entire government must be involved and that each government body has a distinct, 
specialized role to play.   
Different ministries can be involved, depending on the type of intervention.  
If we do a complementary feeding intervention, we should work together 
with the WASH program. And join with a livelihood program to promote 
the food security, and with MAFF for home gardening to make food 
available and to MIME and Ministry of Commerce (MoC) for the fortified 
food. We also need Ministry of Information for mass media to make people 
aware and know how to change their behavior so together we can reduce 
stunting. 
– Civil Society 
The majority of participants said that the MoH, MAFF, and MRD were critical for an 
effective, multisectoral response. These three ministries, along with MoP, have been recognized 
in policy frameworks, such as the National Strategy for Food Security and Nutrition, 2014-2018, 
as being the core ministries for addressing nutrition in Cambodia. The second most important 
ministries were said to be: Ministry of Information (MIF), MOWA, and MEYS. According to a 
couple of participants, parliament also needed to be engaged. 
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MoH: For many participants, particularly those working in the health sector, MoH was seen as 
having primary responsibility for nutrition. According to one non-health sector government 
official, MoH plays a critical role in nutrition improvement: “…like Sub-decree 133 [which 
regulates the advertising and marketing of IYCF products]. And they have the breastfeeding 
program, and the counseling program, and the health center level.”  MoH’s purview was said to 
entail both the health system and community service delivery through the VHSGs. Further, given 
MoH’s mandate, including those of individual departments, such as Health Promotion, MoH was 
considered to be responsible for preventive and curative nutrition services, and health 
information and education.   
MAFF: MAFF was said to be responsible for the first of the three objectives of the National 
Strategy for Food Security and Nutrition, 2014-2018: Food-insecure households increase 
availability and access to food through more productive and diversified agriculture and livestock 
production, sustainable fisheries and forestry, and from non-agricultural employment and 
income opportunities (31). According to a MAFF official, the ministry aims to achieve food 
security through agricultural productivity, diversification, and commercialization.  
According to one health-sector government official, MAFF is responsible for ensuring 
children have quality foods, while MoH is responsible for ensuring these foods are eaten: “They 
say from farm to fork. Farm is MAFF, and when you come to fork it is MoH.” 
MRD: Participants identified MRD as the key government body responsible for implementing 
their number one identified priority action at scale—water and sanitation. One government 
official clarified that safe water is the role of MRD, and not MoH, while another official from 
MRD explained the ministry’s responsibilities, in comparison to MoH, in greater detail:  
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We are responsible for the rural water supply, hygiene and 
sanitation. Anything on prevention, hand washing, safe drinking, and 
clean environment. But not treatment because treatment is under 
health. We provide education and behavior change to the people.  
– RGC 
MoP: Only a few participants—only funders and civil society, identified MoP as having a 
specific role in nutrition. MoP’s responsibility for nutrition was said to be related to food 
fortification. A few civil society actors mentioned having worked closely with MoP on salt 
iodization, and the fortification of fish sauce, as examples. 
MIF: Because SBCC was one of the prioritized actions for implementation at scale, multiple 
respondents from all organization groups considered MIF’s support critical. MIF was said to be 
able to help people recognize the importance of addressing stunting by disseminating messages 
to the general public.   
Mass media is important. We need support from the government [because 
it is] very expensive.  They could talk to the owner of each channel, for 
example CTN [Cambodia Television Network]; the popular ones.  
– Civil Society 
MOWA: MOWA is not officially a member of the TWG-SP&FSN and does not participate in the 
NWG, but was cited by select members of all participant groups as an important ministry to 
engage. This was because of their focus on women and children and their local structures, such 
as their Women and Child Committees, which could be tapped for service delivery. A 
government official cited MOWA as being able to engage women in home gardening, which 
would support household food security and diet diversity.   
MEYS: According to participants, MEYS could be utilized in a few ways, such as by integrating 
nutrition topics into the school curriculum to increase awareness and improve knowledge.  
MEYS could also reach girls before they start childbearing: 
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At 15 or 16 years of age, the girl may drop out of school due to family 
issue. But when she finds a job or gets vocational training for a job she 
will already know: ‘I have to improve my health or my situation to 
contribute to my child.’   
– RGC 
As illustrated by one participant, others saw school campuses as a venue for teaching 
children skills that could benefit them at home.    
Thailand teaches school gardening and we see their malnutrition rates are 
quite different. There are many factors, of course, but this is one thing they 
have been doing. Our education manager worked in Pakistan and he said 
the mothers would come to the school to learn gardening and the kids 
would go to school, so they targeted both at the same time and that 
worked really well.…Another thing that should be done more is 
interlinking with WASH. Our programs do hand washing promotion with 
school children because children are like vehicles for change. They go 
home and say: ‘We did this.’   
– Civil Society 
Another participant suggested that school campuses could be used as a venue for 
promoting healthy eating and hygiene practices by placing restrictions on the kinds of food 
available on school campuses.   
Food vendors are allowed onto school grounds to sell food to children.  So 
what are you feeding them? Is it a nutritious meal or not? Do you get the 
children to wash hands or not before eating?  
– Civil Society 
Parliament: A few participants from all participant groups cited parliament as a critical actor in 
the response. A government official suggested that parliament has the power to persuade the 
MoEF to allocate sufficient resources to nutrition, but that for this to happen, parliament must 
understand and accept the idea that investing in nutrition is critical for the country’s economic 
and human resource development.  A funder concurred, stating that parliament can put pressure 
on the government:  
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…a champion at the parliament asking results, asking what the ministries 
are doing. Then maybe we will have the government spending more money 
on these issues. Like what's happening on HIV. A parliamentarian is 
asking about what is happening and asking for results. Policy makers are 
moving more now because they're getting pressure from upstairs.   
– Funder 
The framing of the issue most relevant to parliamentarians related to the economy. 
You have to show them the intervention can have a good impact on the 
economy because they all look at the economy.  They want their country to 
grow, to show people their lives are getting better.  They don't want to 
hear public health results.  You will have less stunting.  What does that 
mean for them?   
– Funder 
One civil society actor cited the experience of effectively using parliament in other 
countries, such as Vietnam. But key would be to find the right parliamentarian committee, such 
as that for health. 
5.1.4 Create Champions 
According to a few participants, Cambodia needs nutrition “champions” (the term used 
by participants) to lead the nutrition response, but according to one government official, none yet 
exist. Although some individuals, such as Dr. Prak Sophonneary, NNP Program Manager, were 
identified as leaders, they were said to be focused on their particular aspect of nutrition.  
According to a few participants each from government, funders, and civil society, what was thus 
needed was an advocate of a multisectoral nutrition response. According to a funder, this was 
someone in the government who was passionate, and a driving force getting everyone to “play 
together” to coalesce everyone around a shared agenda. Another participant agreed, comparing 
Cambodia’s situation to that of nearby countries: 
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Someone who says they are willing to fight for this for the next 10 years. 
…When I look at Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, they all had those champions.  
Fifteen years back people really were the focal point for nutrition for all the 
policy makers. That was who people would go to with questions about 
nutrition. We don't have that in Cambodia. We don't have someone who people 
say: ‘Oh yes that is the nutrition person.’ 
– Civil Society 
In response to this gap, a government official suggested Cambodia build the capacity and 
the involvement of the line ministries. A funder concurred, suggesting that to address the 
multisectoral nature of nutrition, Cambodia needs a champion per ministry—ideally the Minister 
him/herself—to support multisectoral coordination. The advocate, according to a few 
participants, must be a government leader to ensure the government owns nutrition. A 
government leader was also thought to be more appropriate because of the short-term, project-
based tenure of funders and civil society actors. 
Champions were also said to be needed at the local level. One funder cited the 
multisectoral offices being created in districts as a place to house individuals who could serve as 
the “nucleus for change.” This participant recognized, however, that these offices have not yet 
been implemented sufficiently to serve this purpose. 
5.2 Policy Frameworks and Systems 
5.2.1 Develop Additional Policies 
Despite the range of policy frameworks (e.g., policies, sub-decrees, prakas, and 
guidelines) in Cambodia, the majority of participants identified that others are still needed. For 
instance, according to a funder, Cambodia has decrees and circulars, but no legislation, citing 
Sub-decree 133 on the marketing of breastmilk substitutes. If the sub-decree were a law, this 
funder believes it would have to be enacted and enforced.     
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Legislation has more power than any sub decree because it’s a law.  Nobody 
can go against the law. If somebody is breaking the law, anybody can go to the 
police and request a trial. That’s more powerful than anything.   
– Funder 
A few participants called for a Multisectoral Road Map for improving nutrition, rather 
than sector-based documents, such as the MoH’s Fast Track Road Map for Improving Nutrition, 
2014-2020. Similarly, a few participants called for a food security and nutrition action plan to 
guide implementation of the National Strategy for Food Security and Nutrition for 2014-2018.  
This, as mentioned previously, was needed to help identify feasible actions and ensure they were 
implemented. 
The policies that could support are policies that put in place the targets at 
lower levels, the resources, and the implementation arrangements are 
needed. The implementation arrangements aren't very clear on nutrition, so 
that is something the policy could address.  By saying who is responsible for 
what, where are the integrated planning mechanisms happening at the lower 
level, who should take the lead there, what are the roles of the different 
stakeholders, and so on. 
– Funder 
Meanwhile, a funder from a non-health sector expressed a desire to see current health 
policies, such as the HEF applied more broadly so all nutrition services—health and non-
health—would be covered. 
The stunting impacts are really inequitably distributed. I think there are a lot 
of policies on the health side, such as the HEF. Maybe they could be widened 
to address other aspects that are necessary to make malnutrition decrease. 
Social protection and on the sanitation side we have no policies that guide us 
in terms of who gets assistance or not.   
– Funder 
To improve delivery on the ground, a few civil society participants stated the need for a 
growth monitoring strategy, which the government was said to also have identified. Outreach 
guidelines were also needed, or the finalization and approval of the still pending National Policy 
on Infant and Young Child Feeding, 2008. This policy is meant to guide community-based 
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nutrition service delivery and align all partners around a set of standards of practice and pay for 
volunteers. 
5.3 Policy Implementation 
To improve the implementation of policy frameworks, particularly the coordination of 
service and program delivery, and budget allocation, four themes emerged as strategies: 1) 
improve enforcement and relevance of policy frameworks, 2) establish government oversight, 3) 
use sub-national funding, and 4) strengthen sub-national coordination.  
5.3.1 Improve Enforcement and Relevance 
Participants identified many policies that exist in Cambodia to support, protect, and 
promote young child nutrition, yet a number of participants cited some that were neither 
enforced nor adequately relevant or feasible to implement. Sub-decree 133 and Prakas 061, 
which regulate the marketing of breastmilk substitute products, were named as policies that 
should be enforced. Enforcement of the marketing regulations has recently progressed. WHO, 
UNICEF, Helen Keller International (HKI), and other partners have been urging the government 
to establish an oversight board and write guidelines. The IYCF guideline was cited as an 
example of a policy that needed to be revised because it has expired. This was considered a 
window of opportunity to address complementary feeding. 
5.3.2 Establish Government Oversight 
A few participants, particularly government officials, suggested that to reduce duplication 
of effort and ensure civil society, funders, private sector, and research institutions are aligned 
with government policies and priorities, including geographic priorities, the government needs to 
coordinate nutrition-related activities. According to a funder, one way to do so was to restrict 
actors who do not abide by a set of operating regulations.   
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We will deny their rights first to sit at the NWG so they will not be able to 
put in any donor proposal saying they’re part of the nutrition working 
group or have the support of the NNP. You’re not going to get money if 
you’re not an MoH partner. If you deny this to them that will make them 
think. And then, if they don’t follow these requirements, they should not 
have permission to work in this country. 
—Funder 
According to some government officials, funders and civil society should also be 
required to have their implementation areas approved by the national program and the provincial 
level to ensure no one else is already working there, and to reach areas of priority not yet 
covered. Some organizations do meet with the government prior to selecting sites and 
implementing activities, but this is not a requirement, and therefore, not all do so. 
What you want to do, you come to us. Which OD, which health center, and 
you have to check whether this already done or not. If already done, don't 
do it, don't waste time, money.  
—RGC 
To foster local ownership and sustainability, one government official highlighted the 
importance of engaging the local level in determining where programs should be implemented. 
The sub-national level should have the right to talk with the funding 
agency to make clear how they can be involved to identify the target area, 
to identify interventions, to identify how we can coordinate everybody to 
support the program. We don't want the program to fail when the funding 
agency leaves the country. We want the program to continue.   
—RGC 
Some government participants also requested that funders and civil society ensure 
sufficient scale and coverage. For instance, target the entire health center, or ideally, the entire 
operational district, and not only a few villages. Although funding may be a limiting factor, such 
discussions and agreements were also said to be needed with the government prior to 
implementing activities. 
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5.3.3 Use Sub-National Funding 
To address implementation barriers and ensure sustained provision of nutrition services, 
participants highlighted that the sub-national level needs to allocate funding to nutrition.  
According to a few participants, the lack of standard payments, and the low level of incentives 
both for health care workers and for VHSGs meant services were not being delivered. To address 
this, as expressed by one funder, the role of both VHSGs and health care workers in the delivery 
of nutrition services had to be recognized at the community level.    
Bring the commune council into the nutrition space. There is some 
incentive that the commune council could pay to the volunteer to 
recognize their job. I think doing this screening of all the children in the 
community or doing the ANC and PNC, you could give an incentive to the 
volunteer or midwife who will increase all those interventions.   
—Funder 
This funder highlighted that this approach had been included as Component 6: Removing 
Financial Barriers of the Conceptual Budget in the Fast Track Road Map for Improving Nutrition 
2014-2018 (126). This costing exercise identified the commune council as the key mechanism 
for “supporting, co-financing, managing and monitoring nutrition programs” (126).   
Because stipends for volunteers were said to come from the Health Center Management 
Committee budgets allocated by the commune council, participants recognized the MoI as the 
government body that must push for this change. Toward this, TWG-SP&FSN members were 
said to be working to raise the awareness, mobilize, and encourage local authorities to respond to 
nutrition. One government official expressed hope that this effort would lead to funding and 
local ownership: 
In the future, if we can locate some money from the authority or through 
NCDD [National Committee for Sub-national Democratic Development], 
the village/community will have ownership, they will make their plan, they 
will think this is their role and should be improved. 
—RGC 
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Although nutrition needs to be owned and addressed by the local level, and mechanisms 
exist for the local level to do so, one funder highlighted that the national level is needed to ensure 
MoEF allocates resources to the districts.   
MRD who has no funding, can give a little bit of funding, but it provides a 
mechanism for the districts to go directly to the MoEF and say: ‘We have 
to deliver on these services, but we need your resources to do so.’ The 
district has to be able to bring together the different services that need to 
happen. But in order to do that effectively, they would get stuck because 
there are no funds. That's where the central level can help.  
—Funder 
5.3.4 Strengthen Sub-National Coordination 
A number of participants highlighted that coordination was needed at the sub-national 
level, even more than at the national one. Some of these participants also stated that mechanisms 
exist, but were not being used effectively. These participants recommended that the meetings 
have a clear, strategic agenda and ensure participation by the right actors. Meanwhile, other 
participants, as explained by a government official, stated that additional structures were needed. 
The NCDD is too broad. They try to coordinate everything, but its mission 
impossible. So within that they have to organize a specialized committee in 
order to support, advise, and coordinate all partners, including NGOs, 
public sector, private sector who implement food security and nutrition 
programs.  
—RGC 
Most participants who highlighted the need to strengthen sub-national coordination, also 
suggested that it was the responsibility of the MoI and the Office of the Governor to do so. This 
was because MoI coordinates the NCDD as well as manages local government structures. A few 
participants, as expressed by a government official, mentioned that the commune council should 
be responsible for coordinating the response and ensuring linkages with the health system. 
  
107 
The health system and the administrative systems are different. From 
health center, it's the health system. Community is the administrative 
system. The gap is between the health system and the community. The 
commune council is responsible. 
—RGC 
5.4 Coordination and Communication 
To improve national coordination and communication, the majority of participants 
recommended strengthening the working group mechanisms—the TWG-SP&FSN and the 
NWG.  In general, participants wanted these meetings to provide the opportunity to set and 
implement priorities for the nutrition sector, and to reduce the duplication of effort. A few 
government officials from the non-health sector suggested that the TWG-SP&FSN be used to 
track progress implementing the National Strategy for Food Security and Nutrition, 2014-2018 
and to discuss and overcome any barriers to its implementation. To do so, however, as mentioned 
previously, these participants stated that this strategy must be supplemented by an action plan 
outlining the roles and responsibilities of the line ministries and an M&E framework for 
monitoring progress. 
A few civil society actors involved in the NWG also called for monitoring mechanisms to 
ensure points of agreement were implemented. A number of the participants requested that the 
meetings set a collective strategy and not simply share who is doing what. One funder expressed 
it this way: 
Everybody is presenting and saying: ‘This is what I do. What's your 
feedback?’ But it's not like: ‘What are you all working on? What should 
we work on?’  
—Funder 
 
A civil society actor concurred, suggesting that the group have key milestones and goals 
related to the Fast Track Road Map and orient the meeting discussions around these.   
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Sometimes during the NWG, someone is just speaking about something. It 
doesn't go along with the larger picture. So maybe we can reframe that. If 
someone wants to talk about their work, we can send out an email and 
those interested can read it and not sit there for two hours. Instead, we all 
talk about one topic that is in line with the national level plan.   
—Civil Society 
A couple of participants also suggested that the NNP create a different platform for 
sharing individual organization or project updates so the NWG meetings could be used for more 
substantive discussions.    
I think what would really help is to focus on what is urgent and important 
at this point and leave the other issues for a different time or a different 
way of communicating. We can have a platform for sharing information 
and if you are interested you can check it.   
—Civil Society 
5.5 Information, Evidence, and Research  
According to a few participants, there is sufficient evidence globally for what Cambodia 
must do to address young child stunting, but this evidence must be adapted to Cambodia. Rather 
than proving “again and again” what should be implemented in each country, one funder 
suggested that efforts should focus on understanding how the global evidence can be applied.  
Without this understanding, Cambodia cannot be confident it employs the most effective model 
and appropriately direct its limited resources.   
Cambodia needs to design and implement well-planned, monitored, and 
evaluated pilots. Then, the country can say: ‘We’ve done this, it does this, 
and it should or should not be rolled out.’ 
—Funder 
A government official concurred that the global evidence must be made relevant to 
Cambodia: “…we need to contextualize it, to make it work here. It doesn't mean we can copy 
from any book or any case study.” 
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Linked to knowing what works to support an effective response and wise investments, 
one government official highlighted the need for M&E of policies and strategies. This would 
help to ensure they are relevant and suitable to the country’s situation, and to know if they have 
been implemented and, if not, why.   
A few participants, particularly government from both health and non-health sectors, and 
funders, identified an information gap regarding the “who, what, and where” of implementation. 
For instance, which health and non-health sector activities were being implemented in a 
particular area and by which organization. Such information would inform decision making and 
funding investments, and help to ensure appropriate coverage of multisectoral activities where 
they are most needed in the country. Mapping was identified as a way to address this need.   
They have to do the mapping of who is doing what at the provincial level 
to make sure we don't waste the limited resources we have. 
—RGC 
Although some sectors were said to have maps of their own activities, one government 
official suggested that mapping should be done by all working in the nutrition sector. These 
maps could then be layered on top of one another to provide a fuller picture. This official 
suggested that this was a topic that should be put on the TWG-SP&FSN secretariat’s agenda. 
5.6 Summary  
Although the majority of participants saw the need to improve current conditions, overall, 
few identified strategies for addressing the barriers to progress in Cambodia. In general, these 
strategies were not specific to complementary feeding, but rather focused on addressing nutrition 
more broadly. The following six actions were recommended by most: 
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1. Frame the issue for both policy makers and the general public using an economic 
argument and keep messages simple, repeat them, and use multiple channels to 
disseminate them. 
2. Engage key government bodies—MoH, MAFF, MRD, MoP, MIF, MOWA, MEYS, and 
parliament—in the nutrition response, building on their distinct roles and capacities. 
3. Identify national and local level individuals who can champion a multisectoral nutrition 
response. 
4. Develop select new policies, such as a Multisectoral Nutrition Action Plan with an M&E 
framework, to further support the nutrition response. 
5. Strengthen national and sub-national coordination by improving the effectiveness of 
working group mechanisms through the use of strategic agendas, an agreed set of core 
tasks that are monitored. Further, recognize and utilize MoI’s local structures and the 
Office of the Governor at the sub-national level and decentralize planning and 
management of nutrition services to the commune level to enhance intervention 
coordination, effective management, and budget allocation. 
6. Produce the information and evidence needed to inform and monitor the response. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND PLAN FOR CHANGE 
Globally, evidence has been generated regarding the causes, consequences, and severity 
of chronic malnutrition among young children (11, 16, 137). This has contributed to international 
commitments and partnerships, such as the SUN movement, a shared nutrition agenda, as well as 
agreement on the need for multisectoral strategies (3, 17, 32).   
Cambodia too has increasingly recognized stunting as a significant problem. Despite this, 
specific policies and programs dedicated to improving complementary feeding and a decline to 
32% between 2010 and 2014 in the national stunting prevalence, these efforts have not been as 
effective as needed (26). Further, as seen in policy documents and in this study’s results, stunting 
as a priority—and complementary feeding as a partial solution—is subsumed by multiple 
nutrition priorities. Reasons for this are linked to a number of sociopolitical barriers, including a 
lack of policy community cohesion and shared understanding of the problem and priority 
solutions. Less than effective guiding institutions and coordinating structures add to the problem. 
These barriers are similar to many of the contextual factors known to inhibit national action, such 
as “political will, politics, the regulatory environment, the donor environment (including whether 
donors coordinate their efforts or act in isolation), and the fiscal environment” (101).   
To overcome current sociopolitical obstacles, this study’s participants identified six 
actions, some reflecting experience from other settings as presented in Chapter 2: 1) create and 
communicate a unified frame; 2) engage key government bodies to represent the multisectoral 
nature of nutrition; 3) identify national and local level champions; 4) create action plans with
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accountability mechanisms; 5) strengthen coordination mechanisms at national and sub-national 
levels; and 6) generate the information and evidence needed to inform and monitor the response. 
The implications of the current conditions and participants’ proposed strategies to 
improve them are discussed in this chapter. Also presented and discussed is a proposed plan for 
change that goes beyond participants’ recommendations, drawing on the global literature, to 
address identified barriers to progress. The study limitations and suggestions for further research 
are also presented. 
6.1 Discussion  
This study found nutrition to be a “wicked problem” in Cambodia (138). Such problems 
are highly complex with multiple interlinked causes and solutions requiring cooperation among 
many different stakeholders as well as systemic change to achieve results. They also tend to 
generate a lack of consensus about priority issues and ways to respond (138).  
The most significant challenge identified, at the heart of all other barriers, is the lack of 
cohesion and consensus among the Cambodian nutrition community. “Disagreements over 
strategies and interventions, complicated by politics among the actors…are…fundamentally 
about divergent institutional perspectives and interests” (71). This plays out, for example, in the 
government’s lack of technical capacity and resulting heavy reliance on external actors to 
provide this assistance. The government does not view all technical expertise equally, preferring 
the UN specialists over other entities, such as civil society, funders, or universities. Yet, 
dissonance among the UN agencies, particularly UNICEF, WHO, WFP, and FAO, about which 
aspects of nutrition are most crucial to address and how to address them contributes to 
fragmentation. 
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Insufficient funding available for a national response was another barrier. Many 
participants perceived funding to be adequate if directed to a clear set of priorities and to the 
right geographies. As evident in Cambodia, where the bulk of funding for nutrition comes from 
external sources, donors “can significantly influence a national health agenda through personal 
or organizational agendas” (86). Donors greatly influence the national nutrition agenda, but also 
influence who has power, which is highly linked to access to and control over resources in 
Cambodian society. This is the heart of the patron-client relationship prevalent in Southeast Asia, 
which entails the patron providing resources and the client reciprocating with loyalty, support, 
and assistance (139-141). How donors provide funds can also shift alliances and curtail 
government ownership. Often due to a lack of confidence in government institutions, donors 
strictly manage financial sources “distorting local priority settings…leading to predominant 
influence of a few powerful people, mostly donors” (142).    
Another constraint identified by funders and civil society was the lack of political will. 
This is closely linked to the absence of a unified frame. Collaborative leadership is challenging 
in Cambodia’s interconnected patron-client, hierarchical relationships (141, 143, 144). The 
numerous influencing factors can be seen when trying to understand why study participants were 
unanimous that improvements in water and sanitation were critical for preventing stunting 
through complementary feeding strategies. Water and sanitation was selected perhaps because it 
recently received significant attention in the international literature (39-41), or because of recent 
evidence from Cambodia (145). Alternatively, it may be because of recent increases in donor 
funding for this area in Cambodia. It is interesting to note that water and sanitation was top 
ranked by many health sector government and civil society actors when it is the purview of the 
MRD and not the health sector. This could be due to a desire, in part, to deflect blame for a lack 
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of progress because health sector approaches have not been clearly articulated, perceived not to 
be working well enough or at a large enough scale, or seen not to be sufficient on their own to 
solve the problem. It may also reflect the underlying current of Cambodian society, which 
rewards interconnectedness rather than individual contribution, and thus other sectors must also 
have an important role in the response. 
Importantly, some strategies identified as priorities do not coincide with official 
government documents, such as the Fast Track Road Map for Improving Nutrition. There were 
also government identified priorities (e.g., food preparation demonstrations) that were rejected 
by the majority of other participants, and strategies identified as ineffective by some (e.g., 
supplementary feeding and conditional cash transfers), while receiving support from major 
donors. Although a lack of evidence was cited as a reason for not selecting a priority, this study 
confirms experience in other settings that personal and organizational interests have a greater 
influence on the policy making process (57, 68, 70, 146).   
Because the government relies to a great degree on external actors to influence the 
agenda, it is important to consider whether or not funders and civil society perceive themselves 
as contributing to the problem. Typically, individuals in such roles consider themselves part of 
the solution but, in Cambodia, some of their behavior has been counterproductive to improving 
nutrition at scale. Is this contradiction recognized and understood by these actors? Do they 
consider whose interests are burdened by their narrow perspective? Such reflection is an 
important step along the path to change. And change is what is needed in Cambodia. The next 
section of this chapter presents a framework for doing so.     
6.2 Strategies to Improve Conditions: A Proposed Plan for Change 
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Current conditions suggest Cambodia is not yet ready to implement a national response to 
address young child stunting through improved complementary feeding policies and programs.  
Although suboptimal feeding practices are recognized as contributing to the country’s high 
stunting prevalence, and although the nutrition community recognizes improvements are needed, 
stunting has not achieved issue ascension. Rather, nearly all aspects of malnutrition in Cambodia 
appear to be of equal concern, or if a particular issue is considered a priority, it is by a certain 
individual or organization and not by the nutrition community as a whole. This reflects 
Cambodia’s highly fractured nutrition community and has resulted in incoherent issue framing 
and an unfeasible list of priorities toward which the government can align in a cohesive manner 
and donors can direct their funds.   
At this point, it is important to acknowledge that this study’s focus on stunting and 
complementary feeding as a partial solution reflects the priority of the researcher. When required 
to identify a significant challenge for the purpose of this dissertation, it was the one the 
researcher thought needed to be investigated and overcome. Nevertheless, effective policy 
processes require that the community create an issue frame. This plan for change, emanating 
from the study findings, thus proposes a set of strategies to help Cambodia determine priorities 
and to unite the community around them. Importantly, it proposes a transparent, inclusive 
process in which Cambodian society’s interconnected, hierarchical, patron-client relationships, 
as well as existing suspicions, jealousies, and personal and organizational mandates and interests 
and control of financial resources can be understood, taken into account, and managed. The goal 
of this plan for change is to: Create policy community cohesion within the Cambodian context as 
a mechanism for generating traction toward coordinated action and funding around a set of 
agreed priorities to address malnutrition at scale in Cambodia. At times, examples related to 
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stunting and complementary feeding will be used since this was the focus of this study, but these 
topics are not proposed as predetermined and agreed priorities may ultimately be different. 
 
Shiffman’s framework (73), in which 11 factors are clustered within four domains of 
political priority setting: actor power, ideas, policy contexts, and issue characteristics, provides a 
relevant platform for organizing the plan for change to address this study’s identified barriers 
(Figure 5). Although developed to analyze international contexts, it was successfully utilized in 
Vietnam (86), and can be applied in additional national settings. For the purpose of identifying 
change strategies, the framework was modified. Policy community cohesion was excluded since 
this is the goal of the plan for change. Also excluded was demonstrating the severity of the issue 
since Cambodia in general has evidence of the magnitude of malnutrition.  Select factors—
guiding institutions, global governance, and civil society mobilization—were combined into one, 
national governance. Credible indicators and effective interventions, two separate factors in 
 
 
Figure 5. Adapted Shiffman's Framework 
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Shiffman’s framework, were also combined and are now called strategic information. As such, 
six factors remain, which are framed as key steps needed to facilitate change. The proposed plan 
is presented by each factor phrased as the action needed: 1) identify and create leaders that can 
function effectively within the Cambodian leadership culture; 2) strengthen national governance 
in a manner that reflects the Cambodian context; 3) create an internal frame; 4) identify policy 
windows; 5) create and communicate an external frame; and 6) gather strategic information. 
 Improving the sociopolitical environment requires dynamic solutions that are routinely 
adjusted to reflect a rapidly changing context and one that, at this point in time, is undergoing 
unprecedented political and social change. Thus, although the proposed plan is presented linearly 
(Table 7), the actions needed are interlinked and interactive. The iterative nature of the proposed 
actions reflects that success is dependent on seizing upon opportunities as they arise.  Such 
openings may present themselves in the international or national context, and may be specific to 
nutrition or related to broader societal issues and events. Recognizing and utilizing such 
opportunities requires the capacity to do so, which is a core component of this proposed plan. 
Furthermore, building such capacity must be the mandate of funders and organizations dedicated 
to improving nutrition in Cambodia. Toward this, these organizations must recognize that the 
individuals in nutrition roles may not have the experience and abilities to do so, and thus must 
draw upon resources from other parts of their organizations, such as policy units. (To 
disseminate the study findings and facilitate uptake of this plan, the PI, at a minimum, will share 
a study summary with participants [see Annex 4 for a draft, to be finalized following 
consultations with stakeholders], to present the results during a NWG meeting as per the group’s 
guidelines, and seek to publish the study in a peer reviewed journal.) 
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Table 7. Proposed Plan for Change: Creating Policy Community Cohesion 
Change Factor  Recommended Actions Measures of Success 
Identify leaders 
at two levels: 1) 
mid-level 
strategic 
allies/policy 
entrepreneurs; 
and 2) 
champions at 
high level 
 Determine the key attributes of effective 
leadership in Cambodia 
 Identify strategic allies/policy 
entrepreneurs and champions per key 
constituency: political structures (i.e., 
parliament); technicians (line ministries); 
budgetary decision makers (MoEF); and 
civil society 
 Generate donor interest in funding 
leadership capacity building 
Individuals per constituency 
meeting criteria and willing to 
serve as champions and policy 
entrepreneurs identified; 
Donor funds committed to 
leadership capacity building 
Strengthen 
national 
governance 
 Determine capacities needed in Cambodia 
 Strengthen guiding institution’s advocacy, 
leadership, consensus building capacity 
(and that of identified champions) 
 Revise and utilize the Food Security and 
Nutrition Training program to build 
strategic capacity  
 Strengthen effectiveness of formal 
coordination mechanism 
Guiding institution and 
identified champions’ 
advocacy and leadership 
capacity strengthened; 
Coordination mechanisms 
routinely meeting and 
allowing widespread 
participation; Current FSN 
training curriculum revised to 
reflect governance 
strengthening goals 
Create an 
internal frame 
Build connections and consensus within and 
across each group—government, funders, 
and civil society on 1) decision-making 
process; and 2) the definition, causes and 
solutions to the problem  
An agreed to frame for 
decision-making and for 
nutrition; Strengthened social 
capital within and across 
nutrition sector stakeholder 
groups 
Identify policy 
windows 
Identify upcoming policy windows of 
opportunity to rally all donors around a 
common agenda (e.g., SDGs, revision of 
COMBI) 
Policy windows identified and 
utilized to build consensus 
and communicate the frame 
Create and 
communicate an 
external frame 
 Determine appropriate framing for key 
constituencies by conducting Opinion 
Leader Research 
 Create and communicate the frame, 
highlighting the problem, the solution, and 
who must do what, when 
Develop and convey 
overarching message and sub-
messages and create 
opportunities to convey them 
to budget holders at national 
and sub-national levels 
Gather strategic 
information  
 Review existing evidence and create 
research and evaluation plan to fill gaps 
 Add questions to existing evaluations 
(e.g., NOURISH) 
 Pilot nutrition surveillance study  
 Create maps that overlay data with activity  
Literature review produced; 
Research and evaluation plan 
developed; Nutrition 
Surveillance Survey piloted in 
one province; Maps produced 
and used to plan, identify 
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Change Factor  Recommended Actions Measures of Success 
 Update national data profile; develop for 
provinces (used to plan and to 
communicate/frame) 
priority geographies, and 
monitor progress; National 
and provincial profiles 
produced 
 
6.2.1 Identify and Create Leaders 
Strong leaders who spearhead advocacy and mobilize the community around a unified 
vision and response, thus overcoming community fragmentation are needed at two levels: 1)  
strategic allies or policy entrepreneurs, who are mid-level technicians that can operate behind the 
scenes; and 2) champions, who are high level government officials, such as ministers, as cited by 
study participants (8, 18, 57, 77, 83).   
Strategic allies are individuals who instigate and manage, at least initially, the change 
process. To be effective, these allies must have certain characteristics and abilities. They must 
first and foremost be self-directed, self-identified, and motivated to create change for the greater 
good. Yet they must also be willing to take risks and purposefully work behind the scenes so that 
their individual efforts go unrecognized. Such “backseat” efforts, while critical if real change is 
going to be achieved in Cambodia, are against the current practices of most partners, donors, and 
NGOs in country who are jockeying for credit for themselves, for those they fund, and/or for 
access to resources. These change agents must be able to step outside their own organizational 
mandates and work for nutrition and, broadly speaking, for Cambodia. They must also have the 
time, or be allowed the time by their organizations, to invest in relationship building. 
Furthermore, such individuals must be considered trustworthy or able to build trust within the 
community that they can and will “do the right thing.” Strategic allies must also be viewed as 
credible, both in nutrition technical content and in policy processes, and well versed and able to 
effectively operate within Cambodian socio-cultural norms and expectations. Importantly, 
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strategic allies need not be those already identified as nutrition leaders or in nutrition leadership 
roles in country since these individuals may not have been selected based on the capacities and 
traits described. This means that these allies must also be respected by and able to work with 
current leadership. Anyone who cares about nutrition and addressing it in a more aligned and 
cohesive fashion will be revealed as an ally through their interactions and behavior. Ideally, 
allies will foster additional allies and momentum will grow.   
Nutrition sector champions are the second set of leaders needed. Having leaders at this 
level is aligned with Cambodia’s highly hierarchical, patron-based societal structure in which 
leaders have significant power and influence (141, 143, 144). Particularly important, as identified 
in other settings, such as Bolivia (83), is having strong leaders at each level of the government 
system. This too is aligned with Cambodia’s social structure, where a patron-based relationships 
exist at every level. Because nutrition is multisectoral, political entrepreneurs are also needed 
within each relevant sector. Combined, this means Cambodia must identify champions per key 
constituency: 1) politicians (i.e., parliament); 2) technicians (i.e., in each relevant line ministry); 
3) budget holders (i.e., MoEF and in the Office of the Governor at provincial level); and 4) civil 
society.   
Determining from which constituency to draw leaders is one step in creating nutrition 
champions. Another is identifying the right individuals to serve as champions. Because the 
nutrition sector reportedly has not fully accepted those currently in leadership roles and these 
individuals have been unable to unify the community, this step is of utmost importance. There is 
a significant body of literature on the key characteristics of effective leaders (147-151). There is 
also a growing body of literature and research on nutrition leadership (18, 84, 138). Drawing 
from this, champions must be motivated, knowledgeable, and able to coalesce a fractured policy 
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community. They also need to be well-connected and have a deep understanding of the relevant 
stakeholders as well as insight into these stakeholders’ perspectives and how to adjust the frame 
to bring them on board. 
Emerging Cambodian leaders will be most effective if they are able to bridge these 
attributes with the country’s highly interconnected, patronage-based, hierarchical culture. This 
makes leadership as defined internationally difficult to achieve. For instance, champions must 
simultaneously be respected while not being perceived as better in some way by those they lead.  
Given the importance of relationships in this society, leaders must also be capable of building 
rapport and trust. Typically this is done through patron-based networks, which are seen as 
offering protection, but not trust per se (141). These context requirements highlight the 
importance of creating a set of nutrition leadership attributes for Cambodia that can be used as 
the basis of champion selection. As the right individuals emerge, because many are unlikely to 
have the leadership capacity needed to serve this function, their capacity must be strengthened 
and donor funding is needed to support this effort. (More on capacity building is discussed 
below.) As recommended by the 2008 Lancet series, DPs who seek to improve nutrition in 
country must recognize the importance of investing in capacity strengthening and align their 
support in a more coordinated fashion, independent of project support (81).   
6.2.2 Strengthen National Governance 
Although the involvement of the executive office was a critical component of nutrition 
progress in a number of settings, including Brazil, Peru, and Bangladesh, it was not a sufficient 
condition in Cambodia (82). Despite the Prime Minister having named CARD the country’s 
nutrition coordinating body and assigning the Deputy Prime Minister as Chair of the TWG in 
2012, as this study found, stakeholders have not fully accepted or given CARD the authority 
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required to play this role. The TWG too was perceived as less effective than needed to overcome 
the community’s fragmentation and individual members’ efforts to control the issue.    
As with champions, guiding institutions need the capacity to lead and to manage 
coordination. They must have the ability to effectively generate political will and a shared 
agenda, to establish and manage partnerships across sectors and stakeholders, and to lead a 
coordinated process of planning and implementing multifaceted strategies (18, 70). Capacity to 
build consensus is also critical, which is discussed in the next sub-section. As a first step, 
Cambodia needs to determine the right “home” for nutrition. Subsequently, the DPs need to 
galvanize the UN to shift its focus from policy making and message delivery to strengthening 
this government body to serve as Cambodia’s guiding institution for nutrition and to effectively 
manage the TWG and the SUN coordination mechanisms. As previously highlighted, this may 
require not only a shift in how the UN works with the government, but also who from within 
each organization is dedicated to this task, since it is likely to require individuals with policy 
formulation and capacity building skills rather than only nutritional technical expertise. Most UN 
agencies are likely to have such capacities in country, but not necessarily yet directed to this 
effort. Once the guiding institution has sufficient capacity, it must then build similar capacity at 
the subnational level where a sustainable and effective nutrition response is urgently needed.  
This means Cambodia’s guiding institution requires both the capacity to lead and to transfer such 
capacities to others.   
A prerequisite to building “strategic capacity (71)” in Cambodia is defining a set of 
advocacy competencies needed by a guiding institution and the identified nutrition champions.  
These competencies, particularly fostering effective, collaborative relationships and generating 
consensus, should be drawn from the literature on building nutrition advocacy (70, 71). Yet, 
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similar to adapting international leadership attributes to the Cambodian context, advocacy 
competencies must also be adapted to the country’s socio-cultural norms. For instance, in 
Cambodian society, equilibrium is important. This means that groups with low levels of trust 
among members quickly assign blame, possibly removing the scapegoated individual. By 
contrast, a close-knit group will work hard to find a common perspective (152).   
Building capacity also requires a comprehensive set of strategies—training, on-the-job 
coaching and mentoring, and supporting Cambodia to learn from other countries’ experiences 
(57). But these approaches must be adapted and adjusted over time, rather than simply replicated.  
Bringing in multiple international, independent experts, as suggested for supporting consensus 
building below, is one mechanism that can be used for ongoing mentoring support. It also 
requires donors to prioritize such capacity building and align their support toward it. A concrete 
action needed is to revise the existing curriculum targeting national and sub-national decision 
makers implemented by CARD’s nutrition training pool, which currently focuses too narrowly 
on project design, implementation, and monitoring skills. It needs a clear set of objectives for 
strengthening strategic capacities (as well as on serving as a vehicle to disseminate the internal 
frame and develop plans for action) at national and sub-national levels. Some of these revisions 
were also called for in the 2014 National Progress Report on Food Security and Nutrition (47).  
If Cambodia were to develop this curriculum, it would be a significant contribution to global 
nutrition advocacy efforts. 
6.2.3 Create an Internal Frame 
Multiple goals, a lack of focus and a lack of consensus within nutrition communities is a 
well-documented barrier to creating an internal frame to steer the nutrition response. As 
identified in other studies (57, 68, 146), this situation in Cambodia stems from competing 
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personal and organizational interests. To overcome this barrier, Cambodia needs an internal 
frame regarding nutrition priorities and responses. But before this frame can be developed, as 
found in Bolivia, Cambodia needs a frame for multi-stakeholder decision making processes (68).  
In recent years, there has been a push for a new way of operating. Many donors have 
shifted to a country-centered approach, and a number of declarations (Paris and Accra) (21), as 
well as the SUN movement, have set an international norm for country-owned, partner aligned 
development. Cambodia must capitalize upon this shift and apply incentives or disincentives 
leading each stakeholder to recognize the need for and to adopt practices that allow for a 
collective effort. 
A major culprit in Cambodia for not aligning behind a country-led response is the donor 
community. Currently, multilateral and bilateral donors give conflicting signals, have mandate 
gaps, and fund multiple, parallel activities, leaving their partners, primarily international NGOs 
to follow their mandate and not that of the government. As identified by this study, this situation 
is particularly true for the UN. The government highlighted the lack of coordination, mandate 
gaps, and funded parallel activities across multiple government bodies among UN agencies. In 
addition, Cambodia has the advantage and disadvantage of thousands of small, privately funded 
primarily local NGOs working to improve nutrition, bringing in critical resources, but often 
spending them in ways that are uncoordinated and in conflict with existing policies and 
priorities. There is an urgent need for donors, the UN, and NGOs to help simplify and unify the 
nutrition response and to ensure a collective effort that supports the government. To do so, it is 
imperative to identify the actors who are willing and who have the power, respect, incentive, and 
authority to coalesce around and promote this new country owned and partner supported norm.  
As in Guatemala (68), this could be done by gathering stakeholders’ perceptions of a good policy 
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making process. Dialogue with stakeholders could determine the key principles needed for the 
process, such as “focus on securing common interest (68),” the desired results from a good 
process, who would be willing to participate, and if they would be willing to accept the decisions 
resulting from such a process.    
For civil society, in addition to having their donors aligned behind a government-owned 
and led response, incentives and disincentives to cooperate could be put in place. Positive pushes 
may involve government recognition, such as government medals and awards.  Disincentives 
could come in the form of operating restrictions as well as reporting requirements.  Such 
disincentives exist, though are not always enforced. With the passage of the Law on Associations 
and Non-Governmental Organizations (LANGO) in August 2015, the government now has 
greater latitude in controlling NGOs’ ability to operate in country, and this disincentive becomes 
a greater threat. 
To create the second frame addressing nutrition priorities and solutions, the existing 
divergence among government, donor, UN, and NGO priorities would need to be mitigated. This 
requires consensus building, identified as an effective strategy in the literature review of 
Southeast Asia presented in Chapter 2.  Such a process must allow each actor/organization to re-
examine its own priorities and offer space for frank, challenging dialogue (81). This process 
must also generate a sense of trust among actors, allowing issues of true significance to rise to 
the top without prodding from self-interest, ultimately aligning the community around a common 
agenda and a clear set of actions that facilitate a multisectoral response.   
As presented in Chapter 2, based on experience in the region, consensus can be fostered 
in a number of ways. Building on the Vietnam experience of pairing a national government 
leader with an international expert, Cambodia will benefit from pairing with a group of experts, 
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given historical practice (86). Because of the discord and lack of confidence within and between 
funders and civil society in Cambodia, it is critical to identify experts who are both considered 
neutral and credible. Particularly important in this setting is identifying people inside and outside 
of government who are relationship builders and readily cultivate a sense of trust.  Perhaps 
pooled funding could be used to hire external consultants to co-facilitate this process, with a 
selection committee comprising representatives of key stakeholders.   
A second strategy involves gathering and communicating information and evidence (87, 
88). The provision of evidence is not a sufficient condition for consensus building (71), but it can 
be used strategically to draw attention to the severity and magnitude of the problem and to 
effective solutions. This is discussed further in Section 6.2.6 below.   
Another strategy, given that Cambodian cultural norms restrict public criticism and 
disagreement, requires providing opportunities and channels for individuals and organizations, 
regardless of their power, to safely engage and find common ground. The formal coordination 
mechanisms do not yet afford this opportunity, not only because they lack focus and a strategic 
agenda, but also because they do not necessarily create the needed space to discuss, debate, and 
reach consensus on topics beyond technical matters. Thus, it is necessary to utilize alternative 
channels, such as those established as part of SUN.   
In May 2015, Cambodia established the SUN civil society network. This development is 
an important step in building community cohesion among civil society actors where currently the 
community is dominated primarily by large, international organizations. HKI was named civil 
society lead and in this role must ensure all members of civil society, regardless of their size, 
geographic coverage, or funding levels, have an opportunity to be consulted and engaged. This 
effort could serve as one incentive for smaller NGOs to align with the larger agenda. HKI also 
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has the mandate to broaden the participation of civil society, drawing in networks (e.g., a 
burgeoning Phnom Penh based breastfeeding network) and associations. Also important to 
consider—to broaden local ownership and leadership—is for HKI to mentor a local organization 
that can assume this convening role following HKI’s two-year tenure.  
Finally, to create an internal frame, Cambodia could implement several coordinated, 
multisectoral responses with a core set of priorities in a few provinces. These would require 
strong monitoring and a mandate to adapt the response adjusting for the unintended 
consequences (both negative and positive) that always result from implementation. As these 
efforts evolve, they can be profiled as examples, generating recognition, interest, and 
momentum. Serving as a “tipping point (153),”—a small change in the system—these efforts can 
spread to become the norm rather than the exception. 
6.2.4 Identify Policy Windows 
Windows of opportunity are moments in time that provide an opening for change. To 
result in change, these windows converge problem identification and recognition, a policy 
community proposing alternatives and a course of action, and the political stream accepting and 
adopting it (71, 154). Sometimes such windows cannot be predicted, while at other times they 
can be created. This means Cambodia’s guiding institution and identified leaders need the 
capacity both to recognize and to create such opportunities. Also needed is the ability to utilize 
windows to push an agenda and rally the community to act. Three potential windows of 
opportunity are considered here—the soon to be revised Communication for Behavioral Impact 
(COMBI) Campaign to Promote Complementary Feeding in Cambodia strategy, the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) launched globally in September 2015, and a possible upcoming 
national nutrition conference. 
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COMBI is a communications strategy for complementary feeding, which requires a 
multisectoral response. Although technical in nature, if its revision were to employ a collective, 
inclusive strategy—engaging all relevant ministries and related actors—it would afford the 
nutrition community the opportunity to bridge sectoral boundaries. Such an effort is important 
because, as found in this study, the community recognizes the need to employ a multisectoral, 
coordinated effort to improve complementary feeding, but does not yet know how to do so. This 
approach necessitates pushing the process past the purview of MOH and into that of other actors 
as well. This would allow Cambodia to develop an overarching set of complementary feeding 
messages and strategies that are then tailored and delivered by different sectoral delivery 
channels, such as VHSGs and health staff for health and field extension agents for agriculture, 
rather than only by MOH and NGOs as historically done.   
Although the MDGs were criticized for causing some of the lack of prioritization and 
clarity at the international level (81), they served as a mechanism for holding countries 
accountable for development progress. When the MDGs were developed globally, Cambodia 
adjusted them to reflect the country’s situation, adding stunting and wasting targets. Although 
Cambodia’s targets were not fully achieved, such a process is an important part of priority 
setting. Regardless of whether the international community is able to adjust the goals, indicators, 
and targets of the SDGs sufficiently to address the identified drawbacks, a strategic process of 
adapting them to Cambodia—and identifying the core strategies needed to achieve the specific 
goals and targets identified—could help the country focus its nutrition response. Cambodia-
specific SDG goals, indicators and targets, developed jointly by government actors identified as 
critical to the response in the March 2015 National Nutrition Conference Declaration would then 
serve as a mechanism for holding the country accountable both nationally and on the global 
129 
stage. This latter point is important as international recognition is a useful incentive for progress. 
Cambodia received tremendous positive recognition, including an MDG award, for having 
achieved its targets for HIV well before 2015 (155). The potential for such attention could serve 
as an incentive for generating realistic goals and targets and aligning strategies toward them for 
this next round of global commitment.   
Fora are needed where stakeholders can publicly state that they embrace the country-
owned, country-led approach and explain how they will support components of Cambodia’s 
newly framed nutrition response. Such fora also provide the government the opportunity to hold 
these actors accountable to their commitments. A potential national nutrition conference said to 
be planned for November 2015 could serve this function. Although there was a National 
Nutrition Conference conducted in March 2015, it was not as effective as needed. There were no 
stated objectives for this conference, and although early drafts of the agenda included stunting in 
the conference title, the focus was watered down to nutrition broadly. Further, although there 
was a session in which government actors were asked to publicly declare their commitment to 
nutrition, there appears to have been no resulting budget allocation. As such, this subsequent 
conference could encourage the government to share its priorities and to put donors, the UN, and 
other important stakeholders in the proverbial hot seat. 
6.2.5 Create and Communicate an External Frame 
Focusing attention on an agreed-to priority, raising its visibility and generating resources 
to address it, requires conveying it in ways that resonate with key constituencies who are external 
to the nutrition sector. This portrayal must not only clearly outline the problem and solution, but 
also articulate what each targeted actor can do. Because Cambodia relies heavily on donor funds, 
and the lack of government funding allocated to nutrition was identified as a barrier by this 
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study, MoEF and subnational leadership are the priority stakeholders for framing efforts. (Once 
Cambodia has an internal frame, external donors would be expected to direct their support to 
identified priorities.)   
Although the link with economic growth was identified by this study as a useful frame to 
use with non-nutrition actors, participants were drawn from the nutrition arena. As such, what 
they consider an effective frame may not resonate with non-nutrition constituents. As an 
illustration, despite global evidence demonstrating nutrition as a “best buy (3),” and national 
evidence on the cost of malnutrition (15), as well as the amount needed for the health-sector 
response alone (126), to date, no significant funding allocation has been made. It is unclear if this 
is because communications have not effectively reached MoEF, or because they have been 
insufficiently focused, did not convey an “ask,” or if it is because the frame itself was 
inappropriate. Given the limited availability of public funds, from MoEF’s perspective, ensuring 
the most cost-effective interventions are mobilized and used appropriately to achieve desired 
outcomes may be of utmost importance. Meanwhile, for elected officials, visible results may 
resonate better. To create a truly effective external frame there must be an inclusive, collective 
process, and, as discussed in the recommendations for further research section, more must be 
understood about the perspectives of key constituencies. Such perspectives could be gathered 
through Opinion Leader Research as conducted by Alive & Thrive in a number of countries to 
identify the framing, audience, and channels of advocacy messages. Once developed, this 
narrative must be conveyed through multiple channels, including strategic communications and 
policy windows. 
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6.2.6 Gather Strategic Information  
A systematic review of Cambodian studies found that the country lacks sufficient 
research examining implementation effectiveness and scaling up (156). This was particularly true 
for nutrition-related research, which accounted for a very small proportion of health-related 
articles published between 2000 and 2012, of which only one-fifth provided actionable policy-
related recommendations. This finding, similar to the literature (8, 60, 62), corroborates the 
findings of this study, which calls for greater localized evidence and more routine collection and 
use of data. Both would help set priorities, contribute to policy making, and ensure the efficient 
use of limited resources; however, they would only be as effective as the process undertaken. To 
date, the conduct of research and documentation are led by the same organizations controlling 
resources and the nutrition agenda. Thus, it is critical that this effort be inclusive and transparent.  
An important criteria identified by this study for the Cambodian nutrition community to 
choose an action to implement at scale was whether it was evidence-based, yet there was said to 
be insufficient Cambodia-specific proof of concept. The desire for country-specific evidence 
reflects effective policy making processes in Southeast Asia as reviewed in Chapter 2. Yet, as 
also highlighted in the literature, a lack of evidence can be used as a barrier to progress, and as 
such, having in-country evidence should not be a prerequisite to action (57, 71). To determine 
what evidence is missing, a review of both published and grey literature—program and project 
reports and studies—to see what is known in country in needed. Lessons can be applied and a 
research and evaluation plan for filling identified gaps can then be developed.   
Since 2008, the literature has urged more funding be directed to conducting rigorous 
impact evaluations, particularly those that incorporate cost effectiveness and cost benefit analysis 
to make the case for and focus investments (60, 81).  Such evaluations, along with 
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implementation research, would allow Cambodia to learn both from success and failure, and 
facilitate uptake of evidence during project design and implementation (81). While the 
community creates a research and evaluation plan, Cambodia can take advantage of planned 
studies, such as that for USAID’s NOURISH project, ensuring the questions needing to be 
answered are included.   
Routine data are not collected with sufficient frequency in Cambodia, despite such data 
being an important component of a national multisectoral nutrition response (82). These data are 
critical to help ensure the evidence-base is being applied appropriately and effectively, that 
coverage gaps do not exist, particularly coverage of multisectoral nutrition programming, and 
allow the community to assess progress and adapt programming more regularly. Such data are 
also particularly important for generating interest and action at the sub-national level (73, 88).  
Currently, some key nutrition and IYCF indicators are within the HMIS, but they are neither 
routinely collected nor reported, while other indicators are omitted. Data for the nutrition 
indicators added to the HMIS in 2014 are not currently demanded as part of routine (monthly) 
reporting. Including this information in monthly reports from health facilities (health centers and 
hospitals) would be a simple and important first step in providing essential routine information 
on nutritional status and service delivery to decision makers. In addition, developing reporting 
tools for community and facility-based IYCF service delivery that is reported up from the 
operational district level would help to fill the gap on feeding practices. (A similar approach is 
employed by the HIV sector.) Another option is a national nutrition surveillance system that 
collects routine data, as employed in other countries (87). Annual surveys in one or more 
provinces to capture additional data and those who are less frequently reached by health services 
or community level IYCF service delivery could also be employed and be used to demonstrate 
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the feasibility and utility of such a system. These approaches combined would give Cambodia 
the ammunition needed to advocate for funds to expand.   
Yet, not only do such data need to be collected more routinely, they also must be 
conveyed in meaningful ways. For instance, capacity is needed to help prioritize where to work 
and which specific problems to address in each locale; visual tools, such as maps, could be 
created. These maps could overlay nutrition, hygiene, and agricultural status and practice data 
with information regarding where and what each sector delivers. Using these maps, the 
government could invest its own resources and direct donors to the geographies where the issue 
is most severe, and to support sectors to work together where needed. Maps at both the national 
and the subnational level are needed.   
Another useful tool for highlighting needs, tracking progress, and conveying the frame 
are “profiles.” These profiles, similar to those produced at the national and provincial levels in 
Vietnam with technical and financial support from Alive & Thrive, would provide an overview 
of the situation—including up-to-date nutrition and IYCF data—and the current response being 
implemented.  
6.3 Study Limitations 
There were a number of potential study limitations. Having only one author could have 
introduced bias into the interview process, transcript coding, and the presentation of the findings.  
In addition, the PI both came with a predisposed bias regarding the importance of stunting and 
complementary feeding as a partial solution, and gradually engaged in professional nutrition-
related work in Cambodia over the study period. As a result, the researcher lost some of the 
“outsider” (etic) perspective. The tension between etic and emic (insider) viewpoints is well 
noted in qualitative research (157). The etic approach relies on existing theories and frameworks 
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to guide the inquiry, while an emic one uses the words of the participants to derive concepts. To 
reduce the subjectivity stemming from the PI’s growing personal perspectives and experience, 
despite the initial emic approach, concepts and themes are heavily influenced by participants 
own words. Doing so is a recommended approach for reducing potential bias (157, 158). To 
triangulate findings, secondary documents were also employed. Further, as noted in the plan for 
change section, recognizing the slant toward stunting as the most pressing problem for Cambodia 
to address, proposed solutions are for generating nutrition priorities and are not focused on action 
specific to this issue. 
In qualitative research, key informants are selected because of their expertise, experience, 
and opinions related to the research topic. To ensure participants met these criteria and would 
make meaningful contributions, a systematic process of identifying organizations was 
undertaken. Representatives of organizations invited to participate were sampled based on the 
membership/participation lists of the two primary nutrition-related working groups in Cambodia.  
This study’s participants are considered experts and the current leaders of nutrition policy 
making, programming, and research in country. True to this, most were able to answer questions 
that drew upon their past experience and knowledge, particularly related to how the government 
works. Yet, as made evident by the study results, aspects of participants’ knowledge and capacity 
key aspects of nutrition was limited, which resulted in the majority of participants unable to 
respond to all questions at the level required to fully answer this study’s questions. In particular, 
the majority of participants did not have a deep understanding of issues related to complementary 
feeding, or ideas about how to address existing sociopolitical barriers to nutrition progress, as 
illustrated by few participants offering suggestions for improving current conditions. That 
participants were unable to respond fully reflects the broader context of Cambodia, and while 
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limiting the results of this study, points to the importance of building nutrition technical and 
structural capacity in Cambodia. 
Similarly, bias may have been introduced by non-participation. Of the 51 organizations 
invited for an interview, 9 did not participate. Three of these were from the NWG, and six from 
the TWG-SP&FSN. Of the nine, five were from government, which may have affected study 
findings. The reason given for not participating was that their scope of work was irrelevant to the 
study topic. If this is the case, any bias introduced by non-participation is minimized. Of note, no 
one from the MEYS, identified by participants as influential in the nutrition sector, participated. 
This was the only ministry identified as important that was not part of this study.  
Representatives of the four ministries said to be most influential and responsible for nutrition—
MOH, MAFF, MRD, and MOP—were interviewed. Given this, the lack of participation of 
segments of the government may not be of significance, yet it is a possibility that must be 
considered. The remaining non-participants, all civil society, did not refuse to participate; rather, 
the interview was not able to be scheduled during the data collection period. This lack of 
participation is unlikely to have significantly affected the study results because civil society was 
well represented in this study. Further, there is no reason to believe these organizations would 
have dissimilar viewpoints on the issues. This does, however, remain a possibility.   
Response bias was another potential limitation of this study. The majority of participants 
discussed barriers to progress and to a lesser degree strategies for improvement. This was 
somewhat surprising given that Cambodian cultural norms view failure as shameful, and as a 
result, people seek to avoid criticism (135, 159). That the bulk of responses related to challenges 
and not solutions may be due to the way questions were formulated, including the barriers card 
ranking exercise. Alternatively, perhaps it was because of the rapport built between the PI and 
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the participants during the face-to-face interviews, or because the PI was viewed as a nutrition 
community outsider. In Cambodia, outsiders are frequently trusted more than members of one’s 
community. This is thus what may have led participants to speak freely during the interviews, 
discussing perceived challenges in detail, even those they themselves noted as sensitive.   
6.4 Recommendations for Further Research 
Despite improving political will and the promulgation of policy frameworks, due to a 
number of sociopolitical factors, Cambodia is not yet ready to effectively reduce its burden of 
malnutrition. The results of this study have implications beyond Cambodia. The findings 
contribute to global learning regarding the barriers to a national nutrition response, as well as 
strategies for creating policy community cohesion in a multisectoral development arena. Such 
strategies, drawing from those proposed by Shiffman and others (70, 71, 74, 82), entail 
identifying and creating leaders, strengthening guiding institutions and coordination structures, 
identifying policy windows, creating internal and external frames, and gathering strategic 
information.   
The findings from this study also highlight the need for further investigation. Particularly 
important is the exploration of how cultural and national traits can and need to be handled 
strategically and sensitively to address the sociopolitical barriers as identified by this study.  
Highlighted previously, understanding local definitions of leadership, for example, would help 
countries apply recommendations emanating from the global literature.   
Further research is also needed in Cambodia. As Cambodia continues to tackle nutrition, 
and ideally as it applies at least some of the strategies outlined in this study’s proposed plan for 
change, it would be beneficial to evaluate progress using a developmental evaluation approach 
(160). Developmental evaluation examines change as it emerges within complex environments 
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(or with “wicked problems (138)”), and accounts for numerous interacting and interdependent 
elements and nonlinear dynamics. This type of evaluation entails gathering real-time data, 
providing needed information for ongoing decision-making, and adaptive management. It thus 
provides a second “loop” of information, going beyond problem and solution identification, as 
done in this study, to “questioning the assumptions, policies, practices, values, and system 
dynamics that led to the problem in the first place, and intervening in ways that involve the 
modification and underlying system relationships and functioning” (160). One form of 
development evaluation that should be considered is a prospective, embedded, participant-
observer, action-research study as was conducted in Vietnam (86). 
Another needed study entails examining the efficacy and effectiveness of past and current 
programming, as well as assessing the implementation processes. Such an assessment was 
beyond the scope of this study, but doing so would fill key gaps and help the country prioritize 
which actions should be implemented at scale. The need to study the effectiveness of currently 
known solutions was highlighted by the 2003 Bellagio Conference on Child Survival (90).  
Participants criticized the focus on developing new technologies when two-thirds of child deaths 
could be prevented by known/available interventions. They thus recommended research on the 
“delivery and use of existing technology…breaking bottlenecks in delivery and utilization” 
(161). The need for impact evaluation as well as implementation research was further highlighted 
by the Lancet 2008 series (81), and WHO more recently confirmed the need to better understand 
“program quality, coverage, context, resource use, and delivery platforms” to inform policy 
making and programming (59).   
Research that entails broadening the scope of this study to include participants from three 
key constituencies—non-nutrition actors, such as parliamentarians, the private sector, and sub-
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national level actors would also have merit. A more inclusive framework is needed in Cambodia, 
one that draws on the experience and perspectives of these actors to generate solutions. This is of 
import because increased attention may depend on coalitions that extend beyond technically-
oriented actors (162). Further analysis of the sub-national level is also warranted; in particular, 
an analysis of the current conditions related to political commitment and recognition, policy 
implementation, coordination and communication, and research and evidence and how these 
conditions can be improved. Such a study could compare provinces where young child stunting 
has improved over the years to those where it has not. Learnings from such a study are of import 
given decentralization and the role district and commune leadership have in setting priorities and 
allocating funding. It would also contribute to understanding how to translate the improving 
conditions to implementation. These findings would be of benefit beyond Cambodia as well. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Since March 31, 2015, the end of this study’s data collection period, Cambodia has 
continued to demonstrate its commitment to addressing malnutrition. This can be seen by the 
development of the terms of reference for the oversight board and implementation guidelines for 
Sub-Decree 133, the national code on the marketing of breastmilk substitutes, and by Cambodia 
signing-on to the Zero Hunger Challenge. Despite these steps, until Cambodia addresses the 
sociopolitical barriers that have hindered greater success, in particular, the lack of policy 
community cohesion and clarity of focus, it will be difficult for the country to achieve sufficient 
scale and coverage of an effective nutrition response.   
As seen in Cambodia, and similar to other contexts as noted by Pelletier, nutrition 
communities recognize that successful country-level efforts require sustained political 
commitment, sufficient financial resources, strong multisectoral, multi-stakeholder and multi-
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level governance, and technical, managerial and implementation capacity (57). Also seen in 
Cambodia is that for an effective multisectoral nutrition response, consensus on how to make 
decisions as well as on the decisions themselves is needed (62). SUN also highlights the 
importance of country-owned and directed nutrition responses, requiring that all partners—
donors, the UN and NGOs, align behind the government’s priorities. As proposed here, doing so 
requires such actors to step beyond their organizational mandates and personal interests to 
collaboratively build Cambodia’s capacity to lead its own response. With this capacity to lead, 
and with a strong guiding national institution, Cambodia can effectively utilize external technical 
and financial assistance to define priorities, champion the cause, and frame and communicate the 
issue to demonstrably to reduce malnutrition. 
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APPENDIX 1: KEY CONSTRUCTS 
 
Terms Definitions Source 
Nutrition-related 
Chronic 
malnutrition  
 
Chronic malnutrition, also known as ‘stunting’, is a form of 
linear growth failure which develops over a long period of 
time. Inadequate nutrition over long periods of time 
(including poor maternal nutrition and poor infant and young 
child feeding practices) and/or repeated infections can lead to 
stunting.  
UNICEF, 
2012   
Complementary 
feeding   
A “complex set of behaviors, comprising the timing of 
introduction, food choices, and dietary diversity, preparation 
methods, quantity, feeding frequency, responsiveness to 
infant cues, and safe preparation and storage of foods.” It 
entails the use of age-appropriate, adequate and safe solid or 
semi-solid food in addition to breast milk or a breast milk 
substitute. The process starts when breast milk or infant 
formula alone is no longer sufficient to meet the nutritional 
requirements of an infant. It is not recommended to provide 
any solid, semi-solid or soft foods to children less than 6 
months of age. The target range for complementary feeding 
is generally considered to be 6–23 months. 
Stewart, et 
al., 2013; 
UNICEF.  
2012  
Exclusive 
breastfeeding  
 
An infant receives only breast milk. No other liquids or 
solids are given – not even water – with the exception of oral 
rehydration solution, or drops/syrups of vitamins, minerals or 
medicines.  WHO and UNICEF recommend that infants 
should be exclusively breastfed for the first six months of 
life to achieve optimal growth, development, and health. 
Thereafter, infants should receive nutritionally adequate and 
safe complementary foods, while continuing to breastfeed 
for up to two years or more. 
WHO, 
Media 
Center 
Factsheets  
Infant and 
young child 
feeding (IYCF)  
Term used to describe the feeding of infants (less than 12 
months old) and young children (12–23 months old).  
Optimal infant and young child feeding entails: 1) early 
initiation of breastfeeding with one hour of birth; 2) 
exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months of life; and 3) 
the introduction of nutritionally adequate and safe 
complementary foods at six months together with continued 
breastfeeding up to two years and beyond.  
WHO, 
Media 
Center 
Factsheets  
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Terms Definitions Source 
Malnutrition  
A broad term commonly used as an alternative to 
‘undernutrition’, but which technically also refers to over-
nutrition. People are malnourished if their diet does not 
provide adequate nutrients for growth and maintenance or if 
they are unable to fully utilize the food they eat due to illness 
(undernutrition). They are also malnourished if they 
consume too many calories (over-nutrition). 
UNICEF, 
2012 
Nutrition 
sensitive 
programs and 
approaches 
Efforts that directly indirectly to nutritional outcomes and 
tend not to have nutritional improvements as their aim (e.g., 
agriculture and food security, women’s empowerment). 
Black, et 
al., 2013; 
WHO 2013  
Nutrition 
specific 
interventions 
and programs 
These efforts, also called direct nutrition interventions, 
directly contribute to nutritional outcomes and have 
nutritional improvements as their aim (e.g., micronutrient 
supplementation, breastfeeding promotion)  
Black, et 
al., 2013; 
WHO 2013  
Undernutrition  
 
An insufficient intake and/or inadequate absorption of 
energy, protein or micronutrients that in turn leads to 
nutritional deficiency. Stunting, wasting, and deficiencies of 
essential vitamins and minerals (referred to as 
micronutrients) comprises undernutrition. 
Black, et 
al., 2008  
Scaling-up related 
Agenda setting 
Agenda setting is the first step in the policy making process, 
and is followed by identifying alternatives, choosing among 
alternatives, and implementing the decision. A government 
agenda is the “list of subjects to which government officials 
and those around them are paying attention.” 
Kingdon, 
2012  
Enabling 
environment 
A political and policy process that builds and sustains 
momentum for effective implementation of actions that 
address a problem 
Gillespie, 
et al., 2013  
Evidence-based 
interventions 
Interventions that have been evaluated and considered 
efficacious (internally valid) and/or effective (eternally 
valid). 
Lobb, et 
al., 2012  
Implementation 
science 
The study of methods to improve the uptake, 
implementation, and translation of research findings into 
healthcare policy and practice.  
Padian, et 
al., 2011; 
Peterson, et 
al., 2012  
Leadership 
Leadership entails creating a vision of the future and 
identifying and implementing strategies needed to produce 
change to achieve the vision. It also entails “aligning 
people”, creating consensus, “commitment to and 
momentum” for change, and “motivating and inspiring” 
people to keep them moving forward to achieve the vision. 
Kotter, J. 
2001 
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Terms Definitions Source 
Political Priority 
“National political leaders publicly and privately express 
sustained concern for the issue; the government, through an 
authoritative decision-making process, enacts policies that 
offer widely embraced strategies to address the problem; and 
the government allocates and releases public budgets 
commensurate with the problem’s gravity.” 
Shiffman, 
J., 2007  
Scaling-up 
The ambition or process of expanding the coverage of health 
interventions 
Manghan, 
et al., 2010  
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM 
 
Introduction/Purpose of research 
 
Thank you for agreeing to meet with me today. As I mentioned in previous communications, I am 
conducting this study as part of my doctoral studies at the University of North Carolina in the 
United States. The purpose of this research study is to identify the barriers and facilitators to 
scaling up complementary feeding in Cambodia and the actions needed at local, provincial, and 
national levels to address Cambodia’s high rate of child stunting. To gather information, I will be 
talking with policy makers, donors, and nutrition implementers.   
 
Research Procedure 
 
Today’s discussion should last approximately 1 to 1.5 hours. I have a list of questions I would like 
to ask you today. Please note that there are no right or wrong answers and you can skip questions 
you do not want to answer. To ensure I am able to use all of your useful input, I would like to 
audio record our discussion. This will give me an exact record of what you say. I will also take 
notes about our discussion.  
 
Risks 
 
There are no personal risks for your participation in this study. Because I will take precautions to 
protect your identity, no one will know what you say to me today. However, some questions may 
make you feel uncomfortable or embarrassed. If that is the case, you are free to refuse to answer 
them.   
 
Benefits 
 
Although there is no direct or immediate benefit to you for participating in this study, by doing so, 
you have the opportunity to share your experience and opinions, which will help to improve the 
health of Cambodian children.   
 
Confidentiality 
 
All information in the research will be kept confidential and only serve the research purpose. Only 
I will have access to documents and audio recordings from today’s interview. I will not share the 
recording of your voice, and I will keep all documents and audio recordings in a locked cabinet in 
a locked room. Your name will not be connected to what you say in the interview. Your name will 
not be written on any document. I will destroy the recording when the research is completed.  
 
Voluntary participation and withdrawal from the research  
 
Your participation in this interview is completely voluntary. If you want, you can refuse to 
participate in the interview, or—as I mentioned previously—you can refuse to answer any 
questions at any time.  
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You have the right to refuse to participate in the study without any punishment or harm. Even 
when you have agreed to participate in the study, you can withdraw from the study in case of any 
inconvenience. No one will know of your withdrawal from the research, and your doing so will 
not harm you in any way. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
 
Contact information 
 
If you have any further question about the research, please contact me, as principle investigator. If 
you have any questions about your rights while you are in the research, please contact a 
representative of the NEC:  
 
Ms. Amy Weissman 
Tel: 078.666.595 
Email:aweissma@live.unc.edu; or 
amyweissman@gmail.com 
 
NEC 
No 2 Kim II Sung Blvd 
Khan Tuol Kork 
Phnom Penh 
Cambodia 
Tel: Int. +855 23-880-345 
Fax: Int. +855 23-880-346 
E-mail: research03@online.com.kh 
 
 
  
145 
Signature page 
 
 
Participant’s Commitment 
 
After the interviewer has answered my questions, I am volunteering to participate in the research. 
I know that I can withdraw from the research at any time and the interviewer is willing to answer 
any of my questions during the implementation of this research.  
 
___________________                                        
DD/MM/YY 
 
____________________________                                          
Name of participant   
 
____________________________                                          
Signature of participant   
 
 
Investigator’s commitment     
"I have explained all the procedures involved in this research as well as risks and benefits when 
participating in the research for voluntary participants."  
 
___________________                                        
DD/MM/YY 
 
____________________________                                          
Name of Investigator   
 
____________________________                                          
Signature of Investigator   
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APPENDIX 3: QUESTION GUIDE 
 
Introduction (to be read to the participant) 
 
Thank you for meeting with me today. As I explained in the letter of introduction, my name is 
Amy Weissman. I am a doctoral candidate in the School of Public Health of the University of 
North Carolina in the United States. I have been living and working in Cambodia for 3 years, 
with a US-based NGO called FHI 360.  
 
Today I asked to speak with you for the purposes of my doctoral research at UNC, and not in my 
official capacity as part of FHI 360. I am interested in learning more about how to effectively 
address critical nutrition problems at scale. Therefore, my research aims to identify strategies 
that can create more favorable conditions for implementing complementary feeding with 
national coverage and impact in Cambodia to address chronic malnutrition as indicated by 
young child stunting. I am interested to hear your views and to discuss your ideas on this topic. 
 
This interview is completely confidential. Any information you provide will be presented with 
that provided by other participants, or via anonymous/non-identifiable quotes. Tapes and 
transcripts will be destroyed at the end of the research study.  
 
I would like to record our discussion today. Do I have permission to do so? (if yes:) If there are 
questions that you do not feel comfortable talking about, please feel free to skip them. You may 
also ask me to stop recording and/or leave the interview at any time. 
 
Questions with probes Purpose/Instructions/Notes 
Warm-up 
1. How long you have worked with your organization? 
These questions aim to put 
the participant at ease and 
for the PI to get to know the 
participant and his/her 
organization in brief. 
2. Please describe briefly what your organization does in the 
area of nutrition?  
(listen carefully for how “nutrition” is defined) 
3. Please describe briefly your role in your organization? 
Political Commitment/Shared Understanding 
4. Are you aware of Cambodia’s prevalence of chronic 
malnutrition as indicated by young child stunting?   
 
Probe: what is it?   
 
These questions aim to 
identify participants’ 
understanding of young 
child stunting (“shared 
understanding”) and to 
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Questions with probes Purpose/Instructions/Notes 
5. In your view, why is Cambodia’s young child stunting 
prevalence high? 
 
Probe (allow for “we are short”/not viewed as a problem):  
 Lack of programming? 
 Lack of policies? 
 Lack of technical know-how (among whom)? 
 Lack of political commitment?  
 Lack of recognition of the issue (among whom)? 
 Lack of funding? 
assess the level of priority 
given to this issue. In Q4, if 
participant is unaware of the 
stunting prevalence, explain 
that it has been ~40% for 
over a decade and higher 
than many other countries in 
the region. 
 
6. Because the stunting rate has not changed for many years, 
one could argue that there hasn’t been much progress in 
reducing stunting in Cambodia. There are likely many 
reasons that this is the case. I have here a set of cards with 
a possible reason listed on each one.  
 
Please place these cards in order from the most important 
to the least important reason.   
 
For the top ranked card, ask why it was chosen (if “other” 
ask for a specific reason).  And:  If high in the ranking, 
for technical know-how and/or lack of recognition ask 
among whom 
 
Card statements:  
 Insufficient M&E 
 Lack of targeting and coverage of interventions/services 
 Limited coordination of interventions 
 Lack of national coordination 
 Lack of policies 
 Lack of technical know-how  
 Lack of political commitment 
 Lack of recognition of the issue  
 Lack of funding 
 Other 
Read aloud each of the cards 
to the participant, and then 
hand him/her the stack and 
ask him/her to place the 
cards in order from most to 
least important reason.  
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Questions with probes Purpose/Instructions/Notes 
7. I would now like to talk about ways to address child 
stunting. There is evidence that young child stunting can 
be reduced in part, through appropriate complementary 
feeding. CF is defined by the UN as the following:  
 
Complementary feeding is the transition from exclusive 
breastfeeding to family food. It is the provision of age-
appropriate, adequate and safe solid or semi-solid food in 
addition to breast milk or a breast milk substitute to 6-24 
month old children. 
 
To what extent do you think people understand and/or 
agree with this definition? 
 
To what extent is there consensus in Cambodia that CF 
can effectively address child stunting? 
 
Probe:  
 If consensus, among whom? 
 If no consensus, why? 
 If no consensus, which stakeholders disagree?  
What are their views on how to reduce child 
stunting? 
Read the definition aloud.  
Allow time for questions of 
clarification on this 
definition, if any. 
8. To generate commitment for complementary feeding to 
reduce child stunting among all stakeholders how would  
you “sell” complementary feeding to:  
 
 Government officials in the health sector; 
agriculture sector, planning/finance sector…? 
 Funders? 
 Implementers? 
Ask about ways to frame the 
issue to raise attention to 
it/generate commitment to it 
(seek the elevator speech).  
If need be, give an example: 
Competition and national 
pride in Vietnam. 
Policy Frameworks and Implementation 
9. Cambodia has produced a number of policies and related 
documents for strengthening complementary feeding to 
address child stunting. Please tell me about Cambodia 
policies or related policy-type documents that you believe 
are effective. 
 
(Ask one-by-one about what they name])  
Have a list of policy 
documents based on 
literature review findings in 
case needed to prompt 
participant. 
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Questions with probes Purpose/Instructions/Notes 
Why do you think X is effective?   
 
Probe:  
 Is it based on evidence? 
 Is it feasible?/implementable (being 
implemented?) 
 Are there any gaps/areas of improvement needed? 
Allow the participant to 
respond to the first question, 
writing down the name of 
each one they list.  Then, ask 
the next question and the 
probes one-by-one for each 
document mentioned. 
10. Now consider what key policies or related documents that 
you believe are still needed for ensuring complementary 
feeding in Cambodia.  Where are the gaps?   
 
Probe:  
 Why isn’t this in place yet? 
 What is needed to put this in place? 
Allow participant to respond 
to Q10, writing down the 
name of any they list. For 
each one mentioned, ask the 
probe questions. 
11. There are a number of complementary feeding solutions 
that have been identified for addressing child stunting, 
some of which are being implemented in Cambodia and 
some are not. I have listed one solution on each of these 
cards.   
(Read the cards and hand them to the participant then say 
and ask:) 
 
For a national scale approach, I would like you to sort the 
cards into three piles – those that you think are most 
urgent/should be done, those you think maybe should be 
done, and those you think should not be done.  
 
You placed x, y, z into the do not do pile?  Why? 
 
You placed x, y, z into the maybe pile?  Why? 
 
Are there any solutions missing from this list?  If so, 
which ones? 
 
Cards: 
 Strategic Behavior change communications/Mass Media 
 Food preparation demonstrations 
 Supplementary foods/ feeding programs 
Read aloud each of the cards 
to the participant, and then 
hand the stack to the 
participant and ask him/her 
to sort the cards into three 
piles – must do, maybe do, 
and not do. 
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Questions with probes Purpose/Instructions/Notes 
 Home gardens/Support to household diversified food 
production support 
 Water and sanitation improvements 
 Breastfeeding maintenance counseling/support 
 Individual/household counseling/support for essential 
feeding (quality, quantity, variety, consistency, responsive 
feeding, feeding during and after illness), food preparation, 
and hygiene and sanitation practices 
 Micronutrient supplementation 
 Cash transfers/livelihood opportunities  
 Fortified food 
 Food safety 
 Enforced sub-decree 133 regulating the promotion of 
breast milk and CF substitutes 
12. You placed x, y, z in the must be implemented pile. Why? 
 
Who needs to be involved to make these strategies 
happen?  
 
Probe:  
 Government bodies (which ones? – probe for 
departments within and individuals by position 
title/name) 
 Private sector (how/why?) 
 Funders 
 Implementers/experts (to do what?) 
 
*What role do each of these stakeholders have in 
implementing these solutions?  
 
What is needed to make these priority solutions happen?  
Probe:  
 Funding (at what level)?   
 Commitment (by whom)?  
 Technical capacity (of whom, what specifically)? 
 “Proof of concept” in Cambodia? 
 
 
Be sure to probe about other 
ministries/ government 
bodies when talking with 
government (e.g., when 
talking with MoH, ask about 
Agriculture). 
 
*Ask one-by-one for all 
stakeholders named: What 
role do you see for each of 
these stakeholders? 
Coordination and Communication 
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Questions with probes Purpose/Instructions/Notes 
13. In most countries there are a few people and/or 
organizations that are especially influential when it comes 
to developing, promoting, and implementing nutrition 
agendas, plans, programs, etc.  Given this, how would a 
decision to implement the top priority you named above, 
get made? (Seek examples) 
 
Probe:  
 Which organizations/individuals have more 
influence? 
 Why do they have more influence? 
 Do you or other nutrition stakeholders have any 
concerns about this? 
Look for issues related to 
organizational mandates, 
influential people/groups, 
historical preferences, 
professional preferences, 
comfort zones, ideological 
positions, funding 
availability, and allegiance 
to authoritative “voices”, 
such as 
WHO/WFP/UNICEF, 
Lancet.   
14. You are a member of the NWG/FSN&SPWG.  How often 
to you attend the monthly meetings? 
 
What do you think of this mechanism? (major strengths 
and weaknesses) 
(If a member of both, ask one-by-one) 
 
Probe: 
 Useful? Effective? 
 Purpose is Political?  Technical? 
 Overlap across groups?/Duplication? 
 Politics/power plays across groups? 
 The “right” people are not participating/present? 
 
15. What topics are typically discussed in meetings? 
 
Probe:  
 Progress in policy making? 
 Progress in programming? 
 Funding? 
 New evidence? 
 
16. On what topics is there consensus among group members? 
17. Are there topics for which there is disagreement among 
group members?  (Seek examples) 
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Questions with probes Purpose/Instructions/Notes 
18. Why is there disagreement? 
 
Probe: are there power or relationship issues? 
Ask this question of non-
government participants 
19. Are there any stakeholders missing from the “dialogue” 
that should be engaged/would have important input? 
 
Probe:  
 Government (specific bodies/departments)  
 Implementer 
 Funder 
 Private sector 
 
Information, Evidence, Research 
20. With whom do you normally or most frequently discuss 
nutrition issues?   Seek to understand current 
sources of information, 
evidence, dialogue 21. What source do you rely on most for technical 
information?  
22.  In your opinion is there is sufficient information available 
to support the government of Cambodia to successfully 
implement interventions to improve complementary 
feeding practices at scale?  If not, what is missing? 
 
(If participant has trouble responding, ask specifically 
about the priority he/she identified in Q12) 
 
Probe:  
 What to actually do? 
 How to do it? 
 Effectiveness of current practices? 
 Current coverage? 
Often evidence in-country 
must be generated in 
addition to external 
evidence. This question aims 
to understand what, if any 
in-country evidence gaps 
exist that would preclude 
uptake of CF at scale. 
 
Conclusion (to be read to the participant) 
I have reached the end of my questions.  Is there anything you would like to ask me? (Answer 
any questions the informant has and then thank him/her for his/her time.) 
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APPENDIX 4: DRAFT STUDY SUMMARY TO SHARE WITH STAKEHOLDERS 
 
Introduction 
Between 2000 and 2010, Cambodia’s national stunting prevalence among children under 5 was 
nearly 40%, with some provinces reaching 50% (24, 25, 27). As recently as 2014, more than 
one-third of children were stunted (26). This means Cambodia has had one of the highest 
proportions of chronically malnourished children in the East Asia and Pacific region (11). This is 
of concern because stunted children suffer irremediable damage both physically and mentally. 
Stunting also has economic consequences for affected countries, as illustrated by Cambodia, 
where malnutrition costs more than $400 million or 2.5% of the gross domestic product (GDP) 
annually (15).  
The reasons why young child stunting is such a significant problem in Cambodia can be 
understood using three aspects of suboptimal complementary feeding from WHO’s Guiding 
Principles for Complementary Feeding of the Breastfed Child (45):  
1. Poor Quality and Frequency of Foods: Diet diversity remains a gap in Cambodia. In 
2010, although 70% of children were fed the minimum number of times, only 37% had 
been fed foods from the minimum number of food groups for their age (27). In 2010, 
only 24% of children 6-23 months old met the minimum standard for all three IYCF 
practices—number of food groups consumed, number of times a child is fed, and 
consumption of breastmilk or a milk product (27). Although in 2014 this figure increased 
to 30%, at least two-thirds of Cambodian children still do not receive an adequate diet at 
the right frequency (26).  
2. Inadequate Practices: In Cambodia, although exclusive breastfeeding is relatively high 
for children less than 6 months, the proportion drops dramatically by 4-5 months, 
suggesting that complementary foods are being introduced too early (26). Further, 
although sugary foods are nutrient poor and may decrease a child’s appetite for more 
nutritious foods, mixed feeding of sweetened condensed milk, sugary drinks, chips, and 
other snack food is common (50, 51). Bottle-feeding, often with sweetened condensed 
milk instead of breastmilk or formula, is also on the rise (50). The proportion of children 
6-23 months of age being bottle-fed more than doubled from 2005 to 2010 (27). Further, 
despite the importance of responsive feeding, young Cambodian children are frequently 
left to eat on their own (50). 
3. Food and Water Safety: In addition to nutrition actions, complementary feeding also 
requires a set of essential hygiene actions, such as safely preparing and storing food, and 
washing hands before food preparation and/or feeding the child. Yet, hygiene and 
sanitation are severe problems, with more than 70% of Cambodian households lacking 
improved sanitary facilities (30). The majority (56.7%) of the population, both urban and 
rural, also report open defecation (27). This situation likely contributes to diarrheal 
disease among children less than 5 years of age, the highest rates of which are in the 6-23 
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month-old age range (26.4% of 6-11 month olds and 21.1 of 12-23 month olds, compared 
to 14.2% of children less than 6 months old and 13.7% of 23-35 month olds, the next 
highest categories) (27).  
The 2008 Lancet nutrition series estimated that existing nutrition interventions implemented at 
scale in the 36 highest burden countries could reduce child stunting at 36 months by 1/3 (7). 
These existing effective interventions target children during the “window of opportunity”—the 
1,000 days from conception to age 2. Because rapid increases in stunting occur from 6 to 23 
months, it is particularly important to identify the interventions that target children during this 
portion of the 1,000 days. One approach entails optimizing complementary feeding, which 
requires education, strategic behavior change communications (SBCC), counseling, food 
provision (in food insecure areas), and micronutrient supplementation strategies (3, 55).  
Applying the evidence base at scale is aligned with the Paris and Accra Declarations, which urge 
countries to draw on international best practice while ensuring country ownership and relevance 
(21). Thus, it is important to address stunting through known interventions delivered through 
existing delivery platforms. However, a recent review of scaling-up nutrition shows that there is 
an understanding of what must be done but not an understanding of how to scale up the right mix 
of interventions for each country context and to integrate nutrition-specific and nutrition-
sensitive interventions (62). Much of the evidence is drawn from efficacy trials rather than 
effectiveness studies conducted in defined geographic areas and at relatively small scale (3, 7, 
59, 63). There is a vital need to understand and address the intersecting factors hindering an 
effective response at scale: how to generate political and resource commitment; how to create 
effective multisectoral, multi-stakeholder and multilevel governance; how to overcome 
conflicting ideas about the best approaches to affect change; and how to fill gaps in evidence at 
sufficient scale to address the severity and magnitude of the problem (57, 62, 64). 
The Study 
To support an improved nutrition response in Cambodia, one that applies the evidence base at 
scale, this study sought to answer two research questions:  
1) How favorable are current conditions in Cambodia for scaling-up evidence-based 
complementary feeding policies and programs to reduce child stunting? These conditions 
include political commitment, policy frameworks and their implementation, technical 
capacity, financial resources and investments, multisectoral intervention coordination, 
national coordination and communication structures, and the evidence, information, and 
research available to inform and monitor the response; and  
2) What strategies could be employed to create more favorable conditions? 
Two methods were employed, document review and key informant interviews. Interviews were 
conducted using a question guide along with two card exercises, one to rank barriers to progress 
and another to sort strategies for improving complementary feeding into priority piles.  
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Study participants were drawn from two national working groups related to nutrition: the 
Nutrition Working Group (NWG) and the Technical Working Group for Social Protection and 
Food Security and Nutrition (31) (31). The NWG is housed within the National Nutrition 
Program of the National Maternal and Child Health Center (NMCHC) in the Ministry of Health 
(MoH). It is a government-led group. The TWG-SP&FSN is chaired by the Council for 
Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD), a government coordinating body, and co-
facilitated by the WFP and FAO. Participants were divided into one of three categories: 
government, funder, or civil society.  
Results: Participants’ Perceptions of Current Conditions 
Overall, participants’ perceived that Cambodia faces many challenges in its willingness, 
readiness, and ability to address young child chronic malnutrition at scale. Except for the positive 
assessment of the current policy frameworks, study participants perceived barriers to progress 
among these domains: political commitment; recognition of the problem; policy implementation 
(intervention coordination, technical capacity to address the problem, and funding); coordination 
and communication; and information, evidence, and research.  
Recognition of the problem 
All participants knew the stunting 
prevalence in Cambodia and recognized 
it as a problem. But, recognition of the 
problem of young child stunting was to 
be lacking among policy makers and the 
general public. The majority of 
participants agreed that sub-optimal 
feeding practices are the primary cause 
of chronic malnutrition among young children, but that complementary feeding was not well 
understood by all who need to understand it, and that there has been limited prioritization of 
actions to address it.  
Political commitment 
Primarily civil society and funders said political 
commitment was lacking in Cambodia, though some 
government officials also identified this as a gap. The 
lack of political commitment was said to be because the 
government has not backed up its expressions of 
commitment with budget or action, and because nutrition 
has not received the attention given to other issues, such 
as HIV/AIDS.  
  
The quality of the diets—the kinds of foods and 
minimum dietary diversity, and the minimum number of 
times kids are fed are all very bad in Cambodia. There’s 
also a big emphasis on young children being able to 
take care of themselves, so the idea of responsive and 
active feeding isn’t taught or what’s expected. In fact, 
it’s almost a good thing if your child eats by himself. 
That means it’s a good child, a smart child.  
—Civil Society 
The government is always saying 
nutrition is very important. So if it's 
very important what do they do to 
address this issue? [The Prime 
Minister] should not only talk nicely, 
but translate the work into practice.  
—RGC 
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Priorities for action 
Four strategies emerged as top priorities among all 
participants―water and sanitation; breastfeeding 
maintenance; SBCC/mass media; and 
counseling/support for essential nutrition, hygiene and 
sanitation actions. However, funders and/or civil 
society disagreed with a number of government 
priorities. Two of these priorities (food preparation 
demonstrations and home gardening) were rejected by 
the majority of participants even though one of them: 
home gardening, was also prioritized by civil society. Concerns were also raised about three 
other approaches on the government’s priority list—micronutrient supplementation, food safety, 
and food fortification (fortified food was also on the priority list of funders and civil society).   
From the analysis of participants’ explanations of how they selected or rejected priorities, three 
criteria were identified: evidence of effectiveness (either existing evidence or a lack of evidence), 
an existing platform on which to build, and relevant only for select populations. 
Policy frameworks  
The majority of participants’ reported that an abundance of 
policy frameworks exist in Cambodia and highlighted that this 
has been a major focus of efforts. A few participants had 
favorable views of the relevance and utility of some frameworks 
(e.g., Sub-decree 133). Others were considered inadequate, either because they were not 
developed by the nutrition community as a whole, or were not enforced, or did not address real 
needs, or were unfeasible to implement.   
Policy implementation 
Despite the existence of many policy 
frameworks in Cambodia, participants 
concurred that implementation and 
enforcement was a major gap. This was said 
to be due to a lack of political commitment or 
funding, a lack of awareness, or a lack of 
follow-up. Funding, intervention coordination, and technical capacity are all needed to 
implement policy frameworks, yet these also were considered insufficient in Cambodia.  
Funding: The majority of participants considered the lack of funding to be a major barrier to 
progress in addressing young child chronic malnutrition at scale. This lack of funding was not 
only a true lack of dollars, but also a misalignment between donor and government priorities, and 
funds being spent on non-priorities or on efforts unknown to be effective. Also of concern was 
Even in the Nutrition Fast Track it was 
incredibly difficult, and in the end 
there wasn’t particular prioritization. 
It’s better than it had been; there are 
some things they want to see happen. 
But for some reason, even more in 
nutrition than other things in 
Cambodia where prioritization is 
really difficult, it’s really difficult here.  
—Civil Society 
We are making policy. We 
have all the policies. 
—RGC 
The issue with lack of policies comes down to 
lack of implementation. Policies and strategies 
are out there, but there's no funding to do it, 
people aren't coordinating to do it, there's not the 
technical expertise to lead on it. So they just sit 
there, not utilized.  
– Civil Society 
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the lack of sustainability of nutrition programming in Cambodia without ongoing donor 
investment.  
 
Intervention coordination: Civil society in particular raised concerns about the lack of on-the-
ground coordination. The numerous organizations 
working in the nutrition sector were seen as tripping over 
one another while leaving parts of the country untouched. 
The lack of sub-national coordination mechanisms was 
also highlighted as a gap hindering coordination and 
effective and efficient implementation. 
 
Technical capacity: Technical capacity was viewed as lacking, 
particularly by government officials, and many participants 
agreed that Cambodia does not yet have a cadre of nutritionists. 
According to the majority of participants, there is insufficient 
technical capacity within both the health and non-health sector. 
This view was held by all participant groups, but was considered 
particularly unfavorable by government both from the health and 
non-health sectors, then civil society, and then funders.  
 
Coordination and communication structures and processes 
Despite the existence of coordination 
mechanisms, participants were nearly 
unanimous in their view that coordination of the 
nutrition sector in Cambodia was happening, 
but not as much as needed. Of particular 
concern was the lack of strategic agendas 
guiding meetings, inclusive processes, and use 
of sessions toward achievement of agreed to 
work plans and goals. There were a number of 
reasons given, including the government’s 
structure and hierarchy, and how one manages 
debate and builds consensus in the Cambodian 
I want our partners to implement or support something we think is a gap, or to follow the policy or strategy. But they 
do not listen. They do what they want or what their proposal says even though it does not fit with what we want.  
—RGC 
The government committed to develop the national strategy for five years, but until now we do not see how much budget 
they contribute. For most of  the activity, the government relies on the donor. 
—Funder 
I think as a community we have enough funds, we just don't always do the right things with it.   
—Funder 
…the responsibilities are so cut up that I don’t 
blame them for not being coordinated, for not being 
able to effectively address one issue. It is a much 
divided government structure.  
—Funder 
People sometime don't want to be coordinated. This 
is not only government people, but the DPs 
{development partners} as well. It depends on the 
individual, rather than the institution. Some people 
have their own agenda probably because they're 
here for a short time and have specific work to do. 
—Funder 
 
 
We have many programs and projects 
supported by our development partners or bi-
laterals, but they work separately; they have 
their own perspective, even in UN. 
—RGC 
It’s still new to us. We are still 
in the learning stage. 
—RGC 
People know that nutrition is a 
big issue. They know, but they 
don't know how to put together 
an effort to respond to it. 
—RGC 
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context. Participants also shared their perspectives on members of the nutrition community with 
the greatest influence, and the reasons for this, such as the historical influence of the UN dating 
to post-Khmer Rouge reconstruction. Although the nutrition sector has numerous government, 
funders, and civil society actors involved, government officials in particular identified other 
government, such as MOWA, as missing from the dialogue. Finally, participants, mostly civil 
society, expressed that some dissonance in the community exists, primarily related to technical 
matters or competing priorities. 
Information, evidence, and research 
Effectively addressing young child chronic 
malnutrition requires sufficient data be available 
and used for decision making. According to the 
majority of participants, this is not the current 
situation in Cambodia. Rather, appropriate 
investments cannot be made because the 
nutrition community does not know how to 
implement the global evidence in country. In 
addition, participants reported collected data are 
not routinely used, and outcome data are not 
routinely collected. Those outcome-related data 
that are collected are collected too infrequently 
to inform current decision making. Further, Cambodia does not currently have a fully 
functioning HMIS system, nor the required M&E capacity.  
Results: Participants’ Perceptions of How to Improve Conditions 
Participants identified strategies for addressing the identified barriers to progress Cambodia. In 
general, these strategies were not specific to complementary feeding, but rather focused on 
addressing nutrition more broadly. Six actions were recommended by most: 
7. Frame the issue for both policy makers and the general public using an economic 
argument and keep messages simple, repeat them, and use multiple channels to 
disseminate them. 
8. Engage key government bodies—MoH, MAFF, MRD, MoP, MIF, MOWA, MEYS, and 
parliament—in the nutrition response, building on their distinct roles and capacities. 
9. Identify national and local level individuals who can champion a multisectoral nutrition 
response. 
10. Develop select, new policies, such as a Multisectoral Nutrition Action Plan with an M&E 
framework, to further support the nutrition response. 
11. Strengthen national and sub-national coordination by improving the effectiveness of 
working group mechanisms through the use of strategic agendas, and an agreed set of 
…if we want to know about our intervention, 
where it is and if what we have done is 
successful, we don't have the information.  
—RGC 
People having different M&E frameworks, so 
everything is in people's own silo.  
—Civil Society 
Data we get from the CDHS is not available 
regularly. Right now we wait every five years. 
Between those five years we don't know how 
our implementation goes.  
—RGC 
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core tasks that are monitored. Further, recognize and utilize MoI’s local structures and 
the Office of the Governor at the sub-national level and decentralize planning and 
management of nutrition services to the commune level to enhance intervention 
coordination, effective management, and budget allocation. 
12. Produce the information and evidence needed to inform and monitor the response. 
Recommendations 
Since March 31, 2015, the end of this study’s data collection period, Cambodia has continued to 
demonstrate its commitment to addressing malnutrition. This can be seen by the development of 
the terms of reference for the oversight board and implementation guidelines for Sub-Decree 
133, the national code on the marketing of breastmilk substitutes, and by Cambodia signing-on to 
the Zero Hunger Challenge. Despite these steps, until Cambodia addresses the sociopolitical 
barriers that have hindered greater success, in particular, the lack of policy community cohesion 
and clarity of focus, it will be difficult for the country to achieve sufficient scale and coverage of 
an effective nutrition response.  
As seen in Cambodia, and similar to other contexts, successful country-level efforts require 
sustained political commitment, sufficient financial resources, strong multisectoral, multi-
stakeholder and multi-level governance, and technical, managerial, and implementation capacity 
(57). For an effective multisectoral nutrition response, consensus on how to make decisions as 
well as on the decisions themselves is needed (62). SUN also highlights the importance of 
country-owned and directed nutrition responses, requiring that all partners—donors, the UN, and 
NGOs, align behind the government’s priorities (19). Doing so requires such actors to step 
beyond their organizational mandates and personal interests to collaboratively build Cambodia’s 
capacity to lead its own response. With this capacity to lead, and with a strong guiding national 
institution, Cambodia can effectively utilize external technical and financial assistance to define 
priorities, champion the cause, and frame and communicate the issue to demonstrably to reduce 
malnutrition.  
Using a framework developed by Shiffman (73), actions needed for creating greater policy 
community cohesion and, ultimately, for having a strong, nationally-led nutrition response at 
scale in Cambodia are outlined in the table. 
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Table. Proposed Plan for Change: Creating Policy Community Cohesion 
 
 
Change Factor  Recommended Actions Measures of Success 
Identify leaders 
at two levels: 1) 
mid-level 
strategic 
allies/policy 
entrepreneurs; 
and 2) 
champions at 
high level 
 Determine the key attributes of effective 
leadership in Cambodia 
 Identify strategic allies/policy entrepreneurs 
and champions per key constituency: political 
structures (i.e., parliament); technicians (line 
ministries); budgetary decision makers 
(MoEF); and civil society 
 Generate donor interest in funding leadership 
capacity building 
Individuals per constituency 
meeting criteria and willing to 
serve as champions and policy 
entrepreneurs identified; Donor 
funds committed to leadership 
capacity building 
Strengthen 
national 
governance 
 Determine capacities needed in Cambodia 
 Strengthen guiding institution’s advocacy, 
leadership, consensus building capacity (and 
that of identified champions) 
 Revise and utilize the Food Security and 
Nutrition Training program to build strategic 
capacity  
 Strengthen effectiveness of formal coordination 
mechanism 
Guiding institution and identified 
champions’ advocacy and 
leadership capacity strengthened; 
Coordination mechanisms 
routinely meeting and allowing 
widespread participation; Current 
FSN training curriculum revised 
to reflect governance 
strengthening goals 
Create an 
internal frame 
Build connections and consensus within and 
across each group—government, funders, and 
civil society on 1) decision-making process; and 
2) the definition, causes and solutions to the 
problem  
An agreed to frame for decision-
making and for nutrition; 
Strengthened social capital within 
and across nutrition sector 
stakeholder groups 
Identify policy 
windows 
Identify upcoming policy windows of 
opportunity to rally all donors around a common 
agenda (e.g., SDGs, revision of COMBI) 
Policy windows identified and 
utilized to build consensus and 
communicate the frame 
Create and 
communicate an 
external frame 
 Determine appropriate framing for key 
constituencies by conducting Opinion Leader 
Research 
 Create and communicate the frame, 
highlighting the problem, the solution, and who 
must do what, when 
Develop and convey overarching 
message and sub-messages and 
create opportunities to convey 
them to budget holders at national 
and sub-national levels 
Gather strategic 
information  
 Review existing evidence and create research 
and evaluation plan to fill gaps 
 Add questions to existing evaluations (e.g., 
NOURISH) 
 Pilot nutrition surveillance study  
 Create maps that overlay data with activity  
 Update national data profile; develop for 
provinces (used to plan and to 
communicate/frame) 
Literature review produced; 
Research and evaluation plan 
developed; Nutrition Surveillance 
Survey piloted in one province; 
Maps produced and used to plan, 
identify priority geographies, and 
monitor progress; National and 
provincial profiles produced 
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